

Article

Carbon Capital's Political Reach: A Network Analysis Of Federal Lobbying By The Fossil Fuel Industry From Harper To Trudeau

Nicolas Graham

Department of Sociology, University of Victoria – Email address: njgraham@uvic.ca

William K. Carroll

Department of Sociology, University of Victoria – Email address: wcarroll@uvic.ca

David Chen

Department of Sociology, University of Victoria – Email address: davidchen@uvic.ca

Abstract

This paper provides a network analysis of federal lobbying in Canada by the fossil fuel industry and compares lobbying across the Harper Conservative and Trudeau Liberal administrations. The network we uncover amounts to a small world of intense interaction among relatively few lobbyists/firms and public officials in select centres of state power. Under Trudeau we find that the majority of lobbying is carried out by the same large firms as under Harper, while lobbying has become trained on fewer state agencies. We consider lobbying to be an important channel through which the fossil fuel sector shapes government policy.

Résumé:

Ce document établit une analyse de réseau du lobbysme fédéral au Canada par l'industrie des combustibles fossiles et compare le lobbysme au sein des gouvernements conservateur de Harper et libéral de Trudeau. Le réseau que nous découvrons constitue un petit monde d'interactions étroites entre un nombre relativement restreint de lobbyistes/entreprises et de fonctionnaires dans certains centres de pouvoir de l'État. Sous Trudeau, nous constatons que la majorité des activités de lobbysme sont exercées par les mêmes grandes entreprises que sous Harper, tandis que le lobbysme s'est concentré sur un nombre plus restreint d'agences d'État. Nous considérons que le lobbysme est un canal important par lequel le secteur des combustibles fossiles façonne la politique gouvernementale.

Keywords: Lobbying, Oil and Gas, Social Networks, Corporate Power, Environmental Governance, Climate Change

Mots-clés: lobbysme, hydrocarbures, réseaux sociaux, pouvoir des entreprises, gouvernance en matière d'environnement, changement climatique

Introduction¹

One of the most direct ways that corporations reach into political society is through lobbying. By lobbying government officials, corporations and their affiliated trade associations work to forge and maintain close relationships with public office holders and advance corporate interests by influencing the policy planning process. This paper provides a comprehensive network analysis of federal lobbying in Canada by one important sector of corporate capital – the fossil fuel industry. We examine lobbying by oil, gas, and coal corporations and their industry associations over a seven-year period from January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018. This time period enables a comparative analysis of lobbying under the Harper Conservatives

(from January 2011 to November 2015) and the Trudeau Liberals (from November 2015 to January 2018). Our study therefore analyses the political strategies and reach of carbon capital² in Canada across two successive administrations.

Over the seven-year period, we find 11,452 lobbying contacts with government officials. This amounts to just over six contacts per working day. Within the fossil fuel sector, lobbying is, moreover, dominated by a handful of corporations and industry associations. These organizations, which control much of the economic sector, maintain a steady presence in the halls of government and exert continual pressure on (or work in tandem with) key public officials in their efforts to advance their interests. While there is a high degree of continuity in the lobby network, we observe some changes in lobbying patterns across the two administrations. Among them is the diminished role of Members of Parliament as a focal governmental target under Trudeau and the growing significance of senior public servants and midlevel staff. This points to the targeting of key decision-makers and state actors that remained after the 2015 change of government.

Our study begins with a discussion of recent fossil fuel development in Canada and its challenges, followed by a brief overview of governmental policy frameworks surrounding carbon extractive development during the years covered in the study. We then analyze the data, starting with a focus on the two ends of the ‘lobbying chain’³ – the fossil fuel firms (and industry associations) and their state targets. We consider how this chain has evolved over time while also comparing lobbying carried out by ENGOS and non-fossil fuel industry associations.⁴ Next, through a network analysis, we provide a comprehensive mapping of lobbying relations between fossil-capital organizations, their registered lobbyists, the targeted public office holders, and the state institutions they represent.

Canada’s oil and gas boom

The scientific consensus holds that to remain within 1.5 to 2 degrees of warming and thus avoid catastrophic climate change, a rapid shift away from fossil fuels is required within the next two decades. However, in the same period during which the climate crisis has become an urgent threat, the Canadian economy has come to be focused significantly around carbon extractive development. Indeed, the boom in unconventional fossil fuels – especially bitumen from the Alberta tar sands, along with fracked shale gas and offshore oil and gas⁵ – has precipitated changes to the structure and composition of the Canadian economy, steadily elevating the importance of hydrocarbon resource extraction as a core industry (Carroll, 2017; MacNeil, 2014). By 2010, Alberta had eclipsed Ontario as the province with the largest share of the nation’s capital stock and by 2013 mining and oil and gas extraction claimed the largest share of that capital stock (21.73%) (McCormack et al., 2015). In early 2014, at the peak of the oil boom, the extractive sector accounted for nearly 25% of private investment, up from less than 5% in the early 1990s (Pineault, 2018).

Recent political economy and political ecology approaches have raised concerns regarding the long-run political-economic implications and path dependencies associated with fossil fuel development (Adkin, 2016b; Carter, 2014; Carter and Zalik, 2016; Nikiforuk, 2010). Drawing from work on ‘rentierism’ and staples theory, heavy reliance on hydrocarbon exports is argued to pose a series of economic challenges, often producing a ‘resource curse,’ or a ‘staples trap’ (Haley, 2014; Pineault, 2014; Shrivastava, 2015; Watkins, 2006). The literature finds that reliance on oil exports often leads to revenue

unpredictability while also undermining efforts to diversify the economy's productive base (Laxer, 2015). Importantly, fossil fuel production is highly capital-intensive, meaning that employment in the sector is slight in relation to other industrial sectors and relative to output and emissions (Albo and Yap, 2016).

Structural dependence on fossil fuel revenues (combined with distinctive political-institutional configurations and policies⁶) has also been found to produce negative political impacts. In the Alberta context, research points to a cumulative deterioration of the link between the state and citizens, as oil rents release the state from reliance on tax revenue, contributing to its privileging of corporate interests over democracy and environmental sustainability (Adkin, 2016a; Carter and Zalik, 2016; Shrivastava, 2015). A resource-extractive economy driven by short-term profit-making produces frequent clashes with First Nations' rights, title, and sovereignty (Stendie and Adkin, 2016; Coulthard, 2014; Manno et al., 2014; Thomas-Muller, 2014) while First Nations and other communities in extractive zones and downstream continue to suffer often devastating environmental effects from fossil fuel development (Flanagan and Grant, 2013; Grant et al., 2013).

States or regions suffering from a resource curse may also experience a 'carbon trap' or policy deterioration due to the "institutional molding effects" of oil revenue dependency (Carter, 2014, 26).⁷ Here government reliance on oil rents is argued to obstruct progress on carbon emissions reduction and environmentally progressive policies, making future climate adaptation all the more difficult (Adkin, 2016b; Carter, 2014; Carter and Zalik, 2016; Nikiforuk, 2010).

Work examining the political inertia that characterizes fossil fuel dependent economies is complemented by recent literature that combines the sociology of corporate power with the political economy and ecology of fossil capital (Carroll et al., 2018a; Adkin et al., 2017; Carroll, 2017; Carter and Zalik, 2016; Graham, 2017). This research demonstrates that where carbon extraction comprises a leading sector, corporate power invests deeply in maintaining conditions for the accumulation of fossil capital.

Studies have traced the reach of carbon-capital into political and civil society at regional, national, and international scales. The power of the sector reaches into civil society, as carbon-capital fractions and their allies participate in the governance and funding of organizations such as policy-planning groups, think-tanks, media outlets (Bonds, 2016; Brulle, 2013; Elsner and Kasper, 2015; Carroll et al., 2018a), as well as research institutes and universities (Adkin and Stares 2016; Carroll et al., 2018b; Gustafson, 2012). In the political field, a growing body of research has focused on corporate lobbying (Carter, 2016; Elsner and Kasper, 2015; Graham, 2017; Graham et al., 2017; Klein, 2014), as well as political party donations (Graham, 2017; Graham et al., 2017), and 'revolving door' relations or close personal ties between the corporate community and the state apparatus (Apeldoorn and Graaff, 2012; de Graaff, 2012; de Graaff and Apeldoorn, 2017; Taft, 2017).

We draw from this research while focusing on one important vector of influence – political lobbying at the federal level in Canada. Our examination of lobbying over a seven year-period from January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018 affords a close comparison of the latter years of the Harper and early years of the Trudeau administrations.

Canadian fossil capitalism and government policy: Harper and Trudeau administrations

Former Prime Minister Stephen Harper was forthright in linking Canada's prosperity to its emergence as an "energy superpower" (Fekete, 2012). Under his administration, we subsequently witnessed a spate of new federal regulatory rollbacks and the formation of policy frameworks aimed at facilitating oil and gas development and other resource extraction (Carter, 2014; Gibson, 2012; MacNeil, 2014). Most notably, amendments in 2012 to the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act eliminated much of the core of federal-level environmental assessment in Canada (Gibson, 2012). In practice, the changes have meant that approximately 90% of major industrial projects that would previously have undergone federal environmental review no longer do (Johnston, 2015). In the case of large pipelines and energy infrastructure projects, which cross provincial and international borders, the 2012 changes transferred responsibility for environmental assessments from the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA) to the National Energy Board (NEB), which must also conduct its own "national interest" assessment.

The election of the Trudeau Liberals in 2015 appeared to portend a more circumspect approach to carbon extractive development, including the likelihood of tougher environmental regulations on industry and a serious commitment to achieving climate targets. During the 2015 election campaign, the Liberals promised to "modernize" the NEB and the environmental regulatory process as a whole, in order to restore credibility to the review process (see Tasker, 2016). Along with changes to environmental reviews, Trudeau actively campaigned on a shift away from the Harper government's model of consultation with First Nations surrounding resource development. After years of federal Conservative inaction on the file, the federal government pledged to adhere to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which requires free, prior, and informed consent for large-scale industrial projects (See Wilt, 2017).

The ratification of the Paris Agreement in 2016 appeared to confirm this change of direction on climate policy as Canada committed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 30% below 2005 levels by 2030. Yet Federal policy continues to move away from the commitments made in Paris (Hughes, 2016, 2018; Lee, 2017) while Indigenous rights, title and sovereignty are disregarded in favour of fossil-fuel development. Trudeau's 2016 Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change offers a policy of slow domestic and market-based energy transition, to be funded by expanding capacity for bitumen production and transport in the medium term, alongside the taxation of those same resources when used domestically. Within this framework, the government has approved and actively championed new pipelines, such as the Trans Mountain Expansion Project (TMX), despite lacking consent by affected Indigenous communities and clear evidence that the pipeline is at odds with Canada's commitment to lower its greenhouse gas emissions.

Lobbying is an important means of corporate political influence and we argue that the strategic, organized, and sustained lobbying efforts of the fossil fuel sector help to explain the close coupling of federal policy to the needs of extractive corporations. Before moving to our findings, in the next section we provide a brief review of literature on the lobbying process.

Lobbying: what it is, what it seeks to accomplish, who does it and when?

In broad terms, the goal of lobbying by private firms is to promote policies that increase the potential for making profit while blocking policies and regulations that impede an organization's interests. The federal *Lobbying Act* in Canada defines lobbying as "communicating, with public office holders, for payment with regard to: the making, developing or amending of federal legislative proposals, bills or resolutions, regulations, policies or programs; the awarding of federal grants, contributions or other financial benefits; and the awarding of a federal government contract" (Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada).

As this description suggests, lobbying may be trained on narrow and immediate pursuits, such as obtaining government grants, licences, and access to resources. Through lobbying, firms provide governments with updates on their activities while simultaneously conveying preferences, commitments and threats, or some combination thereof (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014). Lobbying is also aimed at shaping and influencing the policy planning process and this involves a host of sophisticated techniques and strategies. As Brulle (2018) suggests, lobbyists and lobbying firms engage in extensive monitoring activities surrounding both minor regulatory changes and broad policy issues. They subsequently provide state officials with information, statistics, forecasts, background materials, as well as policy briefs and reports, in an effort to advance their interests surrounding policy.

In this process, influencing and controlling a decision maker's *perceptions* of an issue is central. Indeed, as Drutman (2015) argues, to influence the decision-making process, lobbyists aim not only to transfer information on a given regulatory process or policy issue, but endeavor more broadly to 'saturate' the intellectual environment, to overwhelm policy makers with information and argumentation on one-side of an issue, while 'framing out' competing or alternative conceptions. Along with efforts to control the understanding of an issue through the dissemination of information, lobbyists seek to simultaneously construct stable and long-term relationships with decision-makers through repeated interaction and communication (Ibid). Lobbyists therefore work to be viewed as principle stakeholders and as reliable experts, whose knowledge and expertise is trusted and whose arguments and frames ultimately come to mind more quickly than others when it comes time to construct policy or make a decision.

It is difficult to establish the effectiveness or direct 'payoffs' of lobbying. Recent broad level and comparative studies have shown, however, that greater levels of lobbying lead to lower taxation rates (Richter et al., 2009), relaxed regulatory oversight (Stigler, 1971), reduced environmental regulations (Delmas et al., 2016), increased likelihood of government bailouts (Blau et al., 2013; Faccio et al., 2006), more government contracts (Goldman et al., 2013) and higher overall financial performance (Chen et al., 2015) for the lobbying firms. In addition to these indicators, numerous US based studies (where lobbying expenditures data are available) have documented the high levels of corporate spending on lobbying (Baron, 2012; de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014), including in the area of climate policy (Brulle, 2018; Delmas et al., 2016). This is a further indication that corporations see lobbying as a valuable component of their overall accumulation strategies.

In terms of who lobbies, US-based evidence shows that corporations and their affiliated industry associations contribute the vast majority. Their lobbying efforts are found to consistently dwarf those of public interest groups and unions in terms of both expenditures

(Brulle, 2018; de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014) and overall lobbying contacts (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014). The bulk of corporate lobbying is carried out by large firms and industries with high levels of corporate concentration (Chen et al., 2015). Some research on the Canadian case has found similar patterns (Graham et al., 2017). Authors have suggested various reasons for the predominance of large firms in corporate lobbying: large firms have the capital and resources to do so; they may have greater access to politicians to influence policy, or they have the political power to influence outcomes (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014; Hill et al., 2013).

Cronin (2017) has analyzed lobbying by the US Business Roundtable from a social network perspective. As he argues, policy planning organizations such as the Roundtable, which brings together executives of leading US corporations, play an important role in integrating different fractions of capital, helping to facilitate class cohesion. This enables the development of shared visions and strategies, facilitating the exercise of organized corporate power over political-decision making and public policy, especially through lobbying. Moreover, Cronin suggests the Roundtable itself forms an important component of a wider 'business advocacy network.' In contrast to the pluralist perspective, in which lobbying is pursued by a multitude of firms (and organizations) with diffuse and competing interests, Cronin sees corporate lobbying as a networked or joint representational activity involving a certain division of labour among firms with broad shared (business) interests.

Comprehensive research into lobbying by the fossil fuel sector at the federal level in Canada has been carried out by Cayley-Daoust and Girard in their *Big Oil's Oily Grasp* (2012). Examining lobbying from the industry from 2008-2012 (October), they find that 35 corporations and industry associations logged over 2,700 lobbying contacts, while just ten organizations accounted for nearly 75 percent of that total. Cayley-Daoust and Girard also report both a steady increase in rates of lobbying by the fossil fuel industry over that period and an especially sharp rise in 2010 and 2011. The six most active lobbyists (the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, TransCanada, Imperial Oil, the Canadian Energy Pipeline Association, Enbridge, and Suncor) in this period together more than doubled their communications with government officials between these two years. As the authors suggest, the start of this decade marked an important turning point in public debate over energy development, Indigenous sovereignty, and climate change. In 2010, for example, coastal First Nations declared a ban on supertankers in waters off BC's northern coast and that year Enbridge applied to build the Northern Gateway pipeline from the Alberta tar sands to the BC coast while the NEB approved TransCanada's application for Keystone XL.

Our research takes off from where Cayley-Daoust and Girard's ends. We track lobbying events from January 2011 to January 2018, but we also map those events as a field or network, linking the carbon extractive sector to federal institutions. We begin by providing an overview of the seven year-period, including a comparative analysis of the Harper and Trudeau years, with a consideration of how overall lobbying patterns and strategies have evolved with the change in political administrations. The data are analysed across three main domains: 1) The *contacts* by fossil fuel corporations or industry associations; 2) the *designated public office holders* (DPOHs) being lobbied and their position in the state; and 3) the *governmental institutions* being lobbied. Having identified the industry organizations, state personnel and institutional targets that comprise the field of lobbying at the federal level, we then present a network analysis that integrates these three domains.

Sample and data

Under the current federal Lobbying Act, which was brought into force in 2008, companies and organizations are required to register with the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada if they engage in any of a wide range of lobbying activity, including both written and oral communication. Companies and organizations employ either ‘in-house lobbyists’ (a lobbyist directly employed by the firm seeking to influence government) or ‘consultant lobbyists’ (lobbyists employed by a third-party agency or firm, hired by the company or organization to lobby on its behalf) or both. The majority of lobbying by the fossil fuel sector is carried out by in-house lobbyists. Lobbyists (both in house and consultant) must submit monthly filings that report the types of communication they engaged in, the subjects discussed, and officials or ‘designated public office holders’ (DPOHs) being lobbied, including their ministries and position in the state.⁸

Despite recent reforms and improvements, various deficiencies in the Lobbying Act impede transparency and limit our analysis. One important limitation is that the Act does not require that the names of in-house lobbyists who participated in a communication with a designated public office holder be disclosed. Instead, the name of the most senior paid officer who is responsible for filing a return for a corporation or organization (the Registrant) is recorded, whether that person participated in a meeting/communication or not. As a result, it is not possible to determine which lobbyist(s) were involved in each meeting, or whether the Registrant (the senior officer, typically a chief executive) was present. This limits our ability to track lobbyists and their relationships with DPOHs. A further conspicuous drawback is the data’s heterogeneity and, to some extent, its poor organization. Problems, such as misspelling of public office holder names, reversed first and last names, disjunction of names and position titles or even fake names, are not uncommon, and therefore significant editing of the data was required.

To track lobbying by the fossil-fuel sector, we began with 260 organizations: the 239 fossil fuel companies based in Canada with 2014 assets of at least \$50 million and 21 carbon-sector industry associations. Of these, 32 companies and 14 industry associations were found in the Registry. The data encompass a seven year-period from January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018. To enable a comparative analysis across the Harper and Trudeau administrations, the data are divided into two parts, corresponding to the two administrations, with the cutpoint set at 4 November 2015, when the Trudeau regime took office.

Findings

Top fossil fuel corporations and industry associations

Considering the fossil fuel industry in Canada as a whole, we find 11,452 lobbying contacts with government officials over the seven-year period.⁹ This amounts to just over six contacts per working day. However, as seen in Table 1, lobbying is highly concentrated among large fossil fuel firms and major industry associations. The top 10 organizations account for 65% of that total number of contacts; the top 20 account for 88%; the remaining lobbying contacts are spread among 26 less active organizations. The leading lobbyists over period of the study, the Mining Association of Canada (MAC) and the Canadian Association of Petroleum


Producers (CAPP) contributed 1,596 and 1,268 contacts respectively, accounting for a quarter of the total.

Table 1: Lobbying Contacts of the Fossil Fuel Corporations and Industry Associations (January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018)

Organization	2011	2011_2012	2012_2013	2013_2014	2014_2015	2015_2016	2016_2017	2017_2018	Total
MAC	65	223	187	233	165	249	396	78	1596
CAPP	158	335	256	183	77	94	132	33	1268
Suncor	50	92	126	137	102	179	168	27	881
TransCanada	127	77	126	138	109	111	50	13	751
Can Gas Assn.	88	158	82	94	49	100	65	5	641
Enbridge	44	92	131	81	51	108	42	9	558
En. Pipeline Assn.	68	107	44	47	44	95	69	4	478
Teck Resources	58	79	72	55	42	95	59	6	466
Kinder Morgan	20	45	127	101	12	52	36	3	396
Encana	115	55	45	26	23	21	104	5	394
Other	345	709	638	548	400	761	480	142	4023
Total	1138	1972	1834	1643	1074	1865	1601	325	11452

In examining the entire seven-year period, we find some minor shifts in overall lobbying patterns (visualized in Figure 1), but the main lobbyists for the most part appear at the top of the listing throughout. Certain organizations’ lobbying efforts ebbed and flowed; CAPP, for example, was the leading lobbyist three years in a row from January 4, 2011 to November 3, 2013. In the final year of Harper government and under Trudeau’s leadership it continued to play a central, but less dominant role, while the Mining Association of Canada emerged as the leading lobbyist.

Figure 1: Top Lobbying Organizations



See Appendix A for full names of abbreviated carbon organizations and federal institutions

We also found a substantial decline in lobbying in advance of the 2015 election. The finding may indicate a short-term and pragmatic lobbying strategy: in an election that was predicted to result in a change of government, lobbying contracted as firms saw less value in lobbying officials that might not remain within the state following the election. This decline, however, paralleled an augmented targeting of nonpartisan senior bureaucrats (and midlevel staff) – which will be explored in greater detail in the following section. Despite these shifts, we find a remarkable level of consistency in the fossil fuel lobby. Just a handful of corporations that control much of this economic sector, and key industry associations that represent them, accounted for the vast majority of the lobbying each year and maintained a consistent and steady presence in the halls of government.

Industry associations and sectoral comparisons

Central to the network of lobbyists are fossil fuel industry associations. Along with efforts to influence public opinion (through media relations, advertising, and other public relations efforts) (see Carroll et al., 2018), industry associations play a critical role in political policy and agenda setting (Stritch, 2007). They provide space for different interests within the broad carbon-capital sector to define issues of common importance and to organize strategies for advancing sectoral interests. They are able to mediate potential conflicts among carbon firms, allowing corporations to speak with a single voice.

There is no one industry association that represents the entire carbon-capital sector, although the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (whose remit includes natural gas) comes closest. As we saw in Table 1, CAPP is the second most prominent lobbyist in the network, recording 1,268 communications over the period of the study. CAPP has 36 registered ‘in-house’ lobbyists, the most of any fossil fuel organization. Its extensive network of lobbyists brings considerable information and tailored knowledge to the table.

The fifth most active lobbyist in the study is the Canadian Gas Association (CGA), which registered 641 lobbying contacts. The CGA is an industry association representing Canada’s natural gas distribution sector. Its members consist of natural gas distribution and transmission companies, equipment manufacturers and other service providers. Describing itself as “the voice of Canada’s natural gas distribution industry,” the CGA defines issues of common importance and develops strategies for advancing the interests of natural gas producers and transporters.

The Mining Association of Canada (MAC), which recorded an astounding 1,596 lobbying contacts over the seven-year period represents the mining sector in Canada, broadly conceived. Its members include non-fossil fuel metals mining and exploration corporations, such as Cameco, along with prominent fossil fuel firms. These include coal giant Teck and some of the largest bitumen mining corporations, such as Suncor, CNRL and Syncrude, as well as companies that are extensively involved in metals mining and oil and gas production, such as Sherritt International.¹⁰

In comparison to other industry groups, fossil fuel industry associations are far more active lobbyists. The Mining Association of Canada, CAPP and CGA together recorded 3,505 lobbying contacts. This is five times that of the most active forestry associations (Forest Products Association of Canada at 521 contacts, Coast Forest Products Association at 137, Canadian Association of Forest Owners at 27), more than six times that of automotive associations (Canadian Vehicle Manufacturer's Association at 262, Global Automakers of

Canada at 154 and the Canadian Automobile Dealers Association at 104), and over 25 times that of the two renewable energy industry association found in the lobbyists registry (the Canadian Wind Energy Association at 89 and the Canadian Solar Industries Association at 44).

ENGOS and lobbying

By way of further comparison, we consider the amount of lobbying by environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOS) – the groups most likely to oppose increased fossil fuel development. As expected, the amount of lobbying by ENGOS is much lower than that of fossil fuel corporations. A comprehensive search of the lobbyist registry revealed sixteen organizations that were active in lobbying during the time period of our study and which together contributed 2,399 lobbying contacts, or one fifth of that of the fossil fuel sector. The Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society at 628 lobbying contacts was the most active, followed by Environmental Defence Canada (234), the Pembina Institute (227), Nature Canada (218), Ducks Unlimited Canada (215) and the David Suzuki Foundation (205). 1,274 of the contacts took place under the Harper administration and 1,125 under Trudeau.

Officials being lobbied and their positions in the state

The second major domain we examine is comprised of designated public office holders (DPOH) lobbied by the fossil fuel sector and their positions in the state. We coded all the DPOH positions into six hierarchical and functional categories: the Privy Council, parliamentarian, top bureaucrat, senior public servant, midlevel staff, and junior staff.¹¹ As seen in Table 2, across the seven year-period, senior public servants (government staffers who are one level below the top bureaucrats, such as assistant deputy ministers, executive directors and chiefs of staff) were the most lobbied group. The midlevel staff group (which encompasses advisors, policy managers and directors), were the next most targeted, followed by ‘parliamentarians’ (Member of Parliament and Senators).

Position	2011	2011_2012	2012_2013	2013_2014	2014_2015	2015_2016	2016_2017	2017_2018	Category Total
SeniorPublicSer	25.57%	21.91%	23.12%	26.42%	29.52%	30.40%	29.54%	23.70%	3015
MidlevelStaff	17.93%	20.23%	26.23%	21.55%	23.28%	25.74%	30.11%	28.92%	2744
Parliamentarian	24.52%	30.43%	24.59%	25.87%	20.20%	17.53%	13.12%	17.85%	2567
PrivyCouncil	16.26%	15.92%	12.16%	13.27%	12.66%	13.73%	12.18%	13.54%	1571
TopBureaucrat	13.62%	7.51%	11.94%	10.23%	12.01%	9.54%	10.81%	8.62%	1198
JuniorStaff	2.11%	3.80%	1.80%	2.19%	2.33%	2.79%	4.06%	7.38%	334
Other	0%	0.20%	0.16%	0.49%	0%	0.27%	0.19%	0%	23
Annual Sum	1138	1972	1834	1643	1074	1865	1601	325	11452

Note: percentage figures in the table are rounded to the second decimal place.

While these three categories accounted for the majority of lobbying, we observe a shift in their relative prominence when comparing the Harper and Trudeau administrations. In the Harper years under study, ‘parliamentarian’ was the most lobbied category, accounting for 1,972 contacts or 25% of lobbying. In the final year of the Harper era, this group was targeted at a lower level (accounting for 20% of contacts), which is consistent with a

strategic lobbying approach taken towards a regime whose days may be numbered. However, this group remained less prominent in the early years of the Trudeau administration, moving to third position at 595 contacts or 15% of lobbying, whereas senior public servants accounted for 30% of lobbying contacts and midlevel staff 28%.

In addition to delineating DPOH *positions*, we examined the top *individuals* being lobbied. In Table 3, we have identified sixteen DPOHs involved in more than 75 lobbying contacts with the fossil fuel organizations over the period of our study.


DPOH Name	2011	2011_2012	2012_2013	2013_2014	2014_2015	2015_2016	2016_2017	2017_2018	Total
Mike Beale	43	84	40	41	33	46	41	11	339
Jay Khosla	19	21	28	58	24	52	43	6	251
Marlo Reynolds	0	0	0	0	0	51	67	7	125
Serge Dupont	23	23	36	33	0	5	2	0	122
M. Campbell-Jarvis	0	0	8	23	25	31	25	0	112
Joe Oliver	25	35	32	8	12	0	0	0	112
Bob Hamilton	2	6	36	23	15	19	0	0	101
Mark Corey	28	41	27	0	0	0	0	0	96
Dave Forestell	21	54	20	0	0	0	0	0	95
Greg McFarlane	0	15	52	24	3	0	0	0	94
Christopher Praught	3	7	34	22	19	0	0	0	85
James Carr	0	0	0	0	0	42	29	13	84
Michael Keenan	5	8	21	23	5	13	7	0	82
Jason Kenney	23	22	15	14	5	2	0	0	81
Guillaume Julien	0	0	0	0	0	11	52	17	80
Stephen Lucas	1	6	11	12	5	11	30	1	77
Other	945	1650	1474	1362	928	1582	1305	270	9516
Total	1138	1972	1834	1643	1074	1865	1601	325	11452

In contrast to relationships with elected politicians or partisan staffers, which can shift dramatically as governments change, the fossil fuel sector maintains ongoing relationships with DPOHs in the non-partisan government bureaucracy. The latter are often top government bureaucrats (associate deputy ministers and deputy ministers) heading an energy-focused or energy-related federal institution, most often Environment and Climate Change Canada and Natural Resources Canada, and to a less extent, Transport Canada. For example, Mike Beale, the most contacted DPOH, is a long-time associate assistant deputy minister and later assistant deputy minister of Environment Canada (later renamed as Environment and Climate Change Canada), while the second most contacted DPOH, Jay Khosla, has been assistant deputy minister of Natural Resources Canada since July 2013. As lobbying targets, elected politicians and politically affiliated staffers rise and fall with the fortunes of their parties; Joe Oliver and Jason Kenney were gone from Parliament after the 2015 election and therefore not lobbied, while James Carr and Marlo Reynolds rapidly emerged as key targets immediately after the 2015 election.

There was also a shift, after the 2015 change in government, toward targeting senior public servants. Among the top ten senior government bureaucrats who have currently remained in their position, annual contacts with fossil fuel interest groups averaged 144.5 under the Harper regime and 228.5 under the Trudeau government.¹² And, as the findings in Table 2 show, 39.79% of all lobbying contacts during the latter part of the Harper regime

involved parliamentarians and members of the Privy Council, compared to the first part of the Trudeau regime. When the government changed it was the senior government bureaucrats who continued to be the targets of extensive lobbying – and at an increased rate. This points towards a “deep state” or “state within a state” (Lofgren 2016; Taft 2017), whereby key state institutions and actors become extensively integrated with private firms and interests groups that together co-produce regulation and policy and “with only limited reference to the consent of the governed as normally expressed in elections (Garett, quoted in Taft 2017, 118). In an established deep state “leading owners and executives of major private interests” are fused together with state managers “inordinately committed to the success of those interests” (Taft 2017, 118). The deep state, which retains substantial autonomy from controls or regulation by elected officials, far outlasts election cycles.

The third domain of analysis concerns the federal institutions that were lobbied by the fossil fuel industry. Given its complex structure, we divide the House of Commons into two more specific categories: the elected politicians and the hired staffers who assist them. In Figure 2, the former category is coded as CommonsP, the latter as CommonsS. Even after the division, the former was still the most lobbied institution.



Across the administrations we find both continuity and discontinuity in the state bodies that were lobbied. Under Harper, the House of Commons (P) was the most lobbied institution and the primary target in each year. However, consistent with the trend for elected politicians to become less targeted for lobbying under Trudeau in favour of the senior public servants and midlevel staff, the House of Commons (P) became less targeted in the first year of Trudeau’s government and was overtaken by Natural Resources Canada. More industry

attention was also directed at Environment Canada, the second most targeted body in 2016-17.

The network overall, from Harper to Trudeau

Having identified the industry organizations, state personnel, and institutional targets that comprise the field of lobbying at the federal level, we now present a network analysis that integrates these three domains, focusing on the volume of lobbying relations between fossil-capital organizations and state targets (both institutions and DPOHs). As a fully relational method, network analysis has in recent years proven useful to political scientists in 'effectively analyzing the interdependence and flows of influence among individuals, groups, and institutions' (Ward et al 2011: 245). Network analysis takes us beyond overall rates of lobbying (as reported above) into the configuration of social relations that comprise the lobbying space.¹³ A social network consists in a set of *nodes*, some of which are directly linked to others through *edges*, i.e., relations. In this case, the relations are *directed*; they always flow from lobbyist to target. A lobbying relation entails one or more contacts between a lobbying organization and a state body or DPOH. Examining the network of these relations gives us a picture of the structure of corporate influence vis-à-vis the various organizations that make up the federal state apparatus. Each lobbying relation consists of a series of actual contacts involving lobbyists and DPOHs. By examining the frequency of such contacts as recorded in the Lobbyist Registry, we can determine which lobbying relations involve high volumes of interaction. These are the intensive relations, forming the core of the network.

Within the timeframe of our study, the Harper government was in power for 1764 days, compared to 818 for the Trudeau government, affording 2.156 times as many daily opportunities for lobbyists to meet with state officials. The total volume of lobbying for the governments, respectively 7,661 and 3,791, roughly corresponds to this ratio, indicating that across the two regimes the overall volume of lobbying was similar. Table 4 compares lobbying networks for the two regimes, at two levels of lobbying volume. We designate high-volume lobbying in the Harper years as relations involving 30 or more contacts between a lobbyist and a state target. Pro-rated to the shorter timeframe of the Trudeau years, high-volume lobbying relations are deemed to involve 15 or more contacts. Considering first the entire network of lobbying relations, in the Harper years it took in 44 industry groups (corporations and industry groups) and 51 state bodies, with the former linked to the latter through 595 lobbying relations. The entire network under Trudeau was smaller and involved fewer lobbying relations overall, which is not surprising in view of the shorter time period under observation. When we restrict the analysis to high-volume lobbying relations, the core of the network, most of the edges and many of the nodes fall away. Interestingly, however, the network of high-volume lobbying relations in the Trudeau years is slightly larger and has more industry-state relations than the Harper network.

Table 4. Comparison of Lobbying Network for the two regimes

	N of edges	N of industry organizations	N of state bodies
Harper gov't: all relations	595	44	51
Harper Gov't: high-volume relations	58	20	12
Trudeau gov't: all relations	409	39	40
Trudeau Gov't: high-volume relations	69	25	13

Concentration of lobbying follows the concentration of capital

Within both regimes, lobbying is extremely concentrated among the major players and their intensive, high-volume lobby relations. Under Harper, the intensive lobbying relations, as defined above, account for only 9.75% of all lobbying relations (59 of 595), but these relations represent 94.3% of all the 7,661 lobbying contacts occurring between industry and the federal state apparatus. Similarly, under Trudeau intensive lobbying relations account for only 9.8% of all lobbying relations (40 of 369), but these relations represent 95.9% of all the 3,791 lobbying contacts occurring between industry and the federal state apparatus. Across the two administrations, the overall pattern of lobbying is stable: among the 239 fossil-capital companies we included in our sweep of the Lobbyist Registry, the Pearson correlation¹⁴ between frequency of contacts during the Harper regime and frequency of contacts during Trudeau is 0.887.

Fossil-capital lobbying, like fossil capital itself, is concentrated among relatively few large corporations. For the 239 companies, the Pearson correlation between frequency of contacts and 2014 firm revenue is 0.728 for the Harper years and 0.820 for the Trudeau years. Using 2014 assets as a measure of size (which favours companies with large amounts of fixed capital), the correlations are even higher: 0.810 and 0.837 respectively. Not surprisingly, among the 239 fossil-capital firms, active lobbying at the federal level is restricted to a small fraction of companies. Across the entire period, 205 companies did no lobbying; five firms lobbied only under Harper; four lobbied only under Trudeau. The close relationship between firm size and lobbying is highlighted when we isolate the 10 largest companies by 2014 revenue, which all rank among the top lobbyists. In the Harper years, 67.6% of all corporate lobbying (4,191 contacts in total) involved these 10 firms; for Trudeau the figure is 71.7%. The simple contrast between the top 10 revenue earners and the 229 smaller firms accounts, under Harper, for 62.1% of the variance in frequency of contacts; under Trudeau for 66.5%.


As we have seen, lobbying activity at the federal level is concentrated among a few industry groups that tend to represent the larger concentrations of fossil capital. Six of 14 industry groups account for 89.5% of fossil industry-group contacts under Harper and for 92.0% under Trudeau. As a group, the four most active industry associations (CAPP, Mining

Association of Canada, CEPA and Canadian Gas Association, each representing very large corporations) account for 76.8% of all lobbying by the 14 industry associations over the entire 2011-2018 period. We can also discern change over time, associated with sectoral rise and decline: the Coal Association of Canada lobbied the Harper government 10 times but did not lobby the Trudeau government. The BC LNG Association did not lobby the Harper government but lobbied the Trudeau government seven times. We can conclude that the concentration in lobbying closely follows in the grooves of the ongoing concentration of fossil capital.¹⁵

Mapping the core network: state targets and lobbying organizations

Figure 4 shows state institutions with 30 or more lobbying contacts with fossil-fuel organizations under the Harper regime. In the diagram, each node represents a specific institution, with the brown circles referring to the fossil-capital organizations and the blue squares depicting state targets. The size of nodes indicate the (degree) centrality of the institutions and organizations within the network (the more central the organization, the larger the node). Their locations on the diagrams are also good indicators of their relative importance: the key fossil-capital organizations and state targets tend to be located in the centre of the graph. By contrast, nodes are smaller for the less important organizations and typically appear on the periphery of the graph. Line thickness is proportional to the number of lobbying contacts between carbon firms and government institutions.

Figure 4 - Network diagram for lobbying relations involving 30 or more contacts, Harper administration



In the Harper years, the main industry players focused their lobbying efforts on a dozen key state bodies. The high-volume lobby relations focused on Natural Resources Canada (NRCAN), politicians associated with the House of Commons (CommonsP) and, to a lesser extent, Environment Canada, with Foreign Affairs (DFAITC), Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (AAND), and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) being the only other state bodies lobbied extensively by three or more fossil-capital organizations. Among the

lobbyists, CAPP and the Mining Association of Canada maintained extensive high-volume lobbying networks reaching into various state bodies and particularly the triad just mentioned. CAPP logged 335 contacts with Commons politicians, 180 with NRCan and 177 with EnvirCan; the Mining Association logged 214 contacts with NRCan, 186 with the Commons and 102 with EnvirCan. But TransCanada Corporation and several other firms also maintained fairly extensive lobbying networks. Three industry associations and four corporations each had high-volume relations with the same triad of state core state organizations throughout the Harper years.

Figure 5: network diagram for lobbying relations involving 15 or more contacts, Trudeau administration





Figure 5 depicts the lobbying relations between these state targets and the fossil-capital organizations under Trudeau. The high-volume lobby relations under Trudeau continue to target Natural Resources Canada, the Commons, and Environment Canada, which seem to form a state-capital nexus on issues of carbon extraction. If anything, the network has become more tightly focused around this triad, with five industry associations and six corporations logging high-volume lobby relations with all three state bodies. The Mining Association of Canada has gained prominence in the network, while CAPP's volume of lobbying has declined. Among the corporates, Suncor stands out for its extensive lobbying of both Environment Canada (82 contacts) and Natural Resources Canada (69 contacts). Global Affairs (formerly Foreign Affairs) continues to be a target for the Mining Association (which also represents metal-mining firms, some of them with extensive foreign investments) and for TransCanada, whose Keystone XL project has been strongly pitched to US state managers by both the Harper and Trudeau governments. CEPA now targets the National Energy Board (NEB), likely concerning changes, as discussed below, to the NEB and environmental review processes announced by Trudeau (along with major pipeline project proposals and decisions

We can see how each DPOH funnels communications from an array of industry representatives into his/her respective state agency. For instance, at the bottom centre of the sociogram, Mike Beale, Assistant Deputy Minister at Environment Canada (having met with 21 different industry organizations 241 times during the later Harper years), was intensively lobbied by CAPP (76 meetings) and the Canadian Fuels Association (61 meetings). In Figure 9, the social circle of industry organizations lobbying Beale, a functionary ostensibly tasked with environmental protection, speaks volumes about fossil-capital influence over environmental policy.

Figure 9. Mike Beale's social circle, Harper years




Beale's heavily targeted colleagues at Environment Canada recorded fewer meetings overall and show distinct patterns of contact with industry. Collen Volk logged 56 meetings in total with 11 organizations, but 26 meetings were with the Mining Association of Canada. Deputy Minister Bob Hamilton, logging 82 meetings, shows a more diffuse pattern, connecting with 24 organizations, including 17 meetings with CAPP. For much of the 2011-2015 period Peter Kent (positioned near the top of the map in Figure 8) served as Environment Minister and met with 20 fossil-capital organizations a total of 67 times, but no one organization stands out (CAPP merited 9 meetings, Suncor 7, Imperial Oil and Cenovus 6 etc.). The same pattern holds for Michelle Rempel, a Calgary-based parliamentarian who served as parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Environment, beginning in May 2011. This pattern suggests a division of labour among state officials, as specific public servants take primary responsibility for meeting with certain lobbying organizations, while elected politicians maintain a wider but more diffuse array of fossil-capital contacts. In all, two politicians and four public servants affiliated with Environment were extensively targeted in the Harper years.

At Natural Resources Canada, the situation was a little different. Eleven DPOHs associated with this ministry were targeted, including ten top public servants and Joe Oliver (positioned at the centre left of Figure 8), who served as Minister of Natural Resources from

2011 to 2014 (and then as Finance Minister). Oliver, whose social circle is shown in Figure 10, was lobbied 112 times by 27 fossil-capital organizations, including TransCanada (12 meetings), KinderMorgan (10), Encana (9) and CAPP (8), mainly during his tenure as Minister of Natural Resources.

Figure 10. Joe Oliver's social circle, Harper years



Among the mandarins at Natural Resources, Marian Campbell-Jarvis was heavily lobbied by the Mining Association of Canada (48 of her 56 meetings), as was Anil Arora (40 of 67 meetings). Chris Praught's 88 meetings featured conversations with Suncor (11), CAPP and TransCanada (10 each). The other five public servants logged a total of 491 contacts, a good number of which involved CAPP (14 with Mark Corey, 11 with Serge Dupont, 13 with Michael Keenen, 21 with Jay Khosla), the Mining Association of Canada (14 with Serge Dupont, 11 with Jay Khosla), CEPA (11 with Mark Corey, 23 with Jay Khosla), and Canadian Gas Association (21 with Jay Khosla, 13 with David McArthur, who was also affiliated with Aboriginal Affairs).


A third notable category of DPOHs is comprised of elected politicians unaffiliated with the two ministries most targeted by the carbon-extractive sector. Here, Calgary-based Jason Kenney (positioned at the top left of Figure 8) stands out. Kenney, as an insider and cabinet minister in the Harper government, was intensely lobbied by a wide array of organizations. Some of these organizations backed his campaign to become Premier of Alberta in the 2019 Alberta election (McCarthy, 2019). Leon Benoit and James Rajotte were also Conservative parliamentarians extensively lobbied by the fossil fuel sector.

It is well known that in the Harper government power was particularly concentrated in the PMO (positioned at the top right in Figure 8). There, Greg McFarlane, a senior policy advisor, was lobbied by 22 organizations, with the Mining Association logging 16 meetings, CAPP logging 15, and TransCanada logging 11. McFarlane was joined as a PMO official by Dave Forestell, who was also affiliated with Natural Resources Canada and was lobbied by 21 fossil-capital organizations during the Harper years. In that period, as also evidenced in

Association is especially central, showing lobbying relations with 19 DPOHs, 16 of whom were solicited at least five times. CAPP lobbied 18 of the 20 top DPOHs, although only six of these relations involved five or more meetings (and all of these relatively intense relations were with public servants). Among the corporations, TransCanada's heavy targeting of DPOHs under Harper has fallen away, but Suncor has stepped up its lobbying, contacting 19 of 20 top DPOHs in the Trudeau government's early years, 10 of them on at least five occasions. Imperial Oil, Cenovus, Encana, and Teck are also heavily engaged in lobbying the key DPOHs associated with both Environment Canada and Natural Resources Canada. Some public-servant DPOHs carry over from one regime to the next, along with their lobbying contacts in industry. For instance, Marian Campbell-Jarvis at Natural Resources continues to meet regularly with the Mining Association (logging 23 meetings), as does Mike Beale at Environment (logging 18).

Mapping the lobbying relations that converge upon the two Ministers, Carr and McKenna (Figure 12), we find that Carr was lobbied by 25 industry organizations and McKenna by 21. All but one of the industry organizations lobbying McKenna also lobbied Carr, and the tendency was for Carr (whose tenure as Minister of Natural Resources ended with a cabinet shuffle in July 2018) to meet more frequently with industry representatives.¹⁶


Figure 12. Lobbying Relations Targeting Jim Carr or Catherine McKenna, Trudeau years



Noting that 131 of the edges in Figure 11 depict lobbying relations in which only one meeting occurred between the parties, in Figure 13 we show only the 93 relations during the Trudeau years that involved five or more meetings between lobbyists and the DPOHs. Node size is proportionate to centrality in this reduced network, which contains 19 of the 20 DPOHs, six state bodies with which they are affiliated, and 16 industry organizations. The two target ministries form opposite poles, with the Mining Association of Canada, Suncor, and Shell Canada occupying particularly central locations, heavily lobbying both ministries. Most of

the industry organizations are engaged in intensive lobbying with DPOHs in both ministries. Big Carbon appears to have taken to Justin Trudeau's 2015 election pledge that 'We can create clean jobs, grow our economy, and protect our environment by working together' (Liberal Party of Canada).

Figure 13. The Network of Most-lobbied DPOHs, relations involving five or more meetings, Trudeau years



In both regimes we find at the network's core, a small world of leading industry organizations, designated lobbyists, and DPOHs associated with state agencies key to fossil-capital interests, who are in regular contact with each other.

Conclusion

Lobbying is continually dominated by wealthy and corporate interests and is conducted largely away from public view. As Brulle (2018, 302) suggests, "control over the nature and flow of information to government decision-makers can be significantly altered by the lobbying process, and creates a situation of systematically distorted communication." As lobbying creates elite networks of decision makers that exclude the general public, it runs counter to democracy.

From January 4, 2011 to January 30, 2018, 11,452 lobbying contacts (just over six contacts per working day) were recorded between the fossil fuel industry and federal government officials. As we found, the fossil fuel industry is far more active in lobbying federally than other resource and manufacturing associations, while the amount of lobbying by environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOS) pales in comparison.

Continuing the pattern discerned between 2008 and 2012 by Cayley-Daoust and Girard (2012), the bulk of carbon capital's lobbying efforts are carried out by a few large corporations (and industry associations representing the major players) that control much of this economic sector. The pattern of lobbying closely mirrors the ongoing concentration of fossil capital, further outlined by Carroll and Huijzer (2018), and underlines the importance of industry associations that express fractional interests of industrial (sub)sectors. Similarly, just a handful of state organizations and officials are the target of

most lobbying by the fossil fuel industry. Lobbying is strategically focused on key elected politicians as well as two key ministries – one dedicated to extractivism, the other, ostensibly, to environmental protection – and the officials in them. Therefore, the network, at its core, amounts to a ‘small world’ of intense interaction among relatively few lobbyists/firms and the designated public office holders in select centres of state power, who are their targets.

In comparing lobbying across the Harper and Trudeau administrations, we found a pattern of continuity-in-change. Under Trudeau, the bulk of lobbying has been carried out by the same large firms as under Harper, while the lobbying network has become yet more focused on fewer state agencies, with Natural Resources Canada and Environment and Climate Change Canada holding pride of place. The diminished role of Members of Parliament as lobbying targets under the Trudeau administration, and the growing significance, on the other hand, of senior public servants and midlevel staff within the former state agencies, indicate a strategy of targeting the key decision-makers and state actors that remained after the change of government.

Our findings points to the existence of a ‘deep state,’ a form of co-government, far outlasting election cycles whereby key state institutions and actors within them develop long-term relationships with leading corporations and private interests that contribute extensively to policy formulation (Lofgren, 2016; Taft, 2017). They also echo Urquhart (2018), who has demonstrated that the “institutional legacy” of carbon capital-friendly rules and institutions federally and provincially is highly resilient even in the face of electoral change.

In this paper we have provided an architectonic overview of lobbying at the federal level, analyzing the structure of carbon capital influence vis-à-vis the various organizations that make up the federal state. The thousands of meetings taking place between corporate and state officials comprise a definite structure of corporate influence, yet our network analysis is silent as to the content of the relations we have mapped. Further work could endeavour to tie lobbying efforts more closely to the formation of policy. While it is not possible to determine the extent to which a given lobbying effort directly influences a specific policy outcome (and limitations of the federal Lobbying Act make it challenging to trace the precise nature of a lobbying event or meeting¹⁷), research could more closely analyze the timing and intensity of lobbying in reference to high-stakes moments and issues for key industry players, such as decisions surrounding pipeline proposals.

Moreover, in this paper, we considered only one of the most direct and obvious means by which carbon corporations influence the political process. A full accounting of such practices would include tracking political party donations (which remain largely unregulated in Newfoundland and Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Saskatchewan, and the Yukon) and “revolving door” relations or close personal ties between the corporate community and various government departments, agencies, boards and commissions.

The ‘direct’ lobbying efforts we analyzed should also be understood as an important component of a broader elite policy planning or governance network (Brulle, 2018; Drutman, 2015). The latter includes a wide range of business efforts to shape both public and political perspective and opinion, via corporate funded and directed think-tanks, policy-planning organizations, and grassroots campaigns. Indeed, Donald Gutstein (2018), has extensively documented the role of think tanks and policy-planning organizations (along with oil companies and industry associations) in shaping Canadian climate change policy.

This includes, for example, the Business Council of Canada's influence over the Trudeau government's national climate strategy, including the "grand bargain" of acquiescing to a price on carbon on one side, while building pipelines on the other (*ibid*). Therefore, while deep-state co-governance is clearly a departure from democratic practice, it should not be seen as restricted to the fossil fuel lobby, nor as a recently emergent phenomenon. Challenging these multiple modalities of corporate power and influence, as part of the effort to democratize and decisively transform the state at various scales (from the local, regional, national, and international), will be critical to the effort to transition away from fossil fuels in a rapid, democratic, and socially just manner.

Endnotes

¹ This paper is part of the Corporate Mapping Project (CMP), a research and public engagement initiative investigating the power of the fossil fuel industry. The CMP is jointly led by the University of Victoria, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives and the Parkland Institute. The CMP is funded primarily by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC).

² Carbon capital is a 'fraction' of capital embedded within wider structures of corporate power and linked to other fractions (including financial capital) via commodity chains and financial flows (Carroll, 2017). We also refer to this fraction as fossil capital.

³ We use the term lobbying chain to refer to the different organizations/institutions and actors that are involved in a lobbying contact. The chain involves four components: lobbying organization – individual lobbyist(s) – state organization(s)– public office holder(s). While the chain image allows us to consider different organizations and agents involved in lobbying, it should be noted that lobbying relationships are not unidirectional; corporations hire lobbyists to influence decision-makers in key state bodies, yet government may also convene meetings with industry representatives. Under the federal Lobbying Act, the latter are reported as lobbying.

⁴ We analyze only the total number of lobbying contacts carried out by ENGOs and non-fossil fuel industry associations. Future research could provide a comparative analysis of ENGO lobbying across the two administrations as well as analyzing the state bodies and designated public office holders lobbied by them.

⁵ On the development of unconventional shale gas in the Canadian context and associated governance and regulatory challenges, see Stephenson and Shaw (2013). For an analysis of offshore oil and gas development in Atlantic Canada and its regulatory regimes and social and environmental concerns, see Clancy (2011).

⁶ While pointing to reliance on oil revenue as an explanation for 'democratic deficits,' the authors cited here recognize the crucial importance of ideology and policy directions in 'petro-state' formation. They point to the need to avoid undue focus on the commodity of oil itself, in favour of more complex explanations that include a focus on royalty and taxation regimes as well as public ownership frameworks in accounting for state-society relations (see especially Shrivastava, 2015). Similarly, in his political economic history of the growth of tar sands beginning in the 1990s, Urquhart (2018) demonstrates that the boom was facilitated by a radical departure in government resource policy. He argues that both federally and provincially, the prevailing nationalist "think like an owner" approach to resource management was discredited and superseded by ideology of "market fundamentalism." In the process, the industry was 'reregulated' in a manner that suited private interests, and the state (particularly at the provincial level and in Alberta) largely abdicated its role in managing and controlling resource development and growth.

⁷ Moulding effects refer to an institutionalized bias towards facilitating rather than robustly regulating fossil fuel development, leading to reduced state capacity. Examples of such effects, often witnessed in regions with high levels of fossil fuel revenue dependency, and cited by Carter (2014, 2016) include: centralizing environmental regulation in a pro-development ministry, privatizing regulation (industry self-reporting), avoiding consideration of environmental effects at the land tenure stage, blocking or limiting public participation in environmental review hearings, not addressing gaps in scientific research (especially baseline data and cumulative impacts), minimizing protected areas or effective land planning, and inadequate monitoring and lack of government regulation on newer issues (such as emissions).

⁸ DPOHs include Ministers of the Crown or Ministers of State and any person employed in their offices; all Members of Parliament and all Senators as well as any staff working in the offices of the Leaders of the Opposition in the House of Commons and the Senate; public office holders, who occupy senior executive positions, whether by the title of deputy minister, chief executive officer or by some other title, or associate deputy ministers, assistant deputy ministers, or occupy a position of comparable rank.

⁹ The figures shown in this table and totals discussed throughout the paper refer to total lobbying contacts with DPOHs, rather than individual lobbying ‘events.’ Therefore, if two DPOHs are involved in a meeting with a lobbyist this counts as two contacts. Just over 60% of lobbying events involved only one DPOH.

¹⁰ The high number of lobbying contacts recorded by MAC may be explained by the breadth of firms and interests it represents, while its overtaking of CAPP as the most prominent lobbyist in the network, especially under the Trudeau administration, could be linked to a Liberal campaign promise to assess and strengthen Canada’s corporate social responsibility approach regarding Canadian-owned mines in developing countries (see Mazereeuw, 2016). Indeed, as noted below, Global Affairs Canada, which oversees international trade, including ‘responsible business practices abroad,’ was heavily targeted by the Association. MAC’s increased lobbying activity under Trudeau, especially beginning in 2016, was also likely linked to the Review of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. Immediately following the announcement of a federal review of Canada’s environmental laws on June 20, 2016, the association announced that it “plans to be a full, active participant in the federal government’s review of environmental and regulatory processes” (Mining Association of Canada, 2016).

¹¹ The Privy Council category contains specific government positions of the Prime Minister, Governor General, House Leader, Ministers, and Parliamentary Secretaries. The Parliamentarian refers to Members of Parliament and Senators (a small number of provincial politicians are also lumped into this bracket). Top bureaucrats consist of the deputy minister, associate deputy minister, ambassador, diplomat, parliamentary budget officer, and various chief executive titles such as the Governor of the Bank of Canada. Senior public servants are the government staffers one level below the top bureaucrats: the (associate) assistant deputy minister, judge, commissioner, chief of staff, superintendent, director general, executive director, and all the deputy chief executive positions such as the CFO and VP. The midlevel staff group encompasses advisor, policy advisor, manger, director, and deputy chief of staff. Lastly, junior staff contains the assistant, clerk, and secretary. An additional and non-functional category is ‘other’, which has enveloped all the non-governmental or unclassifiable positions, including military officers, scientists, and veterinarians. This very heterogeneous category is not included in the analysis of DPOHs.

¹² Senior government bureaucrats here include only nonpartisan top bureaucrats (DM, ADM and President) and senior public servants (AADM and VP), while party-affiliated Chief of Staff is excluded.

¹³ We used UCINET to construct the lobbying networks and Netdraw (a program packaged with UCINET) to provide the sociograms presented herein. See Borgatti, Everett and Freeman (2014).

¹⁴ The Pearson correlation is a statistical measure of the extent to which two variables are linearly related. The Pearson correlation varies from -1 (indicating a perfect inverse relationship) to +1 (indicating a perfect direct relationship, with the values of one variable rising exactly in step with the values of the other variable).

¹⁵ While we find that the same large firms maintained relatively steady rates of lobbying over the period of our study, certain organizations' lobbying efforts ebbed and flowed. CAPP, for example, was the leading lobbyist for almost three consecutive years from January 4, 2011 to November 3, 2013. In the final year of the Harper government and under Trudeau's leadership it continued to play a central but less dominant role. While an analysis of the timing and intensity of lobbying in reference to high-stakes moments and issues is beyond the scope of our study, as the literature on lobbying suggests (see de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014) developments regarding investment projects and regulatory initiatives also determine which firms lobby and when.

¹⁶ Two noteworthy exceptions: Teck Resources, which has branded itself as a green extractivist despite major recent investments in bitumen mining, met with Carr twice but with McKenna five times; Suncor Energy met with Carr seven times and with McKenna 11 times. Suncor is also an advocate of green capitalism. Its current 'greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions goal: 'harness technology and innovation to reduce our emission intensity by 30 per cent by 2030' (<https://www.suncor.com/sustainability/ghg-goal>). As is widely known by environmentalists, modestly reducing emission intensity while ramping up carbon extraction – Suncor's actual business strategy – produces increased carbon emissions.

¹⁷ An important limitation to the Lobbying Act surrounds the lack of detailed information on the subjects discussed during lobbying events. While the 'subject matter details' are recorded, the self-reported nature of the Act means that lobbyists often provide only thin descriptions of the topics discussed. Furthermore, subject matter details are not traceable to individual meetings/communications, but rather they are accompanied by a 'posted date' that is within one month of when a lobbying event took place.

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Appendix A: Abbreviations for Tables and Figures

AAND	Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development
ATCO	ATCO Group
Can Fuels Assn.	Canadian Fuels Association
Can Gas Assn.	Canadian Gas Association
CAPP	Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers
Can Natural Res.	Canadian Natural Resources Limited
CEAA	Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency
CommonsP	House of Commons (Parliamentarian)
CommonsS	House of Commons (Staff)
DFAITC	Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
DFO	Fisheries and Oceans Canada
EconDevCan	Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada
En. Pipeline Assn.	Canadian Energy Pipeline Association
EnvirtCan	Environment and Climate Change Canada
EMERA	Emera Inc.
FIN	Finance Canada
GlobAffairs	Global Affairs Canada
Kinder Morgan	Kinder Morgan Canada Limited
MAC	Mining Association of Canada
NRCan	Natural Resources Canada
PCO	Privy Council Office
Petro Serv Assn.	Petroleum Services Association of Canada
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
Senate	Senate of Canada
Sherritt Int'l	Sherritt International
Suncor	Suncor Energy
TC	Transport Canada
TransCanada	TransCanada Corporation
Westcoast	Westcoast Energy Inc.