Across the Barricades: Non-Indigenous Mobilization and Settler Colonialism in Canada

Michael Morden
Department of Political Science, University of Toronto – Email address: michael.morden@utoronto.ca

Abstract: Recently, a new body of scholarship on “settler colonialism” has emerged with the goal of analyzing the non-Native dimension of Indigenous-settler relations, in Canada and other settler states. This paper will identify two shortcomings of the new literature: first, a tendency to conflate mass-level non-Natives with the state itself; and second, an erroneous, primordial presentation of non-Native norms and identity. This paper examines two case studies of settler political mobilization in opposition to Indigenous peoples in the contexts of the Indigenous occupations at Ipperwash/Aazhoodena in the early- to mid-1990s, and Caledonia/Kanonhstataon in 2006. The cases reveal consistency in how the mobilization is framed by non-Native participants – as a defense of abstract procedural principles like equality before the law and public order. This normative framework does not resonate with settler colonial theory. They also illustrate the degree to which mass-level non-Natives are autonomous actors in the relationship. During both conflicts, local non-Natives often advanced divergent interests from those of the state, producing a tripartite political dynamic that is not anticipated in the literature.

Keywords: Indigenous Peoples, settler colonialism

Résumé: Récemment, un nouvel ensemble de connaissances a émergé sur "settler colonialism," dans le but d'analyser la dimension non-Autochtone de la relation Autochtones / non-Autochtones, au Canada et dans d'autres pays d'immigration. Cet article identifie deux difficultés de ce nouveau courant de pensée: d'abord, une tendance à confondre la masse des non-Autochtones avec l'État lui-même; en deuxième lieu, une représentation erronée des normes et de l'identité des non-Autochtones. Cet article procède à deux études de cas de mobilisation politique des non-Autochtones en opposition à des peuples autochtones, dans le contexte des occupations autochtones à Ipperwash/Aazhoodena du début au milieu des années 1990, et à Caledonia/Kanonhstataon en 2006. Ces cas révèlent une cohérence des mobilisations conçues par les participants non-Autochtones comme une défense de principes procéduriers abstraits comme l'égalité devant la Loi et l'ordre public. Cette structure normative n'est pas en harmonie avec la théorie coloniale habituelle. Ces cas illustrent aussi le degré auquel la masse de la population non-autochtone est un acteur autonome de la relation. Lors de ces deux conflits, les non-Autochtones locaux ont souvent montré des intérêts divergents de ceux de l'État, induisant ainsi une dynamique politique tripartite que la réflexion n'avait pas prévue.

Mots-clés: peuples autochtones, colonialisme des non-autochtone
Introduction

The iconic image of the 1990 “Oka Crisis” - when Mohawks established road barricades to prevent development on disputed land, sparking a conflict with the Canadian army - features a private of the Royal 22e Regiment and an Anishinabek warrior, each clad in fatigues and nose-to-nose in confrontation. But in 2006, when an Onkwehon:we occupation of a building site in Caledonia, Ontario created a similar flashpoint conflict, the pictures that populated newspapers were different. Along with a preponderance of stock photos of warriors wearing bandanas and perched on barricades, we were confronted with photographs of local non-Natives furiously engaging the Indigenous protesters across police lines. The image was of horizontal conflict between groups, in other words, rather than vertical conflict between Indigenous actors and the state. This is an expression of the Indigenous-non-Indigenous relationship to which we should become accustomed.

But until recently, studies of Indigenous politics have left little space for the non-elite settler agent. The focus has been overwhelmingly on Indigenous people as agents, and the settler colonial state as a structure. Therefore, living, acting, mass-level non-Natives have rarely been recognized as the primary subject of analysis. There are normative reasons why this is undesirable. Focusing solely on Indigenous people contributes to the construction of the settler as an identity-neutral "universal subject," against which Indigenous peoples are contrasted as cultural deviants (Ava Baron, in Veracini 2010: 15). There are also empirical questions about the Indigenous-settler relationship that demand our attention. At present, we know rather more about how Indigenous peoples experience settler colonialism than about how settlers experience Indigenous people politically. Recently, efforts have been made to address this oversight. "Settler colonialism" has emerged as a sub-field of theoretically-grounded inquiry, distinct from Indigenous political studies. But the robustness of this theoretical body for explaining actual settler political mobilization remains in question.

This article is motivated by two questions: First, what are the normative foundations of non-Native political mobilization, in the context of conflict with Indigenous peoples? Second, can we draw a useful analytical distinction between mass and elite non-Native actors? In other words, in a settler colonial society, is the state the single expression of “settlerlessness,” or do non-Natives also exist outside the state as a meaningful third party?

These questions will be examined in the context of two flashpoint conflict events: the occupation of the Ipperwash army base and provincial park by Anishinabek protesters beginning in the early 1990s; and the occupation of a Caledonia building site by Onkwehon:we protesters beginning in 2006. Both cases saw some degree of mobilization by non-Natives in response to Indigenous direct action. These flashpoints and the horizontal conflict that accompanies them offer an opportunity to view mass-level settler mobilization around the Indigenous issue in an atypically raw and honest form. As a result, they can provide insight into the normative underpinnings of non-Native mobilization, as well as reveal the complex relationship between Indigenous people, the state, and mass-level settler actors.

This article will argue that although literature has recently sprung up around the study of settler colonialism per se, it has yet to satisfactorily address these questions. Theoretical accounts of settler colonialism tend to assume a race-based normative
framework predicated on the extinction of Indigenous peoples and the creation of new societies. There is a primordial streak in this presentation of settler colonial identity, which fails to capture the dynamic reconstruction of national identities that occurs in all contexts, including that of settler colonialism. Close reading of the discourse of non-Native agents suggests sincere commitment to an ostensibly "colour-blind" liberal national model, and that this is more than just a rhetorical ploy but actually a powerful normative basis for non-Native mobilization in opposition to Indigenous claims-making. The case studies also vividly reveal the degree to which mass-level settlers operate as autonomous actors in conflicts between Indigenous groups and the state. Though it takes different forms in either case, there is a distinct and consistent tripartite political dynamic, which produces surprising patterns of temporary alliances between Indigenous peoples, state actors, and non-Indigenous counter-protesters. The "psychocultural drama" (Ross 2001) of the occupation contributes clarity to settler political norms, and to the role of mass non-Natives as constraining actors on state elites and Indigenous activists.

Theories of “Settlerliness”

Until very recently, it was difficult to speak of a focused scholarly literature on non-Natives in the context of their relationship with Indigenous peoples. We caught only brief glimpses of the non-Native refracted through Indigenous studies - but this has begun to change. The term "settler colonialism" has entered the academic lexicon in force, as a normative label for abusive practices that victimize Indigenous peoples, a hair shirt cheerfully donned by self-declared "ally" activists, and increasingly, an autonomous area of scholarly inquiry. For example, settler colonial studies was recently dedicated its own specialist journal, and the work of authors such as Lorenzo Veracini and Patrick Wolfe have begun to generate a unified theoretical body to addresses the phenomenon.

The first task of settler colonial (SC) theory has been to distinguish SC from colonialism itself. Veracini explains: "Colonisers and settler colonisers want essentially different things... This analytical distinction, and the dissimilarity between the relational systems they establish, remains crucial especially because distinct stances create different conditions of possibility for different patterns of relationships" (2011a:1-2). Patrick Wolfe, for whom settler colonial invasion "is a structure, not an event" (1999: 96), explains the crucially different relationship of regime to colonized people: "The primary object of settler-colonization is the land itself rather than the surplus value to be derived from mixing native labour with it... settler colonization is at base a winner-take-all project whose dominant feature is not exploitation but replacement" (Wolfe 1999: 163). Settlers, in this presentation, are distinct from colonizers - the external agents of domination, who operate from distant metropoles in order to extract resource wealth - as well as from other kinds of migrants, who do not seek to "found[...] political orders and carry their sovereignty with them" (Veracini 2010: 3). This is an obvious disaggregation, but a useful starting place for theories of SC. It establishes SC as a more clearly bounded phenomenon, present in a limited number of cases worldwide.

The more complex question relates to what, beyond the obvious historical experience, unifies settler colonialisms, and makes them distinct? A constellation of ideas tends to emerge which focuses on the "organizing grammar" of race in settler
colonies (Wolfe 2006: 387). The ascendancy of White over Other has been identified historically - for instance by Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds - as a unifying idea and basis for transnational solidarity between settler colonies like South Africa, the United States, Australia and Canada (2008). Wolfe has argued that the various ways that race has been institutionalized reflects competing goals of SC; the imposition of blood quantum regulations on Indigenous people provided the means to enact their administrative elimination, whereas the "one drop" rule for people of African ancestry maintained a large slave labour resource pool (2006: 387-388). Race, in this presentation, is instrumental: a means of facilitating the removal of the Native in order to seize territory.

The SC ethic is typically understood to be predicated on the elimination of Indigenous inhabitants in the interest of creating space in which new societies can be invented. Elimination can be achieved through several different means: genocidal violence, assimilation, the creation of administrative restrictions on Indigenous belonging, and also incorporation into a monist national model. The insistence of settler colonial scholars is that there is no discordance in the models adopted by settler colonial states, even when they differ radically from one to the next, because all are anchored in a foundational "logic of elimination" (Wolfe 2006). Stated simply, "settler colonialism destroys to replace" (Wolfe 2006: 388).

These are core pillars of SC theory, which contribute theoretical language to some fairly basic historical, macro-political observations. But what do we know about settlers themselves? Veracini dedicates a chapter of his Settler Colonialism monograph to settler "Consciousness," highlighting "a number of paranoic dispositions characterising the settler colonial situation" (2010: p.75). The first and most important of these is "disavowal" of the Indigenous presence. In the settler imagination, the Native is described (rather opaquely) as "... either a being that, literally, cannot be touched, or a life form whose identity and appearance invariably assumes the shape that the coloniser is willing to project" (ibid, p.84). Settlers are also dogged by the experience of "primal scene:" "...the moment of inception of the subject's memory, which coincides with the moment when the illusion of a perfect origin... is disturbed for the first time by acknowledgement of the other's presence" (Temiz 2006). Occasional, inadvertent contact with Indigenous people produces frustration – and therefore aggression – because of the disruption it causes to idealized origins myths. Closely connected with this is the Freudian notion of "screen memory," defined by Veracini as "an inaccurate reconstruction (of the past) that obscures what really happened" (2010:90). This fiction is produced when the subject recognizes the significance of a memory, but is profoundly reticent to remember it. Settlers understand the high stakes associated with acknowledging Indigenous priority in time or the founding violence of their societies, and therefore carefully construct a mythological screen. Its maintenance necessitates non- or mis- recognition of Indigenous people.

Here are the beginnings of theory-grounded comparative analysis of settler colonial politics. There are however several shortcomings, particularly if we are to test this model against empirical studies of settler political mobilization. In the first place, levels of analysis are ambiguous. The bulk of settler colonial theory appears to be focused at the level of high politics, and there is a broad conflation of settlers with the institutions and structures of settler colonialism. Even Veracini's treatment of
settler "consciousness" provides few tools to disaggregate mass and elite-level non-Natives, as it is framed as a discussion of society-wide norms and discourse.

The model also presents what might be described as a primordial view of "settlerlessness" (Veracini 2011b), or non-Native identity. Veracini and Cavanagh (2013:1) insist that "...There is no such thing as neo-settler colonialism or post-settler colonialism because settler colonialism is a resilient formation that rarely ends." This sense is present in most works on the subject, which emphasize historical continuity in the many mutations of a single political and cultural project. Wolfe's argument about the logic of elimination, for example, insists that any appearance of dynamism in the historical experience of settler colonies is superficial (2011). This view of settler identity is not primordial in precisely the way the term is often understood - as an inescapable "organicist" form of identity, rooted in biological inheritance (Smith 2000). But it does anchor national identity in an immutable historical fact, and presumes that new expressions are variations on a single, constant theme. Settler identity in this presentation is perennial, ineffable, and a priori in the modern world - a product of past structural and political change but not vulnerable to future change. This is implicit in the nomenclature itself; no settlement has occurred in southern Canada for many generations. But scholars of SC, such as Adam Barker, insist on settler as a “...descriptive term that recognizes the historical and contemporary realities of imperialism...” (2009: 329). Settler self-identification with the continent is ruled inadmissible, factually incorrect (Barker 2009: 329). Settleness is ascriptive.

This is despite the ongoing, dynamic reconstruction that characterizes settler national identity, as it does all national identities. Canada provides ample evidence of evolving settler identities, changing national myths, and re-interpretation of the Indigenous-settler relationship. Mid-century theorists of Canadian settleness described a kind of "paranoiac disposition" that resonates strongly with the SC literature. For example, Northrop Frye famously identified a "garrison mentality" ubiquitous in Canadian literature. Garrison mentality was characterized by the insularity and oppressive collectivism of communities that live in fear of "a huge, unthinking, menacing, and formidable physical setting" (2011: 227). Margaret Atwood recognized something similar in her study of Canadian identity, a deeply anxious frontier discourse where "...the white expedition is small and totally surrounded by enemy territory, and the Indians win" (1972: 94).

But both Atwood and Frye, along with other savvy observers of settler Canadian identity, acknowledged profound change beginning in the 1960s. The Pearson and Trudeau Liberals engaged in a series of anti-colonial and indigenizing reforms to the national model. At the same time, English Canadian identity became dislodged from the colonial experience, and rooted instead in abstract liberal procedural principles. This process culminated in the eventual embrace of items such as multiculturalism and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as keystones of English Canadian identity. The settler's imagined relationship with Indigenous people also changed profoundly. The relationship ceased to be presented as zero-sum, as settlers came increasingly to see themselves as of the continent, and Indigenous people as their symbolic ancestors (Atwood 1972: 103). This incorporationist tendency is vividly apparent in contemporary discourse. Adam Gaudry (2013) wrote recently of the "Métis-ization" of Canadian identity, for example, which has seen Louis Riel reclaimed by English
Canada as a kind of visionary founding father. Gaudry highlights John Ralston Saul's recent and well-received literary effort at arguing (with spotty evidence) that Canadian values are actually founded in Indigenous knowledge and practice and that, as a result, Canada is a "Métis nation" (2009). Other examples abound. When the federal government invested heavily in national myth-making on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of the War of 1812, for instance, it prominently featured Tecumseth – implacable Shawnee foe of settler expansion - as a Canadian hero.

The obvious rejoinder from SC scholars is that this kind of incorporation is itself simply a new expression of the logic of elimination, a method of erasing the Indigenous fact by dissolving it into the broader settler politic. This is a defensible proposition, but a tautological one. If we accept that appearances are misleading and that settler colonialism is all things, it follows that all things are settler colonial. We have learned little new about the nature of settler politics. This thought can be expressed differently, as a problem of conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970; 1991). The concept of SC has been made to travel immense geographic and temporal distances, as well as vertically across levels of analysis. It has, of necessity, shed "heuristic validity, let alone testability" along the way (Sartori 1991: 249).

This paper suggests that SC studies can benefit from the importation of some broadly accepted principles in the comparative study of identity politics and intergroup conflict. Most important is that the researcher should largely allow their subjects to self-identify. This manifestly is not the case in the study of settler colonialism, which is dedicated to parsing settler discourse in order to uncover an underlying normative framework that would be viewed as unfamiliar by many of its ostensible practitioners. There is certainly debate in the field about how to appropriately analyze the normative bases for participation in intergroup conflict. Hayward and Dochartaigh (2013) suggested recently that "one of the risks in analyzing nationalism is … taking subjects' narratives or discourses at face value or, worse, treating them as fact" (Hayward and Dochartaigh 2013: 7). Russell Hardin and other rationalist scholars argue that the discourses of conflict participants only reflect post-hoc justifications for behaviour (Hardin 1995). But Marc Howard Ross is right to argue that "while competing narratives serve rhetorical purposes, they are much more than political posturing. They are also 'obviously true' to group members and offer plausible explanations about the conflict, its causes, the motives of the parties, and what appropriate behaviour follows from them" (2001:16). Settler narratives of conflict reveal important clues about the normative foundations of mobilization in opposition to Indigenous people. Taking discourse seriously allows us to push past our current reliance on satisfying but lazy strawmen.

Indigenous Direct Action and Settler Counter-Mobilization

This paper adopts two case studies of flashpoint conflicts originating in Indigenous direct action in order to study the foundations of settler mobilization. These conflicts provide a rare opportunity to view a more visceral, mass-level expression of non-Native mobilization around the Indigenous issue. They also provide a better-than-usual opportunity to study identity discourse. As Kissane and Sitter (2013) suggest, "during [conflict] a simplification of the national past occurs, one that obliterates nuance in favor of a dichotomous reading of national values...
when crises expose the vulnerability of the legal order, nationalists are forced to reconsider the moral basis of the political community..." (52-53). “Flashpoint events” (Russell 2010) like the “Oka crisis,” Ipperwash and Caledonia - all originating as physical occupations of disputed territory - are experienced by both parties not simply as interest disputes, but as what Marc Howard Ross (2001) calls "psychocultural dramas:

...conflicts between groups over competing, and apparently irresolvable, claims that engage the central elements of each group's historical experience and contemporary identity. The manifest focus of a psychocultural drama can be over the allocation of material resources... [but] At a deeper level, psychocultural dramas are polarizing events about non-negotiable cultural claims, perceived threats, and/or rights connected to narratives and metaphors central to a group's identity" (79-80).

As a result, they provoke reasonably honest expressions of settler identity in its relationship to Indigenous claims-making. What is revealed discursively is tremendous consistency across cases, not of a nationalist or particularist discourse, but rather of a defence of ostensibly neutral, "colour-blind" procedural principles of liberalism and "law and order". Both cases also demonstrate that the political agency of settlers is quite distinct from the state, and often focused in contradictory directions.

The case studies are based largely on 32 interviews conducted by the author in Caledonia and Ipperwash-area in 2012 and 2013. Interview participants consisted primarily of local non-Natives and Indigenous people that participated in or were close observers of the mobilizations, complemented with a small number of provincial and federal officials that were involved in negotiations. Participants were assured anonymity in recognition of the personal and professional repercussions that open and honest reflection about non-Native mobilization could incur, particularly given that mobilization was largely contained within local, small and dense social networks. Research also comprised local newspaper reportage, and some relevant documentary materials, including victims’ impact statements, websites, and official correspondences of non-Indigenous activist organizations.

**Ipperwash/Aazhoodena Occupation**

The southern shores of Lake Huron, in southwestern Ontario, were occupied by Anishinabe beginning in approximately the middle of the 17th century. The Anishinabe entered into a treaty federacy with the British after the collapse of New France, and were critical allies during the American Revolution and War of 1812. In the early 19th century, the Anishinabe experienced the degradation of more than 99% of their traditional southern Lake Huron land base (Holmes 2004: 18). Four reserves were created out of a surrender treaty of 1827, including reserves at Kettle Point and Stoney Point, or Aazhoodena, at the Ausable River outlet into Lake Huron. Non-Native developers continued to exert pressure on the Anishinabe into the early 20th century because of the tourism potential of the white sand beaches. Several shoreline tracts were surrendered in 1927 amidst allegations of corruption. One of these tracts was later converted into Ipperwash Provincial Park. During the Second World War, all of the Stoney Point reserve was appropriated by the Department of National Defence, and converted into an army camp. The residents
of Stoney Point were forcibly relocated to Kettle Point, where they remained for the next fifty years.

Beginning in the late 1980s, former residents of Stoney Point and their descendants began to demand the return of the land through direct action. Contention escalated from demonstrations to short-term occupations to the establishment, in 1993, of a permanent physical occupation of the army camp. In 1995, the occupation was expanded to incorporate the neighbouring provincial park. This produced violent conflict with the police, and the shooting death of an unarmed Anishinabek protester, Dudley George.

Settler Counter-Mobilization

The non-Indigenous community immediately adjacent to the army camp and provincial park is a mixed neighbourhood of cottages and year-round residences. The closest major town is Forest, Ontario, with a population of approximately 3000. There are a handful of other towns in the area, including Bosanquet, Grand Bend, Thedford and Arkona, which were amalgamated in 2001 into the municipality of Lambton Shores. The local non-Native response to the Aazhoodena occupation occurred on only a small scale prior to the conflagration with the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP), consisting primarily of low-grade lobbying of local politicians and police officials, and complaints about ostensible spill-over lawlessness from the occupation. Following the shooting, however, the OPP conceded de facto control of the park and immediate environs to the Anishinabé, pulling back into a containment posture. In this context, local settlers began to formally organize, professing fear of their perceived vulnerable position.

In the aftermath of the violent confrontation, cottagers and permanent residents began holding meetings under the auspices of a new organization called ON-FIRE: the Ontario Federation for Individual Rights and Equality. By 1996, the membership of ON-FIRE apparently totaled over 1300 members, including a high proportion of the small local non-Native population. The organization had also developed a constitution, by-laws, and membership application processes (Schultz 1996a). ON-FIRE took a hard line on enforcement. Its members publicly decried the peacekeeping approach of the OPP, even lobbying for the RCMP to be deployed in its place on the assumption that it would act more aggressively (Forest Standard 1996). The slow pace of negotiations meant that the land issue itself was not a non-Native preoccupation, but residents organized in opposition to other kinds of accommodation of the occupiers. For example, when the municipality planned to re-route a planned waterline after occupiers prevented access to contractors, the ON-FIRE leadership announced it was "shocked and appalled" that the council would acquiesce to the whims of Stoney Point protesters. Members pushed hard for local elites to adopt a more contentious posture vis-à-vis the occupation, insisting that: "we live this hostage situation every day. It is time to stand up" (Hillman-Rapley 1998).

The lobbying efforts of ON-FIRE strike several distinct discursive notes that are replicated closely in the Caledonia case. The group advanced a rights-based discourse, and rooted their opposition in procedural principles such as rule of law, public order, and equality. Surprisingly, there was also a consistent tendency to bracket Indigenous grievances out of the critique - even to acknowledge the veracity of Indigenous grievances - but to argue that they fail to offer sufficient justification for the violation of liberal equalitarian principles. Historical mistreatment of the Anishinabé and the responsibility for restitution were both externalized, and
framed as falling within the exclusive purview of the state.

Examples abound in letters written by ON-FIRE members to local and national political elites. One example is quoted at length below. The author draws a principled distinction between legitimate means for pursuing grievances – those that occur within institutions - and illegitimate means, without evaluating the Anishinabek claim in question. They also express the expectation that as "ordinary citizens," the local settler population should not be affected by conflict between Indigenous people and the Canadian state - the stuff of high politics. Finally, state agents are accused of pursuing some murky interest at the expense of non-Native citizens:

...Law and order are fundamental to ensure that individual rights are balanced with the needs of the community... In September 1995, some members of the community took it upon themselves to determine what was rightfully theirs without the benefit of the official judicial body. These members acting as they did, [sic] are by any definition lawbreakers. Whether the law is correct or not, lawbreaking is simply that... Law-abiding citizens expect the government to maintain a safe and healthy environment for its citizens. They know also that they are supposed to invoke the system set up by government when there is a dispute that is beyond their realm. The land claim dispute is not within the realm of ordinary citizens to resolve. Clearly, it is a government responsibility. The lack of government leadership in this dispute leads to the conclusion that the government has another agenda...(Author unknown 1996a).

Correspondences carefully avoid ethnospecific references. In the above example, the Anishinabek occupiers are described only as "members of the community," and later "lawbreakers." In other letters, they are referred to as a "special interest group" (Author unknown 1996b). ON-FIRE leaders also took great pains to counter any charge of racism; correspondences emphasized that "membership and representation in this Association has also been offered to all First Nations" (Schultz 1996b). They also commonly draw distinctions between legitimate Aboriginal claimants on the one hand - the Stoney Pointers, who had been victim of profound and unambiguous land theft - and non-local Natives on the other hand, who are accused of causing the real problems despite not having personal stakes in the return of the land. Many ON-FIRE letter writers acknowledged a history of mistreatment of Indigenous peoples and the need for restitution, but insisted that settler citizens should be unaffected by such a process. For example: “…we agree with the return of Ipperwash Army Camp to the natives. I have no problem with this, but when property surrounding the area is held in limbo, as a land owner I disagree” (Author unknown 1996d). Above all else, they protested an apparent state of "two sets of laws in Canada," a violation of the principle of equality (Author unknown 1996c). A member summarized the position: "There is a wider spread awareness of the need for equality in our country. [ON FIRE] has just begun to build support for fairness to all. ONE country - ONE law for all... we are not racist people, however, Gov't native policies tend to be racist - treating natives better than taxpayers" (Author unknown 1996c).

Indigenous-Settler-State Relations

In general, settlers at Ipperwash played a less central role in the flashpoint
event, and adopted less contentious means of collective action than their counterparts will be shown to have done at Caledonia. Partly, this reflects the nature of each conflict. As will be discussed below, the geography of the Caledonia occupation and blockades invited the direct participation of non-Natives. But the more peripheral role of mass-level settlers at Ipperwash also reflects a programmatic commitment on the part of the provincial government of the day to reflect the inputs of non-Natives in the context of negotiations and Aboriginal policy-making.

Mike Harris's Progressive Conservatives signaled during the 1995 election that the interests of non-Natives would play a larger role in land negotiations with Indigenous peoples. The party produced a consultation document in early 1995 that cited the fact that: "Non-natives voiced concern and consternation that land claim negotiations are conducted behind closed doors... Queen's Park [is] alienating non-natives. People believe that two systems of conservation law are being created: one for natives, and another for non-natives" (Linden 2007: 115). In response, the party promised to "balance the interests of native and non-native Ontarians by ensuring that all stakeholders are represented in native land claims negotiations. Native rights must be respected, but land claims negotiations cannot be the exclusive preserve of provincial bureaucrats and native band leaders" (interview 23 November 2012). This ideological and policy commitment on the part of the provincial government to prioritize local non-Indigenous interests in negotiations had the effect of reducing settler mobilization. Non-natives had ample opportunity to process grievances about conflict through normal channels, and generally did so.

But while mass-level settlers and the state were generally closely aligned during the conflict, they remained independent from each other. This was more obviously the case after the conflict had subsided when, beginning in 2004, the new Liberal provincial government commissioned an inquiry into the shooting death of Dudley George. The participation of local non-Natives in the inquiry reflected anger at the new public narrative that was developing around the conflict. At a community meeting, for example, ON-FIRE leader Mary LaPratt accused the Commission of undue sympathy to the Anishinabek cause while minimizing the hardship experienced by settlers: "You didn't live here, you weren't here" (Hillman-Rapley 2006). Local municipal politician Gord Minielly angrily refuted outsider elite portrayals of the facts: "The media has continually been told there were no guns [at the occupation site] and I want it on the record there were" (Hillman-Rapley 2006). Another local resident suggested the government response to
Ipperwash was driven by "blithering idiots on both sides" (Hillman-Rapley 2006). ONFIRE and organizers involved in the Caledonia counter-mobilization collaborated on a website titled The Ipperwash Papers, which purports to detail the deliberate exclusion of non-Indigenous voices from the inquiry, leading to a biased result: “the failures of the Ipperwash Inquiry [mean] that more innocent people… [are] destined to be sacrificed on the altar of political-correctness” (quoted in Hedican 2013: 182). If the participation of mass-level non-Natives in the conflict itself was muted, this was only a reflection of temporarily convergent state and non-Native interests.

Caledonia/Kanonhstaton Occupation

The Onkwehon:we, or Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, traditionally occupied a large territory in the area of present-day New York State. After the Revolutionary War, a large number of Onkwehon:we were forced out of the American, to re-settle in their traditional beaver hunting grounds at the Haldimand Tract, a 950,000-acre territory running along the Grand River. But the Tract was rapidly degraded after settlement, and an 1841 block surrender of questionable veracity left the Six Nations on a reserve constituting less than 5% of the original Haldimand Tract.

The Confederacy experimented with a range of methods for contesting the loss of land, including international advocacy and some early instances of direct action. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, several direct acts of escalating severity occurred. In February 2006, activists established an occupation of the Douglas Creek Estates building site on the outskirts of the town of Caledonia. The site was re-named Kanonhstaton, “the protected place.” The OPP performed a failed raid on the site in April, sparking massive mobilization from the community. Subsequently, the OPP declined from enforcing injunctions to remove the protesters, and was popularly perceived as adopting a more conciliatory and conservative policing approach that reflected the lessons of Ipperwash. Throughout the summer, clashes took place between the Six Nations protesters and non-Natives from Caledonia and elsewhere. Tensions were reduced over time, but the occupation remains in place to date.

Non-Native Counter-Mobilization

The unusually large degree of mass-level non-Native involvement in this particular mobilization is best explained by the political geography of the occupation. Caledonia has been described as "the first significant protest situation that involved an urban population" (interview, 25 February 2013). The targeted site was immediately adjacent to established residential neighborhoods of Caledonia, as well as a school, church, and retail area. It was also removed from the contiguous reserve, meaning that there were non-Native homes between the site and the reserve and thus, behind the barricades. The Kanonhstaton occupation was less geographically peripheral than Oka and Ipperwash, and the concomitant blockades had a more immediate impact on non-Native lives. As a result, settlers became highly mobilized, and adopted repertoires of action that met and exceeded the degree of contentious action deployed by Onkwehon:we.

The first major party in the non-Indigenous counter mobilization consisted primarily of residents of Caledonia, including prominent civic leaders. Behind the leadership of local businessman and future mayor Ken Hewitt, an ad hoc "unity" rally was organized shortly after the barricades were erected. The rally brought more than 3000 local non-Natives into the streets, and sparked the first confrontation
between Onkwehon:we and non-Natives across police lines (Keefer 2010: 79). These confrontations became routine, particularly on weekend nights throughout the spring and early summer (interviews 15 February 2013; 25 February 2013; Keefer 2010: 79). Hewitt and supporters coalesced into the Caledonia Citizens Alliance.

Though it was responsible for much of the initial mobilization, the Citizens Alliance did not represent the most hardline element within settler society, and was eventually out-bid by more confrontational parties. There was actually a significant degree of internal political diversity within the Alliance, and members split over the use of incendiary language (interviews, 27 February 2013; 25 February 2013). A more serious threat to both Indigenous peoples and state authorities intent on maintaining a relative peace came from outside the immediate community, and beyond the control of the Citizens’ Alliance. According to a member of the Alliance:

Any time you got close to a weekend, suddenly it became a grandstand affair, where everybody within 12 hours who wanted to make it a spectacle came in to grandstand…it became a rodeo… the [Citizens Alliance] had more influence on our own people in town. But there were weekends where you were on the speaker horn encouraging people to back off, and they’d tell you to "F" off. A huge volume of people, and none of them were locals. (interview, 25 February 2013).

Most notable amongst the "outsider" protest leaders was Gary McHale, a computer scientist and conservative political activist from Richmond Hill. He launched a website in the early summer of 2006 that became a hub for organizing counter-protests aimed at both the Onkwehon:we and state agents like the OPP and politicians. When the website first garnered attention, McHale acknowledged that he had no connection to the Citizens Alliance or "anyone else in Caledonia, really," but was provoked to mobilize out of principled rejection of the "two-tier approach" to law enforcement employed in Caledonia (Burman 2006). As the occupation wore on and local non-Natives began to demobilize, particularly after all the barricades had come down, McHale became the primary engine behind conflict in and around the site. In October of 2006, he organized a "March for Freedom" at the site, which drew a chorus of criticism from political elites. McHale organized an ongoing series of demonstrations in 2006 and 2007, earning notoriety for a particular protest performance meant to highlight the differential treatment of Indigenous and non-Indigenous people by police. On several occasions, McHale and his followers - later self-styled the "Caledonia 8" - attempted to enter the occupied territory and hoist a Canadian flag, but were prevented by OPP and Onkwehon:we security. In August 2007, McHale established an association called the Canadian Advocates for Charter Equality (CANACE) (Hamilton Spectator 2008).

The Citizens’ Alliance and McHale’s cohort differ vastly in degree, but there is a deep discursive consistency between them, which they share with ON-FIRE. Both groups directed their lobbying efforts toward the restoration of "rule of law" to the Caledonia area, and the reinstatement of equal treatment irrespective of ethnocultural origins. References to the Canadian liberal national model abounded, and much of the anger was outwardly directed toward the state, rather than just Onkwehon:we people directly. The Indigenous grievances at the heart of the
conflict were themselves not openly questioned, but also rarely addressed.

Hewitt, for example, argued that "legitimate land claims grievances with the federal government" did not justify direct action that disrupted lives and devalued homes: "since when did freedom of speech and freedom to protest give anyone the right to disrupt the lives of others, through fear, intimidation, the burning of tires, destroying public property...?" (Smith 2006). McHale drew the same distinction between political grievances and extra-legal action, insisting "I've made it perfectly clear that since I've been involved that I don't address land claims issues. If the government owes them the land, give it to them. If the government owes them money give them the money. My issue is that you cannot use criminal offences to further your political agenda" (Windle 2006a). He repeatedly refuted the perception that he was a racist, commonly invoking the Canadian liberal national model, and effectively presenting himself as an anti-racist activist:

The fact is we have a system now in Caledonia and Ipperwash where the laws of the land are dictated by your race... Obviously anyone takes a stand against a group in Canada, people throw out the racist card. I make no racist statements against them. The concept of equality, multiculturalism, the concept of freedom are not exclusive to any one group (Nelson 2006).

McHale even regularly (and gallingly) cited Martin Luther King as a hero and model in his advocacy. CANACE described its mission as "opposing lawlessness and racially-based policing during aboriginal land claims with the goal of preventing violence and civil rights abuses of both native and non-native citizens", and "...holding police, politicians and native extremists accountable for committing crimes...", all of which constituting "one of the most important human rights struggle (sic.) in our country's history" (Canadian Advocates for Charter Equality n.d. (a)).

Great pains are taken to avoid an ethno-specific discourse; McHale commonly insisted that "race based policing" and extremism also "victimized innocent native people as well" (Canadian Advocates for Charter Equality n.d. (b)).

Indigenous-Settler-State Relations

Caledonia/Kanohstaton offers some fascinating examples of the triangularity of Indigenous-non-Indigenous-State relations. At certain moments, state and Indigenous actors were more closely aligned than is anticipated in the dyadic, normative imagination of SC theory. During the most heated exchanges between non-Indigenous protesters and the occupiers, occupation site security worked in close concert with the OPP (interview, 9 February 2013). OPP passed warnings to the occupiers when (for example) they saw non-Natives massing in the Canadian Tire parking lot or stockpiling beer, or when they received intelligence of a planned march (Muse 2006a; Windle 2006b). When non-Natives were able to enter the site, they were often restrained by site security and promptly turned over to the OPP (Windle 2006c). After the failed raid, the OPP also openly focused its policing on non-Natives, rather than Onkwehon:we. During one major confrontation, a police officer told an Indigenous reporter: "...we aren't too worried about the Native side doing anything. The fact we only have five police facing that way kind of proves that, right?" (Windle 2006d). The structure of the police deployment was cited by hardline opponents of the occupation as evidence of OPP-
Onkwehon:we mutual complicity (Blatchford 2011).

Beyond ground-level policing, there was cautious cooperation between Indigenous and state leaders in managing the conflict (if not in settling claims), and this cooperation often earned the ire of mass-level and local elite settlers. Provincial and federal officials took pains to persuade non-Natives of the legitimacy of the negotiations they had entered into. David Peterson, the former premier and first province-appointed negotiator at Caledonia, was routinely heckled in public presentations to the people of Caledonia, facing the accusation that: "Anything the Indians want, you'll give them" (Muse 200b). While provincial and federal actors established negotiating tables with the Haudenosaunee, for example, the local municipal council passed a resolution condemning any negotiations that occurred before the barricades were removed (Muse 2006c).

The surprising degree of cooperation between Indigenous and state actors, to the exclusion of local non-Native actors, is reflected in two brief anecdotes. First, when OPP commissioner Gwen Boniface resigned her post in August 2006, leading Onkwehon:we protesters paid her tribute, citing her "patience" and "peaceful resolve" (Puxley 2006). They were echoed by other Indigenous leaders. This was in stark contrast to mass-level and local elite non-Natives, who had been fiercely critical of her for perceived acquiescence to Indigenous militancy. Both the Mayor of Haldimand County and Caledonia Citizens' Alliance leader Ken Hewit publicly celebrated her departure, condemning her for failing her responsibilities to the people of Caledonia (ibid.). In a similar vein, in 2009 the new OPP commissioner, Julian Fantino, shocked non-Native observers by defending an occupation-member in court. Clyde “Bullet” Powless, leader of site security at Kanonhstaton from the early stages of the occupation, was charged with assault after an altercation with Gary McHale. Powless pleaded guilty, but Fantino wrote a letter presented in court in his defence. The OPP commissioner praised Powless for "diffusing serious conflict and confrontation," and went on to accuse McHale of "mischief-making forays into Caledonia" (Brown 2009).

Certainly, immense ill-will existed between the Onkwehon:we and OPP, particularly after the OPP raid which was perceived as breaking several explicit promises that had been made to Six Nations. But despite this, there was some meaningful cooperation between Indigenous and state actors at various points in the occupation. From a theoretical standpoint, it is more important that often these two parties aligned in opposition to the expressed interests of mass-level settlers.

Discussion

What does settler mobilization in conflict reveal about the foundations of SC? The above cases suggest two conclusions: first, that Canadian settler political mobilization is framed in terms of norms of procedural liberalism; and second, that mass-level settlers are not agents of the settler colonial state, but are actually autonomous actors capable of operating in opposition both to Indigenous peoples and to the state itself. Both findings can be read as disruptive to the SC theoretical body in its present iteration.

The settler consciousness described to us in the theoretical literature is not recognizable in the discourse of actual settlers - even those specifically mobilized in opposition to Indigenous assertiveness. It is difficult to accommodate Veracini's notions of "primal scene" or "screen memory" to the cases described above. This
is particularly true because of the most surprising tendency expressed by groups as radically anti-Indigenous as CANACE and ON-FIRE: their readiness to acknowledge the fact of historical injustice towards Indigenous people. The dubious sincerity of their concern over these injustices is immaterial. What is important in this analysis is how settlers make sense of the conflict. The historical narrative implicit in their presentation does not imagine Indigenous people out of existence. It does not even preclude the possibility that some form of redress is necessary in the present tense. Instead, it rallies around procedural norms about the legitimacy of direct action, and the importance of (ostensible) equality before the law. It imagines a clear distinction between the settler body politic and the state. The latter is that which is guilty of mistreating Indigenous people, and therefore rendering mass-level settlers vulnerable to Indigenous reprisals. The imagined in-group-out-group entanglement is rather more complex than Indigenous-Settler, or "civilization-savage" as is often suggested. "Us" makes some space for well-behaved Indigenous people, especially local Indigenous people that have experienced injustice but remained committed to institutionalized methods of pursuing redress. "Them" includes Indigenous protesters, but also cowardly non-Native elites that are unwilling to defend sacred principles like the rule of law. These normative foundations are explicit in the organizational appellations themselves - the Ontario Federation for Individual Rights and Equality, Canadian Advocates for Charter Equality - which echo each other to a remarkable degree. They serve rhetorical purposes, indisputably, but also reflect the ideational basis of the non-Native critique.

To be clear, this is an empirical rather than normative argument. It is not to suggest, for example, that settler counter-mobilization does not include substantial racist content. Racism was perfectly explicit at both flashpoint conflicts - for example, in the presence of organized white supremacist groups like the Northern Alliance, who commonly visited Caledonia on weekends (interview, 9 February 2013; Keefer 2010: 81); in young Caledonians waving placards that read "Don't Feed the Animals;" and in avowedly racist hate mail sent to a young member of the Ipperwash occupation. It was also, of course, present in far subtler forms. All interview subjects – including direct participants in non-Native counter-mobilization – identified casual and explicit racist sentiment amongst some members of established non-Native groups. It is present though unconscious in quotes presented above – for example, by the letter writer who deplores racism while in the next line distinguishing between “taxpayers” and “natives” (Author unknown 1996c). But whether and where racism is present as a social-psychological impulse is a separate question, and sometimes a difficult one to answer with the political scientist’s level of remove from individual subjects. Regardless of the answer, it remains the case that there is empirical relevance in how participants discuss the conflict and their participation in it. Mass-level discourse, in particular, is less likely to be the function of strategic framing, and more likely to reflect the cognitive schema that produce what Ross calls "obviously true" facts, "plausible explanations about the conflict" (2001: 16). Rather than emphasizing race or disavowal, mobilized non-Natives framed their critique around anti-racist precepts, arguing that Indigenous exceptionalism was itself a form of racism.

The autonomous nature of mass-level settlers was clear both in discourse and in observation of the dynamics of the flashpoint event. This too is theoretically important in the study of SC. Veracini
(2011) describes "triangular relations" as an intrinsic condition of SC, but he refers to something quite different: the settler colonizer is presented as an integral whole, confronted with the dual agencies of Indigenous and subaltern Others. But the three agencies in the cases examined above belong to state elites, Indigenous people, and mass-level settlers. The point is not simply that mass-level non-Natives are something beyond agents of a unitary settler project. In some cases, Indigenous and state agencies may be more closely aligned - albeit temporarily - than state and mass-level settler agencies. This was the case at Caledonia, for example, when both Onkwehon:we and political elites desired to maintain the relative peace, and so cooperated to mitigate the threat of angry settler counter-mobilizers. In other contexts, Indigenous and settler mass actors may have convergent interests to the exclusion of the state - for example, in the timely resolution of land claims disputes. When Caledonians held their first angry rally, occupation leader Clyde Powless told a Six Nations newspaper: "I think it's good. They are angry about this too... We all want the same thing here" (Windle 2006e). This recognition generates a greatly more complex image of Indigenous-settler relations, and one that can inform studies of land claims negotiations, Aboriginal Affairs policy-making, as well as more abstract and theoretical work. It reminds us that both settler and Indigenous elites operate inside of “nested games” (Tsebelis 1990) – that their orientation towards each other partly reflects social pressures from their respective communities, including intragroup political challengers. Non-elite settlers theoretically possess the agency to derail efforts at reconciliation or restitution at the political level even when it is actively pursued by elites.

There is vast room for future productive research on non-Indigenous political responses to Indigenous people, with several important questions for which there are yet no answers. For example, what motivates non-state settlers to mobilize in opposition to Indigenous peoples, within or outside of institutions? I have sketched out the normative framework through which settlers make sense of their involvement, but have not here weighed norms against other kinds of explanatory factors, such as material interests, to determine what represents the foremost impetus for mobilization. Organizing against a blockade or occupation, which can impose daily inconvenience or even decreases property values, suggests a *prima facie* instrumental motivation. But it is notable in the case of Caledonia that outsiders like Gary McHale – people unaffected by the material costs of the occupation – led the most contentious mobilization. McHale and company made their cause portable, seeking to mobilize non-Natives in other communities that experienced Indigenous direct action. When leading non-state settlers become this far removed from the immediate impact of Indigenous direct action, the explanatory power of norms begins to look stronger. But on this question, more research is required.

It should also be noted that non-native involvement in Indigenous politics is far from univocal. There is a small but growing research literature on “allies” and allyship – non-Native mobilization in defence of Indigenous claims to sovereignty, jurisdiction and resources (see for example, Davis 2010). Much of this is dedicated to normative questions about appropriate forms of participation, but attention has also been paid to instrumental and substantive partnerships between, for example, environmentalists and Indigenous groups. The allyship phenomenon has obvious bearing on questions of non-elite settler
agency, and the normative underpinnings of settler identity. Future research should continue to explore the origins of, motivations for, and expressions of allyship in practice.

To further complicate matters, the distinction between state actors and non-elites threatens to obscure important differences between actors at various levels of government. Federal, provincial, and municipal governments often have divergent interests with respect to Indigenous direct action, and though space did not allow for this political dimension to be developed here, it was vividly apparent in both cases. Of particular note was the orientation of municipal governments at Caledonia and Ipperwash; in both cases, the municipalities were distinctly less conciliatory than their federal and provincial counterparts, siding (perhaps unsurprisingly) with the mobilized local non-Natives. Recently, more research attention has been paid to municipality-First Nations relations (see for example Alcantara and Nelles 2011), and this line of inquiry can also contribute to the study of settler colonialism.

In short, SC studies should make space for the dynamic and heterogenous nature of the phenomenon under examination. "Settleness" is a moving target, and to fit each new iteration awkwardly into a set of limited theoretical constants is to deprive it of heuristic value. The cases studied here suggest that contemporary Canadian settler identity is grounded in a liberal national model, and as such, does not require the disavowal of the Indigenous fact - or even the fact of historical injustice - in order to mobilize non-Natives into horizontal conflict with Indigenous people. Moreover, when SC is presented as a conflation of state and people, important insight into the politics of Indigenous-settler relations is obscured. In the case of Canada, the contemporary reality is that mass-level settlers regard the direct institutions and practices of SC - the Indian Act, for example, which maintains the separateness of First Nations from the broader body politic - as violations of their liberal egalitarian national model. Their interventions are often equally antagonistic towards Indigenous and state agents. As such, they can act as constraints at best, and veto players at worst in the pursuit of restitution. The result is a constellation of intra and intergroup relations that is infinitely more complex than the basically dyadic imagination of SC theory. There is no reason that sharpening our empirical lens must entail blunting the moral argument around which the study of settler colonialism is built.

Works Cited:


Personal Interview. Caledonian civic leader. 27 February 2013. Caledonia.


