Creating an Enemy: Social Militarization in the War on Terror

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Abstract. One of the most prominent effects of social militarization is hostility toward anyone of the same nationality as the enemy. This is common in conventional wars, but has become even more pronounced in the War on Terror, as the enemy is hidden in the civilian population. Western fear of Muslims was common before this war, but has escalated since. Muslims are portrayed as a monolithic group that is intrinsically hostile to the west. The war narrative legitimizes xenophobia by associating individual actions with all members of a group, and for that reason, it is potentially dangerous to Canadian multiculturalism.

Keywords. Multiculturalism; tolerance; Islam; war on terror.

Résumé. Un des effets les plus saillants de la militarisation sociale est l’hostilité face à quiconque dont la nationalité est identique à celle de l’ennemie. Cela est courant dans les guerres conventionnelles, mais cela a été plus marqué dans la Guerre contre le Terrorisme, du fait que l’ennemi se cache dans la population civile. La peur occidentale des Musulmans était courante avant la guerre, mais elle s’est accrue depuis lors. Les Musulmans sont dépeints comme un groupe monolithique qui est intrinsèquement hostile contre l’Ouest. Le discours lié à la guerre légitimise la xénophobie en associant des actions individuelles à tous les membres d’un groupe, et pour cet motif, il est potentiellement dangereux pour le multiculturalisme canadien.

Mots clefs. Multiculturalisme; tolérance; Islam; guerre contre le terrorisme.

A persistent challenge in war is training soldiers to kill their enemy. This is why one of the oldest byproducts of militarization is the demonization of the enemy. The enemy must be transformed into something fundamentally different and intrinsically threatening, thereby making him acceptable to kill. In Agamben’s terms, the enemy must be made into a homo sacer in order to absolve the soldiers from the normal prohibition on killing (Agamben 1998). Although there is a long history of the normalization of killing spreading into the civil sphere to ensure popular support for a war, this has intensified since the rise of liberal democracies. This form of government places the ultimate authority over war in the hands of representatives who are answerable to the citizens, and therefore means that war must have a popular basis if it is to have enduring support. The people must share the soldiers’ disdain for the enemy in order to support killing.

Democratic governments have often built support for war by using the same tactics as those employed to prepare soldiers for battle. A persistent stream of information demonizes the new enemy, framing it in terms of existing prejudices and transforming it into a monolithic group without individual variation. This has been particularly necessary since the Vietnam War, as the power of mass opposition to illegitimate violence was made clear. To generate support for the War on Terror, politicians, reporters, scholars, and ordinary citizens have gone to great lengths to emphasize the otherness of those associated with terrorism. Whether intentional or not, the security concern has become an excuse for xenophobia and racism. The conflict has provided a convenient way of reframing existing prejudices. Giving these feelings a referent, especially one that is connected to a legitimate military target is dangerous and allows even the most virulent anti-Muslim sentiment to be framed in terms of an ongoing war.

Geyer defines militarization as “the contradictory and tense social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence” (Geyer 1989: 79). In this case, the militarization is focused externally and internally. Externally, Muslims are portrayed as a violent and unified group that is intrinsically hostile to the west. With so many Muslims now living in the west, this narrative gives the appearance of a hostile body living within our society – an extension of the enemy force within our own borders. The terrorists’ tactics reinforce this, as they depend on blending into the civilian population. The result is a culture of hostility in which the ongoing War on Terror is reproduced domestically as a struggle to monitor the enemy within.

The danger of legitimized and militarized xenophobia is particularly threatening for Canada. Although building popular support for war may be more difficult in Canada than elsewhere, there is also more at stake in terms of attitudes toward race and culture. Canada is among the countries with the strongest record of support for minority rights and the acceptance of difference. The country has long distinguished itself from the American melting pot, which celebrates the loss of culture and acceptance of a uniform na-
tionality, by promoting diversity within the confines of a unified state. The cultural mosaic is central to the Canadian identity and helps to differentiate it from the US. The reality of the mosaic is contested, but even if overstated, it is a powerful normative claim that the country should respect minority rights. As this essay will show, the imperative to normalize violence has transformed the civil spheres of the United States, United Kingdom, and Western Europe, bringing hidden tensions to the surface and creating new ones. Specifically, it has merged with and justified the fear of immigration. Now, with Canada’s growing military partnership with the US and the conservative political victories in 2006 and 2008, it appears that Canadian multiculturalism could be one of the casualties in the War on Terror.

The War on Terror

Fear of terrorism and disdain for terrorists are justified. It is understandable for those who have lost friends and family members in attacks to want the perpetrators to be punished. The desire for national security is likewise reasonable. If war is ever justified, then it is in cases of self-defense against acts of terror or in which only retaliation can prevent further attacks. Drawing attention to the strategies of the War on Terror and its consequences for the civil sphere should not detract from this. More importantly, it should not serve as a justification for tacitly accepting terrorism. Nevertheless, the motives of revenge and self-preservation are often extended beyond reason and serve as justifications for any extreme actions deemed necessary to defeat the enemy.

The interplay between justified anger and extreme responses makes the War on Terror particularly interesting from a theoretical perspective. If the war were entirely unjustified, then it would be easy to respond with simple condemnation. The conflict is clearly more complex than this. Because it is rooted in the desires for security and correcting an injustice, it is difficult to draw a precise line between morally acceptable and unacceptable responses. However, one can judge the social consequences of the war without resolving these complex questions. Specifically, one can see how the moral ambiguity of the conflict helps to cover what might otherwise be considered extreme measures. Whatever the moral status of the War on Terror, the conflict has clearly transformed civil-military relations and reshaped the civil sphere to reflect the tension of a society that is always prepared for an attack.

During times of war civilians, like the soldiers themselves, must become accustomed to the idea of killing other people. Desensitization often figures heavily in the training of soldiers because they must face others directly and do the killing themselves (Grossman 2009). Civilians play a less direct role, which only requires that they accept the war and the military policies. In practice, this means that civilians do not need the same intensive training as soldiers, but that both must see the enemy as someone who is not protected by ordinary moral rules. Wars promote a hatred of the Other, but who the Other is depends on the kind of war being waged. In conventional wars, the Other is clearly marked, but in the War on Terror, locating the enemy combatants and even defining them is far more difficult.

The War on Terror is by nature a conflict that transcends the line between military and civilian life. In conventional wars, it should be easy to distinguish combatants from non-combatants. Soldiers must wear uniforms, are usually found in large groups, and are stationed in strategic locations. Civilians are unarmored, out of uniform, and often concentrated in demilitarized areas. This is the usual state of affairs in conventional wars. Even when this distinction is ambiguous, it rarely breaks down completely. For example, during the Second World War, resistance fighters across Europe blurred the line between civilian and soldier by taking up arms against occupying forces. Although many of the resistance fighters hid among civilians, this tended to be out of necessity rather than desire. Mixing with the civilian population was a sign of weakness. Irregular forces usually formed distinct organizations existing outside civilian life as their size and capacity increased. Thus, we see the most powerful partisan organizations growing into large, permanent forces and behaving somewhat like regular soldiers (Ellis 1995; Asprey 2002). The same process of growth and leaving the civil sphere has been the normal path for paramilitary groups in other wars as well (Joes 1992).

Terrorists, by contrast, deliberately integrate into the civilian population and resist organizing themselves into anything resembling a military force. They challenge the idea of what it is to be a combatant, as the debates surrounding their proper status for imprisonment and interrogation purposes make clear. Terrorists’ strategies make them extremely difficult to locate. Even high-capacity organizations avoid presenting a visible target. Moreover, irregular soldiers of past wars generally fought on their home territory. Partisans defended an invaded land or resisted colonial governments. They did not voluntarily cross into foreign territories in search of weak targets. The fact that terrorists often do this further distinguishes them from other irregular combatants and shifts security concerns onto the civilian population. In short, they represent a unique enemy whose form encourages mass suspicion.

Many countries already have a record of discrimination against citizens of the same nationality or religion as the enemy during times of war. During the Second World War, the United States and Canada were safe from the same civil unrest as occupied Europe. Yet, these countries behaved as though they were threatened by their own people. Over 110,000 Japanese Americans, many of them citizens, living in the Western US were interned. President Roosevelt authorized the imprisonment out of fear that these people could be agents of the Japanese government (Robinson 2001). The Canadian government took the same course during the Second World War and did so for the same reasons. Around 21,000 Canadians of Japanese descent had their property confiscated and were locked in camps for much of the war (Conklin 1996). Although it tends to receive less attention than Japanese internment, this also happened to many Canadians during the First World War. Immigrants from the countries making up the Central Powers, primarily
Germans and Austrians, were interned (Gwyn 1995:187). The hostility toward Japanese and German soldiers became hostility toward anyone of those nationalities.

If the civil sphere can become part of the battlefield during a conventional war, by countries safe from domestic conflict, then it should come as no surprise that the same militarization of the civil sphere has been reproduced in the War on Terror – a conflict defined by hidden enemies and domestic threats. The result is that liberal, democratic countries with a relatively high level of respect for minority rights have begun persecuting Muslims, Arabs, and those who look like Arabs. Thus far, there has been nothing comparable to the Japanese internment. However, there have been strong informal sanctions against Muslims and official actions against individuals based on their resemblance to a terrorist profile.

Cultural Division

The discourse of demonizing the enemy helps to make war possible; but even when the war is almost universally considered moral, as the Second World War is, it produces social repercussions. Hostility transforms cultural values and reshapes the way of life. There is ample evidence of an increasing fascination with popular culture representations of terrorism and news reports on the subject. Even with real attacks rarely happening, the constant discussion of terrorism on the news, in movies, and on television, ensures that terrorism does not slip from the public’s attention even as recessions, natural disasters, and civil rights violations raise new concerns.

Television and movies are dominated by themes of insecurity and conflict. Reporters discuss potential attacks that could inflict thousands of casualties. Politicians convince their constituents to accept lasting alterations to their civil liberties. No matter what specific form it takes, information and misinformation about certain Muslims becomes a caricature of an entire group. The search for an answer to the question of why terrorists would attack civilians has led to the creation of an entire industry dedicated to exploring their motives. Even when this literature makes progress, it often inadvertently contributes to the rampant Islamophobia. The myths that terrorists are insane or brainwashed have been thoroughly discredited (Sageman 2008; Pape 2003) – a significant advance in the understanding of terrorism – but this evidence shifts the focus from the individuals who perpetrated the attacks to entire cultures. If causation cannot be located in the individual, then culture and religion are often blamed. Commentators discuss an inherent hostility of Arabs or Islam, and, in doing so associate entire groups with the actions of a few representatives.

The idea of a clash of civilizations is a prime example of how individual action becomes transformed into a group identity. Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations?” was first published in 1993 as an essay (Huntington 1992). In it, he argues that the world will become increasingly dominated by large culturally and religiously defined blocks, most of which are antagonistic. Among other things, he predicts a major conflict between Islam and the West. His book by the same name made this point more forcefully and helped to establish an entire literature analyzing cultural antipathies (Huntington 1996). Huntington characterizes each of the major civilizations as largely uniform entities that pursue a single agenda. The clash of civilizations argument is a prime example of the tendency of imbuing cultures with a false degree of coherence and uniformity. Benhabib rightly criticizes this understanding of culture and blames it for the often simplistic responses to cultural disputes (Benhabib 2002). Other scholars have made the same point directly against Huntington (Sen 2007; Berman 2004). Despite this backlash, Huntington’s perception seems to be one of the dominant ways of understanding the War on Terror.

It is possible that there is something in culture or religion that causes violence, but it seems implausible that it can be so clearly connected to a single identity. However, in this case the truth hardly matters. The thought that the violence is produced by identity traits shared by millions of people in one’s own country is enough by itself to transform the hatred of the enemy into a hatred of anyone sharing some of the enemy’s characteristics. Thus, the military conflict becomes a civil conflict – a war of monitoring Muslims, subjecting them to additional security measures, harassing them, and reproducing the idea of the monolithic enemy. In this way, the War on Terror has been used in the US, UK, and the countries of Western Europe as a way of fighting multiculturalism.

The Immigrant Threat

The United States is often called a country of immigrants, but this commonality does little to alleviate the tension between newly arriving groups and those who already consider themselves assimilated. Like all immigrant groups, Arabs have faced discrimination and been derided as a group that cannot become truly American. Discrimination against Arabs is at least partly explainable with reference to the ongoing discrimination against immigrants. Immigrants threaten the sense of national integrity and are easily misunderstood. They are particularly worrisome for Americans because they undermine the feeling of isolation from the rest of the world. Immigrants are a clear sign that distant conflicts can reemerge at home. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that many of those falsely accused of terrorism are recent immigrants (Murray 2004). Unlike citizens by birth, immigrants are presumed guilty because of their identity.

There were cases of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim violence before 9/11 and these certainly would have continued even if there had not been an attack. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this group of immigrants would be as central to contemporary political debates if it had not been for the combined effects of the narrative of cultural difference that started in the 1990s, the image of Muslims as terrorists, and, above all, the ongoing wars against Muslim opponents. As Huntington and his supporters show, the idea that Muslims represent a distinct group that is intrinsically hostile to the West was
prevailed for at least a decade before the attack. The terrorist attacks of the late 1990s and the September 11, 2001 attacks seemed to confirm this suspicion. In doing so, they renewed interest in the idea of irreconcilable cultural difference.

It is important to see how much that the anti-immigration sentiment and general xenophobia have been magnified, and that this is strongly related to the ongoing war. In the US, the fear of immigrants and tendency to essentialize their identities were preconditions for the post-9/11 militarization of the civil sphere. Xenophobia is, of course, a major problem in itself, but the ongoing military actions have given it a much different character. Muslims are not hated or feared for their cultural and religious differences alone. They are no longer simply the Other. They are frequently represented as threats to American culture or American religious values. This is especially true of conservative commentators who cultivate the image of being ‘tough on terrorism’ and ‘tough on immigration’ to appeal to their constituents.

US immigration law has changed since the attacks to reflect the fear of Arabs and Muslims (Akram 2004). The idea that these are fundamentally different sorts of people with values that are incompatible with western society is a justification of this – an unassailable justification when immigration restrictions are linked to the values of patriotism and safety. Muslims are seen as potential enemy combatants, and no amount of evidence can counteract the perceived threat they pose because terrorism by nature reinforces the perception of threat from the civil sphere. This narrative was reinforced at the highest levels of government. President Bush and his staff continually invoked negative Arab stereotypes in speeches and in new policy decisions (Merskin 2004).

Race relations in the UK have followed a similar pattern. Discrimination against Arabs was prevalent even before September 11, but has increased since (Cainkar 2002; Poynting 2007). Before the War on Terror, xenophobia was primarily a response to the migration of Arabs and Africans to England. The association between Muslims and violence was already firmly established by the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, but there was little confrontation with terrorists domestically. This shows little sign of abating. Even after the British military scaled down its military commitment in Iraq, the social effects remain. Muslims continue to be a suspected minority.

Across Europe and in the US, the fear of a different culture infiltrating and corrupting societies has increased sharply over the past decade. Refiguring this fear in security terms, in the language of an ongoing war against a group of people that are associated with Muslims, legitimizes the desire to scrutinize them and doubt their loyalty. Civilians are encouraged to be as constantly vigilant as soldiers on the front lines. The terror threat level system, increased presence of security forces, and constant news coverage of terrorism all contribute to an atmosphere of insecurity. They encourage citizens to be constantly on guard against an attack. Campaigns like New York City’s “If you see something, say something” encourage civilians to constantly monitor each other. Through the militarization of the civil sphere, Muslims have been transformed from outsiders to enemy operatives threatening the west internally. “[T]he War on Terror has contributed to the emergence of new justifications for racism within the United States and Europe. In public discourses, fears of terrorist attacks have become displaced onto migrants and citizens of color, particularly male South Asians and Middle Easterners” (Al-Ali 2009: 7).

The idea of the sleeper cell is particularly problematic. More than any other characterization of terrorism, it captures the fear of an internal threat. The idea is that some Muslims are part of small, covert groups that will spontaneously rise up and begin attacking other citizens. These groups are particularly frightening because they are composed of people who seem to be assimilated – people who live ordinary lives, work normal jobs, and have families. The covert operatives even maintain their cover for years, only to use their role as trusted members of the community to perpetrate attacks. They are outsiders with all the characteristics of allies except for the hidden intention to attack when their host country is vulnerable. Although little evidence of sleeper cells has ever been uncovered, they figure prominently in news reports on terrorism. Many of the fictional attack scenarios that reporters discuss involve these sleeper cells launching surprise attacks.

In 2001, Stanley Fish predicted that “If we reduce the enemy to “evil,” we conjure up a shape-shifting demon, a wildcard moral anarchist beyond comprehension” (Fish 2001: A19). This turned out to be right, but his words of caution were not followed by many in the media. The effects of a narrative of demonizing terrorism and linking it closely with a religion and ethnicity are already visible in the United States and Europe. The danger now is that the same cultural militarization might spread into Canada, as it becomes a larger partner in the War on Terror.

Canada’s War

Canada’s responses to the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been important symbolic acts of autonomy. The country is often compelled to side with the US and UK in conflicts, but over the past century has increasingly sought to establish a distinct foreign policy. In 1914, Canada entered the First World War with Britain. Because of the countries’ political relationship, the British declaration of war pulled Canada into the conflict without the latter having much choice. Canada’s strong performance in the war contributed to national pride and led to a more autonomous foreign policy. Although Canada did enter the Second World War in support of Britain, it is important that it did so on its own terms. The declaration came on September 9, six days after the British declaration (Watson 1998: 156). This history of growing independence in deciding whether to declare war helps to explain why Canada has thus far taken a unique approach that does not universally support the US.

It remains important to display autonomy, both from Britain and from the United States. The former is still linked to Canada by a history of direct and indirect control. The
latter is perhaps an even stronger force for swaying Canadian foreign policy because of the countries’ close economic links and cultural similarities. The decisions not to participate in the invasion of Afghanistan and to oppose the Iraq War were powerful statements of independence. In fact, these decisions gave Canada the appearance of having a greater capacity to resist American influence that the British, who are widely seen as blindly following the Bush administration’s lead. Prime Minister Blair in particular is portrayed as an American puppet, someone who cared more about pleasing President Bush than looking out for his country’s interests. For much of the War on Terror the United States and Britain were the largest coalition partners. The close relationship has dissolved since Bush and Blair left office and Britain has scaled down its commitment in Iraq. Its politicians show growing resistance to supporting American interests in the Middle East.

A new partnership between the United States and Canada is forming to replace, at least partially, the weakening link between the US and Britain. This new partnership threatens to once again bring Canada into a supporting role for another country. Canadian participation in Afghanistan began soon after it was declared by President Bush. This early commitment to the war was primarily a symbolic gesture, as no soldiers participated in the invasion of Afghanistan. More direct support developed slowly, growing from forty soldiers in 2003 to around 2,500 in 2009. The Canadian contingent has engaged in heavy fighting against Taliban forces around Kandahar. It has also played a major role in the reconstruction effort in the region. The large American force often overshadows the Canadian efforts. Given the size of the Canadian contingent, it must fight according to the terms of the US military.

In short, Canada has gradually shifted to a militaristic foreign policy and become increasingly supportive of US objectives (McQuaig 2007). Stephen Harper’s announcement that Canadian soldiers would begin withdrawing in 2011 may reverse this. Still, Canada’s participation in the war for a decade and its ongoing support of American counter-terrorism has made the country a major partner in the struggle and given the United States the appearance of international support that it badly needs. Even after the 2011 withdrawal, Canada may have to face the threat of terrorist attack because of its participation in the war and tacit support of the coalition even when its soldiers are not involved. Canada continues to be morally and strategically linked to the coalition. As Wesley Wark explains, “We live on the northern flank of Al Qaeda’s great enemy and, whether we like it or not, we have to conceive of security in hemispheric terms” (Wark 2005). The military strategy reinforces this mutual dependency. The new coalition policy emphasizes integration between American and Canadian units, which may further unify the country’s policies regarding terrorism or at least implicate Canada in American decisions. This means that whatever course the Canadian military takes, the country is already firmly committed to the war. The social tensions produced by the war have taken root and Canadians have opened themselves to the constant threat of terrorist attack.

The War on Terror has already had profound effects on the two major coalition powers. In each country, civil liberties have been eroded, discrimination has increased, and narratives of domestic terrorism have become more common. The central question now is what effects Canadian society will experience as the country plays a more direct role in the conflict and is more closely aligned with US policy. Initially, Canada may seem a poor candidate for social militarization. The widespread opposition to sending soldiers into Afghanistan indicates an opposition to war, and perhaps also its corollaries. Only thirty-nine percent of the population supports the decision; it has been unpopular since the first soldiers were sent in (Taber 2010). Nevertheless, the same kind of anti-Islamic rhetoric that is common in the US is becoming prevalent in Canada. Despite its multiculturalism, Canada seems as susceptible to demonizing its enemies as its allies (McCutcheon 2009).

The Culture War in Canada

Tolerance and cosmopolitanism are central to Canadian culture, or at least to Canadian identity. There is a great deal of evidence suggesting that Canada does embody these traits better than most other democracies. As a multi-nation state, Canada demonstrates a high degree of institutional tolerance compared to other western states. The country has also demonstrated greater respect for indigenous peoples than many others facing the dilemma of how to compensate for past attacks (Banting 2006). Kymlicka finds that intermarriage is prevalent and there is a high frequency of friendships transcending ethnic divisions (Kymlicka 2001: 37). William Watson argues that Canadian tolerance is particularly important as a way of giving Canadians a unique identity and separating them from the US (Watson 1998). Indeed, descriptions of multiculturalism are often framed in opposition to its neighbour (Barry 2001: 294).

Many scholars have challenged the idea of the Canadian mosaic and shown that the perception of tolerance is somewhat misguided (Watson 1998: 173). Reitz and Breton argue that the perceived multicultural difference between the US and Canada is illusory and that there is really very little separating the two in this regard (Reitz 1994). Antipathy toward immigrants and selection biases when choosing who is allowed into the country, are common. Commenting on immigration trends between 1971 and 1981, Watson says “We naturally think of the United States as the more racist society, but in fact we were the ones with the stronger preference for Europeans” (Watson 1998: 152).

The degree of toleration in Canada is therefore contested. Many studies can be cited supporting it and providing counter-evidence. It appears that much of the disagreement has to do with the difficulty in operationalizing tolerance. Whatever the truth, Watson’s point is probably correct – the identity of multiculturalism is central to citizens’ self-perception. Whether or not it is true, the ideal of respect for minority rights is a powerful normative force. Even if it is not always borne out in practice, it can serve as a guiding principle. In fact, it is particularly important in this sense because this
value can serve as a starting place for mistreated minorities to work towards better treatment.

Foreigners also tend to perceive the country as being cosmopolitan, especially compared to the US. One reason for the perception of greater tolerance is that it is institutionalized. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have inclusive policies at the national level. These are weaker in the US and more prevalent at the state and local levels. Still, the substantive results are often the same (Banting 2006: 55). The evidence against Canadian multiculturalism suggests that the country has some of the xenophobia shown in Europe and the US. This is particularly true since the evidence against Canadian tolerance often focuses on the treatment of immigrants.

Canadian culture will have to contend with many of the same side effects of the War on Terror as the other coalition partners. Even if the country withdraws its military support, it remains deeply engaged in the same understanding of terrorism. Canada is largely dependent on a perception of the conflict that is created by its allies. Canadian media receives much of its information from foreign news agencies, primarily services run by American, British, and French agencies (Karim 2003: 14). This makes it susceptible to the anti-immigration sentiment that is popular in each of these countries. It also leaves Canadians under the influence of countries that may not have the same degree of respect for minority rights. As Said points out, the American media has a long history of presenting the Islamic world as a hostile entity threatening the west and that even apparently objective reporting often hides this bias (Said 1997). The framing effect of the media that produce much of the information about terrorism cannot be underestimated. It plays an active role in shaping the perception of threat.

Media are mobile spotlights, not passive mirrors of society; selectivity is the instrument of their action. A news story adopts a certain frame and rejects or downplays material that is discrepant. A story is a choice, a way of seeing an event that also amounts to a way of screening from sight (Gitlin 1980: 49-50).

This framing effect is not unique to foreign media. Canadian reporting has also contributed to the militarization of the civil sphere by excluding the majority viewpoint. Most Canadians oppose the War in Afghanistan and have since the first soldiers were sent into the country (Taber 2010). Nevertheless, news agencies often fail to report this bias. The popular opposition is overshadowed in favor of coverage of security threats. The national media’s coverage of domestic politics has often taken a conservative tone and contributed to the suspicion of attacks from within (Steuter 2008; Steuter 2009).

One can find evidence of the effects of the War on Terror in the responses to Muslim immigrants and activists. Many random attacks have occurred over the past decade, often linked to hate speech that is clearly directed against Muslims. When reasons are given for these attacks, the justification is usually framed in terms of the threat that Islam poses to the West. The opposition to Tariq Ramadan is a prime example of this fear. The Oxford University professor faced strong opposition from those claiming that he was a covert supporter of terrorism when he gave two lectures in Montreal in the spring of 2010. Many feared that he might be secretly working to spread discontent and to encourage domestic terrorism. Most telling of all was the criticism that he hides his true views behind a message of moderation and tolerance (Scott 2010). This is, of course, a claim that cannot be refuted, as anything Ramadan says will either be interpreted as extremism or a façade. The same goes for all of the charges made against Muslim immigrants. Muslims are clearly not the monolithic force that the clash of civilizations theory implies. Indeed, Canada provides examples of how many internal divisions there are. These show that it is misleading to characterize all members of the religion as being the same. First, there is the lack of any large-scale organization. One of the reasons Canadian Muslims have been easy targets is that they are heterogeneous, and have formed many associations rather than a single powerful organization that is capable of speaking on behalf of a unified group (Haddad 2002: 13). These organizational difficulties and the inability of Muslims to mount a united defensive against racism show that as a group they do not have the cohesion to wage a culture war on Canadian society. Second, Canadian Muslims, and Muslims in other western countries for that matter, have lacked the power to create an influential counter narrative over the past decade. The narrative of Muslim uniformity and hostility has gone relatively unchallenged.

Canada cannot resist being reshaped by Muslim influence. Several recent disputes have made this clear. One of the most controversial aspects of Islam are the niqabs and burkas that some women wear to cover their faces. Although these are relatively rare in western countries, many have issued bans on these to force women to expose their faces in public. Montreal’s Bill 94 would require workers in the public sector to always have their faces uncovered (Crowd Protests Quebec Niqab Ban 2010). Since the bill was proposed it has been resisted by Muslims and civil libertarians, but has been justified by the Immigration Department as a necessary protection against terrorism. The educational system, committed to both multicultural and secular values (Collet 2007) will likewise have to adjust. It is structured to encourage cultural understanding and tolerance, and teach immigrants this perspective, but by doing this in a secular setting it conflicts with Muslims’ strong religious convictions. The result is an antagonism between two central values. These and other issues will have to be resolved, but they would be best dealt with through a rational discussion and attempt at accommodation. Meeting these challenges from the militarized perspective of a country at war with Islam would be counterproductive.

Conclusion

This essay has shown the growing militarization of western states participating in the War on Terror. Although this process is encouraged by the governments’ actions and the prevalence of entertainment that reinforces the values of the
clash of civilizations view, the shift seems to have no single institutional source. Theories of ideology often attribute change to manipulation by a single force. In this case, the same narrative is reproduced by many actors: the media, scholars who essentialize Muslim identity, and citizens who use the war as an excuse to express their xenophobia. Although governments are responsible for waging the War on Terror and determining its objectives, an array of actors in the civil sphere contribute to the social militarization.

In most cases, the current suspicion of Muslims as enemy combatants is largely rooted in a preexisting suspicion of immigrants. This is certainly true for the countries discussed in this essay. The US and Canada in particular have a history of hostility towards residents of enemy nationalities, even when these people appear to be loyal citizens. Many of the overt signs of repression have disappeared, only to be replaced by suspicion from fellow citizens. Muslims in the west are widely seen as enemies, no matter how benign they appear, and will likely continue to be viewed that way until the scope of the war is redefined and we come to a more enlightened understanding of it. The demonization of the terrorist enemy has implicated many loyal citizens and threatens to reverse the progress of cultural tolerance. The fact that this comes in less overt forms than internment does not make the effects any less damaging.

There is some question about whether Canada really deserves its reputation as a cosmopolitan country with respect for minority rights. This question should continue to be assessed. However, whatever the truth, the idea of Canada as a culturally sensitive country is central to the national identity. This identity, along with the country’s Muslim inhabitants, is increasingly under threat from the growing militarization of western societies in response to the terrorist threat.

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