Article

Canada’s Accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity: Cooperation and Diplomatic Presence in Southeast Asia

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Abstract

This article examines Canada’s accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As one of only a select group of 10 countries from outside of Southeast Asia that is a Dialogue Partner with ASEAN, Canada has gained important diplomatic and market presence in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, Canada’s national interests are advanced through the accession to TAC by supporting a rules-based system of regional order. The foundations of ASEAN—based on sovereignty, consensus, and the process of informality—make the “ASEAN Way” frustrating to proponents of an “independent” and “activist” foreign policy for Canada, especially as human rights abuses have unfolded in the region and the state of democracy remains a mixed record. However, Canada’s only method for securing economic interests, and just as critically, to promote a rules-based international order for the Indo-Pacific that is not dominated by China, is to participate with ASEAN as a TAC signatory.

Résumé

Cet article examine l’adhésion du Canada au Traité d’amitié et de coopération (TAC) avec l’Association des nations de l’Asie du Sud-est (ANASE). En tant que l’un des seuls groupes restreints parmi dix pays de l’extérieur de l’Asie du Sud-est à être un partenaire de dialogue avec l’ASEAN, le Canada a acquis une présence diplomatique et commerciale importante dans l’Indopacifique. De plus, les intérêts nationaux du Canada sont favorisés par l’adhésion à l’ATC en soutenant un système d’ordre régional fondé sur des règles. Les fondements de l’ANASE, la souveraineté, le consensus et le processus de l’informalité, rendent la « voie de l’ANASE » frustrante pour les partisans d’une politique étrangère « indépendante » et « activiste » pour le Canada, d’autant plus que des violations des droits de la personne se sont produites dans la région. Et l’état de la démocratie reste un bilan mitigé. Cependant, la seule méthode du Canada pour sécuriser les intérêts économiques, et tout aussi critique, pour promouvoir un ordre international fondé sur des règles pour l’Indopacifique qui n’est pas dominé par la Chine, est de participer avec l’ASEAN en tant que signataire du TAC.

Keywords: Canadian Foreign Policy; ASEAN; Southeast Asia

Mots-clés : Politique étrangère canadienne ; ASEAN ; Asie du sud est

Introduction

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)1 was described by US President Joe Biden to be the “heart” of American Indo-Pacific strategy (White House, 2022), and the association figures to be a cornerstone of Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy. This is particularly true if Canada wants to have a broad engagement with the region and not one that is subsumed by China. At over 660 million people in 2020, the only countries in the world that have a larger population than ASEAN are China and India. With a combined economy of over 3 trillion USD in 2020, ASEAN would have the 5th largest economy in the world, when measured against countries. Furthermore, ASEAN has positioned itself as the diplomatic centre of the Indo-Pacific and the primary forum of international cooperation for the region. The challenge facing Canada in its engagement with the Indo-Pacific is what Hanlon and Lien

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in this volume describe as a “competitive pluralism,” noting the presence of very different political systems that range the spectrum from full democracies to authoritarian models, as well as the economic interdependence that binds these very different forms of government together. Participation in ASEAN structures provides Canada with a diplomatic channel to navigate the competitive pluralism of the Indo-Pacific.

Still a term that is yet to receive broad international consensus, the “Indo-Pacific” was first conceptualised as a region by the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in a 2007 address to include India, another great power that happens to be a democracy, as part of a region that is increasingly dominated by China, and used the Indian and Pacific Oceans to demarcate its boundaries. The term grew in popularity after its official use in a 2012 Australian white paper, but has notably been rejected by China—perhaps in opposition to the United States’ inclusion of the term Indo-Pacific in its foreign and security policies, and due to India-China tensions. The exact area encompassed by the Indo-Pacific varies depending on the perspective of each country that has adopted its use. For the purposes of this paper, it refers to a geographic and geostrategic area that spans across the Indian Ocean, East Asia, and Southeast Asia to the adjacent western Pacific Ocean, including the countries which border the aforementioned oceans (Heiduk & Wacker, 2020).

Though diplomatic presence in multilateral forums has been an intuitive national interest in Canadian foreign policy since the waning days of World War II, the decision of the Harper government to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with ASEAN in 2010 was not a self-evident conclusion without controversy. The attractive side of ASEAN is that it is an association that has successfully encouraged economic cooperation amongst its members, and transformed the region from being a geopolitical powder keg of threats and invasions during the Cold War to one of peaceful coexistence by the late twentieth century. Furthermore, ASEAN has positioned itself as the diplomatic forum of the Indo-Pacific through its ASEAN Plus Three (APT—Japan, China, and South Korea), Plus Six (which adds India, Australia, and New Zealand), and the Dialogue Partners (which adds the United States, Russia, Canada, and the European Union). The controversy for Canada originated when ASEAN made membership as a Dialogue Partner conditional on accession to TAC. Though much of the treaty contains language that closely aligns with the interests and values of Canadian foreign policy and its historic support for multilateralism—such as the pacific settlement of disputes, and support for economic interdependence—it is the hard line drawn in TAC on the unassailable status of the sovereign authority of ASEAN member-states that is problematic. This is due to the uneven process of democratization in Southeast Asia, and the state terror unleashed by Myanmar’s Tatmadaw (armed forces) since 2017 and the martial law that was imposed in the country in early 2021.

By acceding to TAC, Canada secured its position as an ASEAN Dialogue Partner, one of only 10 countries outside of ASEAN to hold this distinction, and made a critical step towards joining the East Asia Summit (EAS), where ASEAN plays the central role. The invitation to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to participate at the 2018 EAS almost certainly would not have been extended without accession to TAC. Refusal to accede to TAC, and thereby forfeiting Canada’s Dialogue Partner position, would have profoundly affected Canada’s ability to implement a diverse Indo-Pacific strategy that engages with ASEAN members, and with the Indo-Pacific region more broadly. Maintaining Canada’s position as a Dialogue Partner opens the door to engage with the governments of the Indo-Pacific, but potentially also the civil society actors of the region and to facilitate the apt suggestion made by Ramraj
in this volume for Canada to take a multi-scalar approach to diplomacy and regional problem-solving. Perhaps just as importantly, despite the obvious limitations of ASEAN, Canada’s diplomatic presence with the association represents the most viable option for supporting a rules-based international order for the Indo-Pacific, and an engagement with the region that is not dominated by the increasingly insecure Canada-China relationship.

**Background: The ASEAN Context**

ASEAN was founded in August of 1967 when the foreign ministers of Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines got together over a game of golf and were able to reach consensus on the Bangkok Declaration—a handful of general principles for inter-state relations in Southeast Asia that centre around regional stability and economic cooperation. The association that “sports-shirt diplomacy” informally produced over golf would gradually expand to include Brunei (1984), and then the rest of peninsular Southeast Asia, with Vietnam (1995), Laos and Myanmar (1997), and finally Cambodia (1999). This section will identify the general characteristics of ASEAN and explain why these features make ASEAN unique compared to the traditional international organizations that Canada participates in. The section will conclude with a consideration of the successes and challenges of ASEAN.

Fundamental to understanding ASEAN are five general characteristics of the association present since the Bangkok Declaration and shaped by the region’s political history of European colonialism, the Japanese occupation during World War II, and the interstate tensions of state-building during the Cold War (Stubbs, 2008: 457-459). The first characteristic that is fundamental to ASEAN is neutrality and the preservation of Southeast Asia as a region that must not be dominated by great powers. Secondly, ASEAN is based on the inviolability of state sovereignty and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of its members. Thirdly, ASEAN provides the diplomatic forum to peacefully resolve disputes. Fourthly, these diplomatic summits follow the “ASEAN Way,” which is a process that is informal and non-confrontational. Members are not to be publicly shamed by diplomats from other countries, nor will ASEAN create institutional arrangements that place limits on the sovereign authority of its members. Finally, the purpose of ASEAN is social harmony for domestic constituents, such as through economic cooperation and governance that provides employment and strong economic growth.

Southeast Asia has achieved some remarkable success that has been either directly or indirectly fostered through ASEAN. The diplomatic pursuit of non-interference and respect for the sovereign integrity of its members helped to transform Southeast Asia from a region that was amongst the most dangerous places in the world during the tumultuous 1960s into a zone of stability by the end of the 1990s. Under Sukarno, Indonesia had a foreign policy in the first half of the 1960s described by its president as “konfrontasi,” (translating to “Confrontation” and consisting of political and military opposition to the formation of Malaysia), and the Sabah dispute over North Borneo presented a difficult diplomatic situation between Philippines and Malaysia. The most fearsome diplomatic challenge for the region revolved around the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War), a massively destructive war that tore apart Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, as well as dragging a number of great powers into Southeast Asia, most obviously the United States, but also the Soviet Union and China (Thayer, 2000; Guan, 2013; Tuck, 2018).
These general characteristics of ASEAN as described above might at first glance easily co-exist with Canadian support for international organizations that encourage multilateralism amongst states. The importance of multilateralism is a hallmark of Canadian foreign policy scholarship (Keating 2012; Nossal, et al. 2015; Kirton, 2006; Tomlin et. al., 2008), and support for multilateralism remains evident in Canada’s strategy for the Indo-Pacific. Multilateralism is not the martyrdom of Canadian national interests, but rather the mechanism through which Canada achieves “possessive” goals, such as economic benefits through trade and foreign investment, as well as broader “milieu” goals, such as a predictable rules-based international order (Keating, 2012: 2). The world order derived from a rules-based system is, “the international relations equivalent of oxygen: with it cooperation on virtually every front becomes possible, while without it prospects for progress fade” (Haass, 2020: 253).

A rules-based international order gives Canada a diplomatic presence that is rarely attainable, based on its relative capabilities and rank in the world. This support for multilateralism is the “concession to reality” in Canadian foreign policy because it acknowledges that Canada cannot force other governments to protect human rights or to participate in a free and open trading environment (Holloway, 2006: 237). Securing Canadian national interests and the promotion of Canadian values is only realistically advanced through the oxygen given to international cooperation of a rules-based international order. One of the broader milieu goals is what Denis Stairs called the “diplomacy of constraint” (1974), whereby Canada has banked on the rules-based international order as a method of nudging great powers, especially the US, towards greater forbearance in their international politics than they might otherwise be inclined to pursue.

ASEAN is more problematic for Canadian foreign policy than it might first appear. ASEAN self-identifies as an “association” rather than an “organization” and is united through a “declaration” rather than a charter or constitution. Institutionally, ASEAN is remarkably “thin” for having existed for such a long period of time. In a traditional international organization there is a balance between state sovereignty and the responsibilities of sovereign states to the international organization and its governing institutions. Sovereignty is not overridden through participation in international organizations, but their norms, rules, procedures, and institutions may act as a check on state behaviour. The rules-based international order has been described as a “political culture of the modern liberal state” with a 200-year-old tension between universal ideals rooted in human rights/dignity versus the supreme authority of sovereign states (Sluga, 2021: 10). The fundamental position of the inviolability of state sovereignty enshrined within ASEAN means that member states do not share sovereignty with the association. In ASEAN, there never really was meant to be much of a contest between the universal ideals of human rights and the sovereign authority of the state because the latter was always meant to be supreme.

The United Nations is the classic example of this balance between ideals and state power, as expressed in a Charter that emphasizes both the sovereign authority of its member-states and to reinstate “faith in fundamental human rights.” The UN never established a “definitive constitutional umpire” that is neutral and impartial (Ziring, et al., 2000: 28) in order to discipline or punish states for violations, with such considerations determined through an intensely political process of Security Council resolutions. UN authority over the sovereign power of members has “remained contingent on the vagaries of the international environment and the whims of nation-states” (Hanhimäki, 2015: 133). Other international
organizations are characterized by this balance between state sovereignty and institutional responsibilities, even if we acknowledge these institutional responsibilities as politically driven by its members.

For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has made reform demands on borrowing countries under its safeguards agreement, and the rulings of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body on states are extraordinarily difficult to override. NATO, NAFTA, and most significantly, the European Union (EU), are all characterized by this balance between sovereignty and the state accepting that participation in the organization places limits on the authority of member-states. The crucial point with respect to ASEAN is that the balance between sovereign authority and institutional governance falls weightily on the side of sovereignty in the case of ASEAN as it does not attempt to impose a structure of governance on its member-states.

Another difference between ASEAN and international organizations pertains to the expectations of the ASEAN Way, principally, the diplomatic approach of informal dialogues to find consensus on informal guiding practices, perhaps an unsurprising characteristic of ASEAN, given its seemingly casual golf-course origins. ASEAN is not trying to build institutions of governing authority that dogmatically prescribe conditions on the limits of state sovereignty. Informal talks are towards informal practices, not “thick” institutions and supranational law.

The ASEAN Way is a process where heads of state/government and members of cabinet invest time in diplomatic meetings to chat with each other and to better understand each other. It is a “slow-burn” approach to consensus building that looks painfully laborious compared to the rapid-action of “shuttle-diplomacy” that we may tend to imagine when we envision effective diplomatic proceedings. The informality of the dialogue is predicated on states continually searching for common ground to build consensus and avoiding topics where reconciliation is beyond the outer edges of what is possible. Public denouncements and shaming the governments of ASEAN are viewed as breaking with the expectations of decorum that are instrumental to the ASEAN Way and the search for shared purpose.

ASEAN has benefited Southeast Asia in the fields of economy, as a regional forum for the Indo-Pacific, and in security, by effectively ending inter-state conflicts between its members. Firstly, Southeast Asia has experienced strong economic growth. ASEAN has played a role in fostering this economic growth for the region through the ASEAN Free Trade Area that sets preferential tariff rates across its members and facilitates foreign direct investment. As an economic region, ASEAN experienced an estimated growth rate of 5.7 percent in 2019. This strong growth was expected to continue even after the 2020 Covid-19 recession, with Vietnam, Singapore and Malaysia predicted to have growth rates in 2021 of 6.7, 6.3, and 6 percent respectively (Reuters, 2021). As Covid-19 outbreaks have continued to upset Southeast Asian economies, estimates for Vietnam and Malaysia have been downgraded to a respectable, albeit less impressive 4.8 and 4.5 percent, while Singapore’s recovery has slightly exceeded expectations, with GDP anticipated to grow 6 to 7 percent (World Bank, 2021a; 2021b; MTI, 2021).
### Table 1. ASEAN GDP Growth Rates Pre-Coronavirus Pandemic

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Figure 1. GDP growth rate of ASEAN member states 2015-2019 (Worldbank 2021c)

However, it is an overstatement to presume that ASEAN has been the sole cause of this economic growth. Domestic structures of technocratic governance and the extent to which countries have made sincere efforts to replicate the “developmental state” are more central to economic development than ASEAN itself, however, participation in ASEAN has supported the continuation of developmental state practices despite pressures for neoliberal reform (Stubbs, 2012). The point is that ASEAN can be understood to be playing a supporting role that encourages the outward looking orientation of its more successful states and has secured commitments to economic interdependence over zero-sum economic competitions (Hill, 1994).

Secondly, ASEAN has acted as the “regional conductor” for the Indo-Pacific (Yates, 2017). The informal processes of the ASEAN Way have defined diplomacy in Southeast Asia as the association grew to include 10 states, but also to cultivate diplomatic engagement on terms set within the region, which is no insignificant feat concerning the region’s colonial history and the Indochinese wars that brought in France, the US, the USSR, and China. The success of ASEAN is not just the establishment of Southeast Asia as a zone that is free from direct great power control, but it is how the ASEAN Way facilitates non-confrontational means to prevent great power domination and to accommodate these great powers within the loose diplomatic arrangements of ASEAN. After the consolidation of ASEAN in the late-1990s through the acceptance of Cambodia as its tenth member, the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) was formed as a means to strengthen cooperation across the Asia-Pacific by including the highly advanced economies of Japan and South Korea, as well as China. Soon after, the ASEAN Plus Six was formed that included Australia, New Zealand, and India, thus largely fulfilling ASEAN’s ambition as the regional conductor for the Indo-Pacific. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is another notable diplomatic setting of the Indo-Pacific, one that is focused on security issues. The ARF includes all 10 ASEAN members, the Dialogue Partners (which includes Canada), but also a number of South Asian countries, not just India.
Finally, and closely related to the first two successes noted above, Southeast Asia has transformed from being a dangerously anarchic region of intense rivalries, to one where interstate conflict is delicately managed through the ASEAN Way, attesting to the presence of a rules-based international order for the broader Indo-Pacific that ASEAN helps to facilitate. Before joining ASEAN, Southeast Asian states interfered in each other's internal struggles on 29 occasions. Once having joined ASEAN, members never again interfered in these internal struggles of member-states (Kivimäki, 2010). This transformation is nothing short of a geopolitical shift of tectonic proportions when one considers the tumult of the past. The informality and thin institutional structure of ASEAN has caused one commentator to describe ASEAN's record of conflict prevention to be remarkably robust, given that this interstate peace is not conditioned on strong institutions and international law, but rather on the "imagined realities" of the ASEAN Way as fostering peaceful interstate relations (Kivimäki, 2012: 404). ASEAN is not the EU, where supranational governance has unquestionably altered European interstate politics compared to the first half of the twentieth century, and there persists tangible threats to the region that the ASEAN Way is struggling to cope with.

The first challenge to stability in Southeast Asia is what can be described as ASEAN's "illiberal peace" (Kuhontra, 2006). While the ASEAN Way provides the diplomatic forum to end interventions between members, and of course, to end full scale invasions of each other's sovereign territory, this non-interference principle at the core of ASEAN may be part of the context for the intermittent steps taken towards democratization in the region. Unlike in the EU, or even the NATO alliance, ASEAN stakes no claim to advancing the civil liberties and political rights of liberal democracy. Social harmony is a stated goal of ASEAN, but in the context of the "Asian values" debate (Smith & Jones, 1997). This means stability through effective governance and economic growth, not necessarily individual rights and freedoms. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit, no ASEAN member is ranked as a "full democracy." The "flawed democracies" of ASEAN have either experienced cycles of authoritarianism and democratization (Thailand), or very slow and incremental advancements (Malaysia and Singapore). The two ASEAN members that have most assertively pushed a message of democratization have themselves seen their democracy index lower in recent years, as in the case of Indonesia (due to a mix of presidential candidate Prabowo's political campaign and support for discriminatory laws rooted in intolerance by the courts and the People's Representative Council—DPR) and the Philippines (under President Duterte). The governing regimes of Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are outrightly "authoritarian" and extraordinarily repressive under a range of indicators.

Though all four of the authoritarian regimes of ASEAN are cause for concern, owing to their ongoing methods of state-wide repression and their propensity for episodic human rights violations, it is Myanmar that poses a monumental, if not an existential challenge to ASEAN. Systemic persecution against the Rohingya has been apparent in Myanmar since at least the early 1960s in the military coup that brought the Tatmadaw to power, characterized by events such as their derecognition as an ethnic community under the Citizenship Law in 1982. Ironically, violence against the Rohingya intensified during the modest democratization that the Tatmadaw permitted since 2008, stoked by a populist "politics of fear," reaching levels of repression that have been described as ethnic cleansing and even genocide (Chowdhury, 2020: 600-2).
What the Tatmadaw has described as “counter-insurgency” has displaced 200,000 internally within Myanmar, pushed over 1 million Rohingya into Bangladesh, 350,000 in Pakistan, another 500,000 have been displaced as far away as Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. Nobel Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) won landslide electoral victories in 2015, and then again in 2020, making “the Lady” State Counsellor of Myanmar (but not permitted to be president by the Tatmadaw). Suu Kyi paradoxically defended the state terror carried out by the Tatmadaw to the International Court of Justice (IJC) (Beech 2017), disillusioning many human rights supporters around the world, causing the Trudeau government to even withdraw the honorary Canadian citizenship that had previously been bestowed upon her. Not even Suu Kyi’s calculated betrayal of her own ideals was enough to satiate the paranoid young officers that have recently risen to power within the Tatmadaw, who declared the 2020 election results fraudulent, arrested the Lady along with 5,000 NLD supporters between January-April, and imposed martial law.

There is a legitimate concern that the Tatmadaw has perhaps sown the seeds of its own destruction with the coup against Suu Kyi, and set in motion political unrest that the military will not be able to control (Thant. 2021). By abolishing the parliament, the military is now responsible for a humanitarian crisis of its own making, where 3.5 million face hunger, and insurgent groups, such as the Arakan Army in Rakhine State, as well as other groups in the north, have effectively broken from Yangon.

The second challenge facing ASEAN is the question of whether ASEAN can find shared purpose with a hegemonic China. The South China Sea dispute is a glaring example of an irreconcilable rift between China and ASEAN members, especially Vietnam and the Philippines, but also involving Indonesia, Brunei, and Malaysia. Attempts to address the issue through ASEAN, most notably when the Philippines brought a case against China through the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, have been thwarted by Cambodia’s veto. Another example of the limits to ASEAN is evident in the exclusion of Taiwan from the ARF. As the setting for diplomatic negotiations on security issues, the absence of Taiwan from a grouping that even includes North Korea is highly conspicuous and a powerful example of ASEAN’s limits to brokering peace on the most contentious issues. ASEAN has expressed a desire to place Taiwan on the agenda on multiple occasions since the ARF was formed in the early 1990s, but these efforts have been stopped by China, starkly illuminating the weaknesses of ASEAN as a regional conductor (Yates, 2017: 456-457).

Concepts and Approaches

In theory states have a wide variety of foreign policy approaches available to them. In practice, they will always be constrained by the level of influence they have on the world stage. In this, Canada is no exception. Canada is a “middle power” in the broadest understanding of the term, which is based more on what Canada is not—it is neither a great nor small power, relative to other states. The concept arguably sprung from Hume Wrong’s functional principle, which posits that Canada’s level of influence should be determined by three things: “the extent of its involvement, its interests, and its ability to contribute to the situation in question” (Chapman, 1999: 74). Prime Minister King extended the functional principle to include the idea that Canada was “at least one of the middle powers,” in hopes that this newly named power would be recognised formally in international institutions. Chapman notes that under the functional principle (and to a lesser degree the hierarchal
model, which categorizes states by international standing), a middle power will see its level of influence oscillate in magnitude over time, in accordance to its ability to fulfil Wrong's three criteria.

This could explain why Canada's status as a middle power has been hotly contested over the years; its support waxing and waning based on whether Canada is visibly and successfully pursuing its interests on the world stage. Also useful in the understanding of "middlepowerhood," the behavioural model switches the focus to the role that middle powers play in international politics; pursuing greater influence through multilateral institutions, mediation, cooperation and peacekeeping efforts. Canada has tried to leverage its position as a middle power through a variety of approaches, from the quiet yet effective diplomacy of Lester B. Pearson; to the “Third Way” of P.E. Trudeau, which sought to diversify Canada's foreign and economic relations away from the United States; to the bold, moralistic policy of the Axworthy Agenda under the Chrétien government.

Canada's effectiveness in pursuing its foreign interests, given its relative power to other nations, is critically dependent on its ability to wield “soft power,” such as through collaboration with nations with similar interests, quiet diplomacy, and norm setting. Nye, who coined the phrase soft power in 1990, used it as part of a spectrum that incapsulates both the dynamics of resource and relational power between states, with soft power (that of persuasion and co-option, or the ability of a country to “[get] other countries to want what it wants”) at one end, and hard power (coercion or payment) at the other. Though hard and soft power lie at opposite ends of his spectrum, Nye (2021) notes that an influential state would use a careful balance of both. In this framework, power is more than one country being able to dominate another, rather, it focuses on the ability of a state to achieve its desired outcomes and to influence other countries. In its relationships with hard power states such as the United States and China, Canada cannot truly achieve the former, and therefore is left to attempt the latter.

Canada has used soft power to varying degrees over its political history. The Golden Age of Canadian foreign policy is more appropriately characterized as a “mixed” approach of both quiet and independent diplomacy, with the era’s central figure, Lester B. Pearson, being “respected” for his quiet approach to building consensus in international organizations, but also “a little feared” for his ability to apply pressure to foreign governments that could be perceived as undermining international cooperation (Holmes, 2007: 295). Quiet diplomacy involves the ability of one government to influence foreign governments through channels that are often obscured from public view, and based on a measured appreciation of what one country can expect of another. In his testimony to the External Affairs Committee on the failures of quiet diplomacy, Pearson defended his record, stating it was, “a matter of balance, a balance between influencing government in respect of matters about which you do not agree” (quoted in: Dobell, 1973: 317).

The more overtly nationalistic behaviour of the Trudeau government during the late-1960s and 1970s was described as “passing the buck” to Canada’s allies. Canada was seen as refusing to make the commitments necessary to the diplomatic process of international cooperation and instead to narrowly define the national interest in terms that were too myopically nationalist (Dobell, 1973: 320). In practice however, the Trudeau government maintained the approach of quiet diplomacy when it came to human rights violations, working privately with like-minded allies to support the rules-based international order
rather than making moral pronouncements on the iniquities performed by others (McKercher. 2018).

The “chivalric evangelism” (Mank, 2020: 93) of the Axworthy Agenda during the 1990s - early 2000s has also been subject to critiques, both from those who argue that the moralism of the rhetoric was never matched by the behaviour of the Chrétien government (Bosold and Bredow, 2006; Webster, 2010), and those who viewed it as a form of “pulpit diplomacy” where the Canadian diplomat was playing the role of fire-and-brimstone preacher of moral rectitude rather than hard-nosed civil servant dedicated to protecting the national interests of the country they represent (Hampson and Oliver, 1998). Allan Gotlieb, Canada’s ambassador to the US for almost the entirety of the 1980s, warned against the perils of “romanticism,” by allowing self-righteous Canadian morals to antagonize the US, in a manner that could teach Canadians about the “curse of geography” (Gotlieb, 2004). Denis Stairs (2003) similarly derided this moralistic period of Canadian foreign policy, suggesting that the approach failed to appreciate the geographical and institutional privileges afforded to Canada compared to much of the Global South, and cautioning against the utopian bias of thinking of values as a commodity that can be exported to other countries in the world.

Despite this, Canada’s bold policy during this era resulted in leadership roles in the landmines ban; the Rome Statute that resulted in the International Criminal Court (ICC); and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) that produced the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) document. The R2P is a particularly significant document due to the challenge that it poses to the more absolutist expressions of state sovereignty. Far from a soft power approach, support for the R2P is found in Jennifer Welsh’s popular book (2004), At Home in the World, which articulates a “model power” approach for Canadian foreign policy that is unshackled from the restraints imposed by quiet diplomacy.

It is an eminently reasonable concern to question whether one’s government is pursuing foreign policy objectives aggressively enough. In their general theory of foreign policy, Palmer and Morgan (2006) argue that all states strategize to maintain the aspects of the international system that are advantageous to them, but seek to change those aspects that the state opposes. The setbacks to democracy around the world since 2016 and the weakening of a rules-based international order are a threat to Canada’s milieu goals and national interests, and certainly offensive to its values. The problem for middle powers such as Canada is that both rising powers and ruling powers are far more successful in changing the international system (Palmer and Morgan, 2006: 8).

Canada appears ill-positioned in 2021 to assume a position of meaningful leadership to directly challenge the threats arrayed against liberal democracy and the rules-based international order, except in concert with like-minded states, wherever Canada can find them. This intent to shape the rules-based international order is the reason why Canadian foreign policy has been described as having contradictory evidence of multilateralism, mixed with being overly dependent on the Americans, and sometimes advancing their national interests in ways that are more narrow than traditional multilateralism but independent from Washington (Kirton 2007).

Drivers of Policy and the Role of Agency

The debate over the merits of quiet diplomacy is a debate on the extent to which Canada has the capabilities to advance their national interests, and more often than not, liberal-
democratic values. A follow-up debate on quiet diplomacy is a question on whether Canada can “loudly, and proudly” assert its position, if such a position entails a rebuke of other national governments, without being punished by these states that are the subject of Canadian scorn. As a hugely influential work of realism succinctly phrased it: “the freedom of choice in any one state is limited by the actions of all others” (Waltz, 1959: 204). Canada is free to abandon quiet diplomacy and to claim the moral high-ground against a wicked world—regardless of the hypocrisy that is evident with the state of so many of Canada’s Indigenous communities—but it must be willing to face the consequences of losing its diplomatic presence.

Canadian foreign policy is unsettled in the Indo-Pacific because so much of the politics of the region itself remains unsettled, with multiple unresolved tensions that defy easy reconciliation and have stakes that threaten the carefully managed rules-based international order that nobody takes for granted there. The state of democracy in the world, and the Indo-Pacific in particular, does not look particularly promising. The Tatmadaw brutally reasserted its dominance over Myanmar once again and an Asian-style glasnost does not seem likely for Brunei, Vietnam, Cambodia, or Laos. However, the principal cause of the unsettled qualities of the Indo-Pacific pertain to China, the once-and-future superpower.

It was once hoped that China could become a “responsible stakeholder” of the rules-based international order through its accession to the WTO or with the establishment of the G20 (Beeson, 2019: 83). This same logic was applied to Canadian governments going back to the diplomatic push by P. E. Trudeau to recognize the People’s Republic of China during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Discussing the Trudeau rapprochement with China, Paul Evans characterized the diplomatic initiative in evocative terms:

The paradox is that the person who led to an opening with Communist China and who cemented high-level personal relations with its leaders was also the person deeply committed to advancing rights and freedoms in Canada...The implicit reasoning of the Liberal foreign-policy elite of the late 1960s was that it was unrealistic even to begin to think about substantial change in Mao’s China, that there would be something gained by ending China’s isolation, and that there was little that Canada or any other country could do to shape China’s future through direct intervention. If fundamental change was unrealistic, occasional influence was at least imaginable (Evans, 2014: 26-27).

As recently as 1997, Canada-China trade was relatively insignificant, representing only 0.7 percent of Canada’s exports and 1.9 percent of imports (Drummond & Clemens, 2014). Under the Chrétien government, Canada supported China’s accession to the WTO as part of their strategy to diversify trade away from the United States. Stephen Harper, while the leader of the official opposition in the House of Commons, was fiercely critical of the Liberal “Strategic Partnership” policies of the Chrétien and Martin governments on the moral grounds of China’s human rights record, but dizzyingly reversed position into its second minority government and worked to increase the economic ties between Canada and China (Nossal and Sarson, 2014; Burton, 2015).

The economic relationship with China metastasized during the twenty-first century, and China soon became Canada’s fastest growing trade partner. From 2003 to 2017 Chinese exports to Canada grew by 17% percent annually. According to Statistics Canada (2018) Canada-China bilateral trade increased from 11 billion in 2001 to 64.4 billion (USD) in 2016,
making China Canada's second largest trading partner, though still well behind Canada's trade with United States. Once accounting for only 1% of Canada's trade twenty-five years ago, China now accounts for 6% of Canada's trade as of 2019 (Global Affairs Canada, 2021).

As the bilateral trade relationship between Canada and China continues to grow, the power imbalance between the two economies becomes more apparent. Though China is Canada's second largest trading partner, Canada only ranks as China's fourteenth largest trading partner, representing less than 1.5% of China's imports and exports. Despite Canadian exports to China expanding and remaining strong through both the 2008 Great Recession and the economic downturn in 2020 spurred by the pandemic, Canada typically imports more than double what it exports to China each year. Current data places Canada's 2020 trade deficit at 51.3 billion CAD (Government of Canada, 2021b).

The Canadian economy has also become increasingly dependent on Chinese goods. Almost fifty percent of Canada's production inputs contain some amount of Chinese content, and China is Canada's top producer of 158 products identified as being in limited international supply (Global Affairs Canada 2020a). As a middle power managing its relationship with the second largest economy in the world, Canada frequently relies on its participation within multilateral organisations to bolster its negotiating position with China. At the first Canada-China Economic and Financial Strategic Dialogue (EFSD) in Beijing, thirteen of the fifty agreed upon points involved reaffirming support and participation in rules-based international organisations such as the G20, WTO, and IMF (Global Affairs Canada, 2018).

It appears as if the fate of Canadian foreign policy is anxiety over its dependence on great powers, formerly with Great Britain, and then with the US. Though it is difficult to imagine Canadian apprehensions with the US ever going away, Canada has now firmly entered an era characterized by fears surrounding China, both Canada's relationship with Beijing as well as the broader threats that Beijing poses to the Indo-Pacific. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau initially promised to move past the “warm economics, cool politics” of the Harper years with Beijing and to embark on a strengthened relationship that would be more evenly warm (Calvert 2018).

The proposal that Canada and China can have such a relationship quickly broke against the incongruities of the national interests of these two countries. The fissures in the Canadian-Chinese relationship are vast (Manthorpe, 2019; Cooper, 2021), and include, but are not limited to: a campaign of spying and subversion inside Canada allegedly directed through the Chinese Communist Party; the arrest of Meng Wanzhou, CFO of Huawei, in Vancouver on fraud and conspiracy charges in contravention of US sanctions against Iran; the practice of “hostage diplomacy” by the Chinese government against Canadian citizens in the ostensibly retaliatory arrests of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor by the Chinese government and the death sentence against Robert Lloyd Schellenberg; and the tariffs and bans China and Canada have placed against each other, affecting Canadian exports of canola, soybeans, and pork. Talks of establishing a Canada-China Free Trade agreement have been abandoned, with then Minister of Foreign Affairs François-Philippe Champagne calling China’s approach “assertive, coercive diplomacy,” going on to say, “The China of 2020 is not the China of 2016” (Vanderklippe, 2020).

These growing tensions between Canada and China make ASEAN an attractive market for Canada to turn its focus to. ASEAN is already Canada's sixth largest trading partner, reaching 25.1 billion in bilateral merchandise trade in 2015. As Danielle Goldfarb, the Associate
Director of Global Commerce Centre, Conference board of Canada told the 2015 Senate Committee on Southeast Asia, “A number of our next top markets, as we call them, are actually in Southeast Asia...Southeast Asia has grown at 6 per cent annually over the past five years, taking out the effects of inflation,” going on to state that these economies offer greater growth potential than Canada’s traditional markets for investment and trade.

While the Trudeau government has confirmed they will not pursue a China-Canada FTA, talks of a Canada-ASEAN FTA continue to be discussed as recently as August 2021, after the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in Brunei. A Canada-ASEAN FTA is expected to boost Canada's GDP by approximately 5.1 billion, or approximately 0.3 percent. Paul Evans (2017) notes that Canada’s relationship with ASEAN follows a middle power approach, where both sides have a vested interest in working through rules-based organizations to limit the dominance of great powers such as the United States and China. Cooperation between Canada and ASEAN that may have otherwise faltered under various political pressures have been fuelled by what Nye (1990) would describe as “large elements of mutual advantage.” (158)

Strains in the Canada-China relationship have not occurred in a geopolitical vacuum. Beyond these bilateral tensions arrayed against Canada are the broader irreconcilables between China and the Indo-Pacific that grow in intensity as China’s relative power and influence increases and the search for a regional shared purpose becomes more elusive than ever (Allison, 2018; Kissinger, 2012). The intensity of the contemporary pressures emanating from China are numerous and threaten to unravel the rules-based international order. Disputes over the South China Sea; the illiberal crackdowns in Hong Kong and the denial of civil liberties and political rights throughout China; the sabre-rattling against Taiwan; and fatal border skirmishes with India all contribute to a dangerously anarchic international environment in the Indo-Pacific that threatens to unravel the rules-based international order.

Added to these momentous challenges include the internment of possibly 1 million Uyghurs in Xinjiang province; cyberattacks associated with the PLA; and the theft of intellectual property and various trade disputes—issues that have been exacerbated by the concentration of power by Xi Jinping, unprecedented since the Tiananmen massacre, and perhaps since the era of Mao (Economy, 2019). The unsettled nature that results from this lack of shared purpose in the Indo-Pacific over an increasingly powerful and authoritarian China threatens the rules-based international order that has functioned as the cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy since World War II and the ominous rise of a “power-based diplomacy” that will replace the fragile rules-based diplomacy.

**Trajectory**

The decision facing Canada today is how to approach the relationship with the Indo-Pacific. Fundamental to this question is the general consensus that recognizes Canada’s limited abilities to directly shape the Indo-Pacific region more broadly, and China in particular (Palamar and Jardine, 2012). Canadian foreign policy should be directed at preserving the rules-based international order, but this order, especially in the Indo-Pacific, is under great duress from the behaviour of China and there are abundantly obvious limitations on Canada’s capacity to protect it (Lim 2020: 35). What is required of Canada is to undertake strategic considerations with respect to the relationship with China, and according to Jeremy
Paltiel, to “put Asia in a strategic context,” which has not been Ottawa’s approach in the twenty-first century (2016: 49). Canada needs to take seriously a diplomatic approach in concert with Indo-Pacific countries of “keeping the playing field open” rather than taking either a laissez-faire perspective or focus on short-term bilateral trade deals (Paltiel, 2016: 50).

One option, superbly described by Kenneth Holland (2021), is for Canada to join the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (known as the “Quad”)—the US, Japan, Australia, and India—an informal forum on defence that is drawing hard lines in the geopolitical sand for a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Holland makes compelling arguments in favour of Canadian participation in the Quad, based on Beijing’s tensions with Canada, the dangers that the Communist Party of China (CCP) pose to the rules-based international order, and the shared purpose in an “Asian arc of democracy.” However, whether Canada will even be granted the opportunity to join the Quad is debatable. The launch of AUKUS in September 2021, a security pact between the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia with the goal of containing China’s influence in the Asia Pacific, only furthered the image of Canada as a minor player in the region (Lang 2021). While Canada’s absence in the agreement is not particularly notable due to Canada’s quiet and inconsistent presence in Southeast Asia, greater questions of Canada’s import on the world stage arose when it was discovered that Canada was neither invited nor informed of the AUKUS agreement prior to the day it was announced.

Joining the Quad would almost certainly make Canada ineligible for the EAS, based on the antagonism that the Quad represents to China. ASEAN represents a non-confrontational approach towards China and the Indo-Pacific. The informality of the ASEAN Way makes the diplomatic process slow, appearing almost non-existent at times, but it is better for Canada to talk to representatives from China through the ASEAN diplomatic channels. Every ASEAN government has reservations and fears surrounding China, even Cambodia and Myanmar, and no ASEAN country, and certainly not Canada, wants to shut down the diplomatic channels presented by ASEAN and be isolated into bilateral negotiations with a geopolitical behemoth like China. To abandon quiet diplomacy at this stage would be to acknowledge that diplomacy has failed, which will only exacerbate the existing tensions with China. Furthermore, most of Canada’s fellow dialogue partners represent a strong coalition of democracies with whom Canada shares interests and political values, such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the US, the EU, and perhaps India. The signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in late-2020 shows that ASEAN can still take the lead in supporting a rules-based international order in the Indo-Pacific, and even one that includes China (Petri and Plummer, 2020). Canada’s accession to TAC was a critically important decision to continue to work multilaterally with Indo-Pacific countries and support a rules-based international order.

If Canada’s direct influence is limited even among its allies and fellow Five Eyes counterparts, it is little wonder that Canada has a strong preference to work through multilateral rules-based organisations. Historically, Canada’s efforts in the Indo-Pacific were initiated through its participation in multilateral organisations, such as its role in the Columbo Plan as part of the Commonwealth of Nations; its contribution to the Korean War through its membership in the United Nations; or its diplomatic efforts on the Vietnam war through the ICC. Canada’s early involvement in Southeast Asia can be more strongly tied to its obligations to these international organizations than a strategic plan to develop its presence within the region. Patrick James (2014) posits that Canada’s positioning on the
global stage makes it ill-suited to take a leadership role, or to be a “first mover” in matters of security in particular. This theory is supported by Canada’s absence from both the Quad and newly formed AUKUS. Rather, Canada’s decades of experience working through rules-based international organisations allow it to leverage the minor influence it has most effectively through these types of institutions, or as a reactive “second mover,” whose actions are closely tied to those of its allies.

The current Canadian government seems to have fully embraced this characterization, with numerous references to multilateralism as “the cornerstone of Canada’s foreign policy” throughout its 2020-2021 statements on trade and foreign affairs. The goals of peace building and security are stated as part of the work through the United Nations and NATO, with trade relationships navigated through the rules of the WTO. For Global Affairs Canada, the first point on its Departmental Plan is “contributing to a rules-based international system that advances Canadian interests.” Multilateralism is Canada’s strong preference as an international actor. Those in favour of a more activist approach argue Canada’s use of international organisations has become its own Maslow’s hammer, but there is little doubt it is one of the more useful tools of influence that the nation has at its disposal. In order to be effective however, Canada will need to place an emphasis on reputation building in the Indo-Pacific, and show a consistency in its presence there. As Grinius (2016: 1) notes, “in order for Canada to be seen in Asia, it must be seen in Asia.”

The slow relationship-building of ASEAN is perhaps then well-matched to Canada’s style of influence, one that infers that some presence in Southeast Asia is better than no presence at all. It has long been a reliable backstop to Canada’s inconsistent participation in the Indo-Pacific. Even during a lull of interest in Southeast Asia under Chrétien, a Department of Foreign Affairs official noted that if due to “resource constraints and domestic indifference” Canada could not take a leadership role in the 1997 ASEAN Regional Forum, then “Canada’s objective was to be a useful and interesting participant.” By 2011, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrence Cannon appointed Canada’s first Ambassador to ASEAN. In 2015 the Canadian Senate Committee on SEA identified ASEAN as Canada’s means of access to the region, and its path to participating in the ADMM-Plus and East Asia Summit. This was reaffirmed by Justin Trudeau’s invitation to the EAS in 2018.

In 2009-2010, when Canada was pressed to either accede to TAC or to potentially lose its status as a Dialogue Partner, the decision was largely dependent on the US accession to TAC (Stubbs and Williams 2009). This was not to march in lock-step with the Americans, but was born out of the recognition that the United States was not going to increase political and economic pressure on Myanmar’s government and so Canada, with its limited capabilities, should dismiss whatever hope for international revisionist actions that could force regime change. President Obama’s decision to complete a formal diplomatic arrangement with ASEAN was fairly straightforward:

To me, though, alienating nine Southeast Asian countries to signal disapproval toward one didn’t make much sense, especially since the United States maintained friendly relations with a number of the ASEAN countries that were hardly paragons of democratic virtue, including Vietnam and Brunei (Obama, 2020: 478).

It is not surprising that an association which prioritizes sovereignty as fiercely as ASEAN does is known for its institutional weaknesses. Alice Ba (2009) argues that the process-driven cooperation of ASEAN will continue to promulgate a constrained version of
regionalism in Southeast Asia, but this cannot discount the ways in which negotiations have built enduring institutions in the context of “assumed regional disunity”. Amitav Acharya, in perhaps the most important academic book written on ASEAN, emphasizes that the ASEAN Way presents its own “social learning” between members whereby norms of peaceful coexistence, regional unity, and economic interdependence have gradually evolved (Acharya, 2001: 47-79).

Changing norms around respect for the sovereignty of ASEAN members was a revolutionary breakthrough for the region when one considers Sukarno’s Indonesia or Vietnam during the 1960s-80s, but the proposition that ASEAN can gradually nudge its more authoritarian members towards acceptance of a legitimate human rights regime is particularly inauspicious in 2022. Indonesia, ASEAN’s “primus inter pares” as well as its most consistent supporter of democratic reform over the last two decades, has used ASEAN summits to put diplomatic pressure on Myanmar, such as during the 2007 “Saffron Revolution” and again in 2008 when Cyclone Nargis created a humanitarian disaster and the military initially obstructed relief efforts (Roberts and Widyaningsih, 2015). It is also important that 8 out of the 10 dialogue partners of ASEAN are committed to the values of liberal democracy and approach ASEAN meetings as an important venue for the spread of these norms (Bae, 2018: 34-36).

Accession to TAC does not mean that Canada forfeits its sovereign right to criticize the actions of ASEAN members. Immediately after Canada concluded its accession to TAC during a meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Hanoi in July 2010, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Conservative Party MP Lawrence Cannon, immediately cited in a press release Canada’s commercial interests in the region, but also that Canada “remains a vigorous defender of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.” The minister was direct in singling out Myanmar in particular, noting:

I also called on the Burmese regime to live up to its commitments to hold free and fair elections by unconditionally releasing all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, engaging in genuine dialogue with members of the democratic opposition and different ethnic groups within Burma, and enabling full democratic participation in the process. (Government of Canada, 2010)

The Trudeau government did take action following the state terror unleashed by the Tatmadaw since 2017. Former Liberal Party leader, Bob Rae, was appointed to serve as Canada’s “Special Envoy” to Myanmar and the government earmarked approximately $300 million in humanitarian assistance for those in Myanmar and Bangladesh who have been displaced by the violence. Most significantly, the House of Commons passed a motion in September 2018 that recognized the violence against the Rohingya as genocide, and Canada acted in concert with the EU to levy sanctions against a number of high-ranking members of the Tatmadaw (Government of Canada, 2018). Accession to TAC requires a decorum on the part of Canada that respects the ASEAN Way, but it in no way ties Canada’s hands on taking action to help those in need, or to forfeit Canada’s right to express its views on the state of the world.
Conclusion

The broader geopolitical context that faces the Indo-Pacific, and world order more generally, is the rise of China. Participation in ASEAN diversifies Canada’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific beyond what is becoming an increasingly problematic and insecure dependence on China. Furthermore, Canada’s accession to TAC and its position as an ASEAN Dialogue Partner are crucial to embed relations with China within a broader context of Indo-Pacific multilateralism. Much of ASEAN’s future, on issues of democratization and human rights, remains unresolved, but it remains the centrepiece of a rules-based international order for a region that may find itself under profound duress in the coming decade.

No country on the planet is seriously considering intervention against the Tatmadaw. Myanmar is already teetering on the brink of civil war, not just in the west and the north of the country, but even in Yangon. Any pressure that sniffs of intervention will only back the Tatmadaw into a corner with Beijing, a place that not even the junta wants to be in. Instead, Canada should maintain the delicate balance of providing humanitarian assistance where it is tolerated, and in partnership with like-minded states. Change must come from within Myanmar, and this is only possible if the Tatmadaw does not perceive itself to be under siege. Until the day comes when the Tatmadaw no longer sees the value of ASEAN, it is ASEAN that presents the most appropriate forum to find a way out for the Tatmadaw. The ASEAN Way provides cold comfort to those suffering from the military’s state terror, but it remains the only practical diplomatic option for countries such as Canada and its partners within ASEAN, such as Indonesia, that understand the threat to stability that the actions of the Tatmadaw represent.

Accession to TAC gives Canada access as a Dialogue Partner and gives the country a diplomatic presence to work with our fellow Dialogue Partners, such as the US, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and the EU, who similarly view these actions as a threat to regional order and offensive to the basic human dignities that ought to be afforded to people regardless of what country they are born into. The weakening of the rules-based international order and the return of power-based diplomacy to the Indo-Pacific will gravely threaten human rights in Myanmar, China, and perhaps, much of the region.

P. E. Trudeau’s iconic line of “sleeping with an elephant” is as true now as it was 50 years ago and will presumably remain true for as long as our countries endure, and the US will always weigh heavily in all of Canada’s foreign policy decisions. However, the state of Canada-China relations, and the anxieties of China’s presence in the Indo-Pacific, has perhaps eclipsed the primacy of the US in Canada’s relationship with ASEAN over the decade following the original decision to accede to TAC and yet, Canada’s role in the Indo-Pacific is more than just cautiously balancing its actions against the desires of hegemonic nations with large hard power resources.

Canada is not without agency, though its options may be limited. What cannot be forced with coercion may be nudged through the channels of carefully built relationships with the ASEAN nations, judicial use of quiet diplomacy, and selective pressure through multilateral institutions. Ten years on, it is clear that Canada would not have the access to the Indo-Pacific that it currently possesses without its accession to TAC and its role as a dialogue partner. What remains to be seen is whether Canada is willing to use this access to become a committed and dependable presence in the region, or to even put forward an official Indo-Pacific strategy at all.
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1 Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia.

2 Though the Trump Administration was able to block the Appellate Body from ruling on disputes by simply refusing to fill vacancies on the AB after terms expired.

3 Glasnost represents the political reforms and openings undertaken by Mikhail Gorbachev near the end of the Soviet Union.

4 Indonesia is regarded “first among equals” in ASEAN due to the population size of the country compared to the rest of the association (over 40% of the population of ASEAN members).

5 Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, India, United States, Canada, and the EU. Russia and China are both listed as “authoritarian regimes” by The Economist’s Democracy Index.

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