Radicalism, Protest Votes and Regionalism: Reform and the Rise of the New Conservative Party

Anthony Sayers
Department of Political Science, University of Calgary – Email address: asayers@ucalgary.ca
David Denemark
Political Science and International Relations, University of Western Australia – Email address: david.denemark@uwa.edu.au

Abstract For descriptive and analytical reasons there is an understandable tendency to view political parties as homogenous. Yet it is widely known that most parties, particularly those that compete in single-member plurality systems, are effectively coalitions. This paper explores support for the Reform Party of Canada in part to better understand the character of the current governing Conservative party of which it was a founding component. We find a party that attracted two distinct kinds of supporters: radicals, for whom support reflected the appeal of Reform party policies, its leader and ideology, and protest voters for whom it was mainly an alternative to the then-governing Liberals. These supporters were geographically concentrated, with the former in Western Canada, and the latter in Eastern Canada. Such diversity describes one of the central challenges confronting all parties operating in Canada's single member plurality system: sustaining a coalition of supporters in which reasons for attachment to the party vary by region. As with previous governments, it helps to explain the peculiar political demands that confront the current Conservative government as it seeks to maintain this coalition.

Keywords: political parties, Reform Party, Conservative Party, protest votes, regionalism ; populism

Résumé: Pour des raisons descriptives et analytiques, on tend à percevoir les partis politiques comme des ensembles homogènes. Il est pourtant notoire que la plupart, surtout ceux qui compétitionnent dans des **systèmes uninominaux où s'affrontent plusieurs partis**, sont en fait des coalitions. Cet article explore l'appui du Parti Réformiste du Canada, en partie pour mieux comprendre les caractéristiques du Parti Conservateur actuellement au pouvoir, dont le Parti Réformiste fut une composante fondatrice. Nous sommes en présence d'un parti qui attira deux types distincts de partisans: des radicaux qui appuyaient le Parti Réformiste, son leader et son idéologie, et des électeurs qui cherchaient surtout une alternative au Parti Libéral alors au pouvoir. Ces deux types de partisans étaient concentrés régionalement, les premiers dans l'Ouest, les seconds dans l'Est du Canada. Cette diversité illustre un des défis majeurs auxquels sont confrontés tous les partis en lice dans le système canadien, **uninominal à plusieurs partis**: stabiliser une coalition de partisans pour lesquels les raisons de soutenir un parti varient selon la région. Comme pour les gouvernements antérieurs, cela contribue à expliquer les exigences politiques spécifiques auxquelles le présent gouvernement Conservateur est confronté alors qu'il vise à maintenir cette coalition.

Mots-clés: partis politiques, Parti Réformiste, Parti Conservateur, vote de protestation, régionalisme ; populisme

Introduction

In a foundational analysis of Canadian partisan and electoral politics, Johnston and his co-authors (1992) map the distinctive ideological and regional coalitions that underpinned Canadian parties at the time of the 1988 federal election that so spectacularly collapsed in the subsequent 1993 election. Such intra-party coalitional politics is common in parties operating in single member plurality electoral systems that usually deliver a substantial legislative premium to the largest electoral party. The drive to build a large enough party to win overcomes the appeal of ideological purity.

The collapse of the then ruling Progressive Conservative (PC) party at the 1993 election ran along the fault lines identified by Johnston and his colleagues, with the Reform Party of Canada soaking up much of the western support lost by the Tories and the Bloc Québécois (BQ) benefitting in Quebec. Though the remnants of the Progressive Conservative party were about the same electoral size as Reform, it managed to win only two seats compared to the 50 won by the latter.

Reform went on to reshape party politics in Canada, helping to mould the Conservative Party that resulted from the 2004 merger of its own successor party, the Canadian Alliance, and the older Progressive Conservative Party. The new Conservatives have gone on to win three successive elections and arguably end 100 years of Liberal Party electoral dominance.

A decade later, discussions of the character of the current Conservative government emphasize the continuing strength of the populist Reform-Alliance impulse over that of the older Progressive Conservative Party. In a recent article discussing possible changes to cabinet, national affairs columnist Jeffrey Simpson noted that Defence Minister Peter McKay, once leader of the Progressive Conservatives, was '….the last Tory surrounded by the hard-line breed running the show' (Simpson, 2013). While much is made of this distinction, there is a tendency to treat the Reform element itself as homogeneous (for example, see Belanger and Godbout, 2010).

Yet the essential nature of this party that changed the face of Canadian politics is not settled. Flanagan (2007) speaks of Reform consisting of five parties. Archer and Ellis (1994) note the demographic and ideological distinctiveness of its activists compared with those of other parties and point to divisions in the beliefs of core Reform supporters. Applying Pinard's (1971) theory of one-party-dominance, Belanger (2004) suggests that ideology, associated with policy voting, is less important to its rise than its role as a protest party, capturing general discontent and displacing the Progressive Conservative party.

We know that minor parties in majoritarian electoral systems may play two distinct roles. They may attract the disaffected who cast a negative, protest vote primarily as an expression of disdain for the major parties. Or they may attract radical or policy voters who intend to elect representatives who in favouring policies ignored by current parties, wish to challenge political orthodoxy (Bowler and Denemark, 2002; Dalton and Anderson, 2010). In the Canadian case, we know that all parties experience marked regional variation in support, evidenced in Reform's strength in Western Canada and weakness elsewhere.

We use data from the 1997 Canadian Election Study (the last election in which Reform ran) to apply a model that allows us to identify the character of support for Reform along three dimensions: protest voting, radical or policy voting and regional voting. We seek to establish the extent to which Reform's support was rooted in political disaffection, reflecting performance-based protests captured by economic fears and party leader support. Or, alternatively, we explore the degree to which Reform's support reflected ideological concerns and therefore a more purposive positive vote by policy voters.

The first of these would reflect support grounded in Reform's role as a minor party alternative to the major-parties while the second would suggest the impact of a hitherto untapped, or lightly tapped, vein of more radical politics. We map regional variation in the density of these two types of supporters to analyze the interaction between the regionalization of the vote in order to understand the character of political support post 1993.

The results show Reform attracted both sorts of voters: protest voters drawn primarily from late-deciding, non-partisans disproportionately in the East and radical, ideologically motivated self-identifying partisans or policy voters heavily, but not solely, located in its Western heartland. This regional variation on key issues among Reform voters was central to its coalitional dynamics. Policy partisans across the country held significantly stronger stances on key social attitudes than did their non-partisan Reform voting counterparts. These voters were concentrated in the West. Reform's non-partisans in 1997 were late-deciding protest voters - with a lighter attachment to its social and economic policies but concern for government probity – spread across the country, but concentrated in the East. In short, a sizeable mainly radical element heavily concentrated among its supporters in Western Canada and a smaller mainly protest component concentrated in the East. These differential concentrations of partisans and protesters point to a significant mediating role played by electoral rules in shaping not just elections but Canadian political parties (Cairns, 1968). In the East where the concentration of Reform voters was low, Canada's first-past-the-post system all but precluded the election of representatives to Ottawa, reducing the party to a vehicle for mainly symbolic protest voting. As Rosenstone et al. (1984) have shown, this type of support can be ephemeral – voters are not willing to repeatedly waste their votes for a hollow protest. Higher concentrations of support in the West

secured parliamentary representation for the Reform Party and the more visible profile that accompanies official Opposition status. These supporters could rightfully regard their votes as purposive and part of an ongoing political movement of consequence. Reform's regionalism, though perhaps originally the product of regionally specific concentrations of alternative social and political attitudes, was reinforced and sustained by Canada's FPP electoral system and became central to the politics of the Conservative party after 2003.

The Canadian case serves as an important reminder that political parties – particularly in single member plurality electoral systems – nearly always fulfill multiple representative roles. In particular, populist minor parties are often at once a vehicle for the expression of radical ideological issues or policy voting by deeply attached partisans, and also for frustration with traditional party alternatives among voters who feel no deep affinity for the party and its larger program; they are in this sense two parties in one.

This analysis allows us to understand the character of the coalition built by the current Conservative government and its fault lines beyond that between its former Reform and Progressive Conservative voters. The Reform component of the new Conservative party was itself comprised of two elements, those drawn by its capacity to generate new policies and those disaffected by the 'Liberal' and perhaps 'PC' way of doing politics. The subsequent merger of the Reform and the Progressive Conservative parties brought into the new Conservative party voters whose ideological preferences were more closely aligned with those of late-deciding protest voters in 1997 (see Bélanger and Godbout 2010). In this regard, the results of the Gomery Commission (2005; 2006) that indicated corrupt behaviour relating to the Liberal party while it was in office likely swelled the ranks of disaffected voters willing to support the Conservatives and encouraged it to keep issues of government probity high

on its election manifesto and policy agenda, matched with more traditional ideologically conservative concerns.

From 2004 until now, particularly at a rhetorical level, government accountability along with clearly conservative policies on major issues such as the economy (taxation and spending), immigration, policing and the family have been key elements of the Conservative's platform and policy agenda. The former address disaffected voters, the latter more policy oriented voters, although modified somewhat by the impact of the world financial crisis of 2008-9. The Conservative Party exhibits elements of the coalitional dynamics that underscored Reform's rise to national prominence in 1997. Canada's regionalism combined with its first-past-the-post electoral rules continues to play a vital role in these processes.

The Rise of Reform

The emergence of the Reform Party of Canada in the late 1980s gave expression to increasingly sharply felt social dislocation and political disaffection for which the traditional parties were viewed, especially in the West, as having no real response (see Gagnon and Tanguay, 1996, p. 107). Geographic variation in support is a constant of Canadian politics, regularly expressed since 1921 in the rise of regionally based minor parties (Bickerton, 1996, p. 497). Major parties bound by the need to forge electoral majorities in the two most populous and economically powerful provinces, Ontario and Quebec, struggled to accommodate these distinct agendas (see Carty, 1992: 578). While reliance on federal support may have limited the willingness of voters in Atlantic Canada to challenge the status quo, a tradition of suspicion and resentment developed in the increasingly affluent West to the domination of national politics and parties of the priorities of Ontario and Quebec: manufacture, multiculturalism and special accommodation

of French-speaking Canadians (Nevitte, et al., 1998).

This sense of exclusion was fuelled by the increasingly convergent programs of the Liberals and Conservatives on platforms often at odds with the sentiments of Westerners. Across the 1980s and 1990s, the two major parties took turns presiding over a struggling Canadian economy and increasing levels of debt, while extending commitments to multiculturalism and the accommodation of minority claims for special benefits. Western conservative voters in particular were alienated by this convergence and the actions of the Progressive Conservative government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. Mulroney oversaw the expansion of bilingualism, immigration and multicultural programs (Flanagan, 1995, p. 40), while introducing a Goods and Services Tax (Gagnon and Tanguay, 1996, p. 115). Western conservative discontent came to a head when the government awarded a major aerospace contract to Bombardier of Montreal despite receiving a technically superior bid from Bristol Aerospace in Winnipeg. As McCormick summarizes: "The Conservative government notwithstanding, the West was clearly low on Ottawa's priorities" (1991, p. 343).[1]

With the failure of the New Democratic Party (NDP) to establish itself as a viable alternative to the two largest parties (Harrison, Johnston and Krahn, 1996, p. 160), those disenfranchised by their opposition to these issues came to see the party system as broken (Gagnon and Tanguay, 1996, p. 107). The result was a marked erosion of both the popular confidence in the major parties (Barney, 1997, pp. 577-81) and the perceived legitimacy of the federal government and its welfare state services (Laycock, 1994). Combined, these set the electoral stage for the emergence of a party premised on championing those concerns (Harrison, Johnston and Krahn, 1996, p. 163).

The Reform Party of Canada

At its first Party Assembly in 1987, Reform fundamentally challenged the programmatic and electoral status quo (Gagnon and Tanguay, 1996, p. 128). Its first policy platform called for the rejection of special status for Quebec, a reduction in the scope of the Canadian welfare state, an end to official bilingualism and the tightening of immigration (Nevitte, 1998, p. 176). Emphasizing the burden of claims on the federal budget and bureaucracy imposed by 'special interest groups,' leader Preston Manning argued Canada was suffering under the yoke of a 'tyranny of the minorities' that threatened both national unity and fiscal responsibility. He called for a downsizing of the federal bureaucracy and the return of as many governmental duties as possible to the private realm (Barney, 1997) and local or provincial governments 'closest to the problem and need' (Manning, 1996; Archer and Ellis, 1994, discuss these issue attitudes amongst Reform Party activists). Consistent with a populist view of politics, Manning also promised to introduce citizen initiatives, parliamentary free votes, town hall meetings, and referendums to restore grassroots control over a federal political system that he believed had lost touch with its constituents.

Despite fielding 72 candidates in the 1988 federal election Reform failed to win a seat. But just months before the 1993 federal election Reform was gifted an 'exquisite' chance to 'showcase its political agenda on a national stage': the 1992 Charlottetown Accord constitutional referendum to consider the issue of special, distinct status for Quebec (Nevitte, et al., 1998, p. 176). By opposing what all other parties supported, Reform gained national exposure and cemented itself as the supporter of a distinct notion of national unity at odds with the politics of minorities embedded in the Accord. Opposition to the Accord fit well with Reform's populist egalitarianism and its opposition to special treatment for Quebec and aboriginal peoples.

Reform managed this feat in part by refusing to run candidates in Quebec. Not having to accommodate the sentiments of Quebec's voters allowed it to maintain its vigorous attack on special status for the province. All other parties confronted the difficult task of fashioning a sense of Canadian unity that included the mainly French-speaking and distinct province. Reform's non-Quebec strategy also made the most of the plurality logic of Canada's single-member-district electoral system. As with many minor parties in Canada and elsewhere, Reform could build its electoral fortunes by outpolling national parties among regional concentrations of alienated voters (Nevitte, et al., 1998, p. 193).

The 1993 election saw the governing Progressive Conservatives implode, gaining just 16 percent of the vote and losing 168 of their 170 seats, an unprecedented rejection of a governing party (Nevitte, et al., 1998, p. 173; also see Carty, Cross and Young, 2000). Reform won just 19 percent of the vote but in replacing the PCs as the plurality party in the west gained 52 seats (winning 22 and 24 in Alberta and British Columbia respectively). The Bloc Quebecois, running only in Quebec with the goal of separation from Canada, won 14 percent of the vote and 54 seats. The traditional left-wing minor party, the NDP, lost two-thirds of its vote and sank from 43 to 9 seats. With just 41 percent of the vote, the Liberals won 177 seats and a clear majority, establishing a pattern that was to define Canadian politics for a decade.

The campaign for the 1997 federal election echoed many of the same themes as 1993. Manning and Reform continued to oppose special bilingualism and special status for Quebec, benefits for minority groups, and concern with changing moral standards and lifestyles choices of society. The federal government was characterized as both inefficient and out of touch with the average citizen (Gidengil, et al., 1999, pp. 266-67). In the end, Reform retained its

share of the national vote (19.4 percent), sufficient to secure it 60 seats in the House of Commons, and the mantle of official Opposition to the returned Liberal government. It did so in an election where regional differences were significant factors in both the patterns of votes and the issue appeals designed to win them. The empirical analysis that follows explores these patterns in the 1997 Canadian federal election.

Protest and Radical Sources of Populist Minor Party Support

Several Anglo-American and European democracies experienced the rise of new populist parties such as Reform around the turn of the 21st Century (Canovan, 1999, p. 4; Sigurdson, 1994, p. 257) as established parties faced challenges associated with rapid change (Barney, 1997; Betz, 1998, pp. 1-10; Kitschelt, 1997, chapters 8-9). Electoral support for these parties has taken a variety of forms, but two have been pre-eminent in recent decades – one rooted in protest, the other in ideological or policy voting.

The first reflects the role of minor parties as residual catchments of short-term, performance-oriented disaffection (Duverger, 1954; Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus, 1984, p. 15). Support of this type is not the product of voters' ideological fervency as much as of their disdain for the major party alternatives, and likely to resemble the votes going to any minor party alternative to the incumbent party. That is, short-term protest voting reflects voters' disillusionment with major party performance and programmatic convergence.

The second reflects the affirmation of a variety of unorthodox issue stances or policy radicalism that catch-all major parties cannot afford to embrace (see Kirchheimer, 1966). Here, then, votes for populist parties can be expected to be distinct from those going to any other party, resulting in a nearly exclusive gain of votes from the party

in government. That is, ideologically-informed voting is dominated by party stalwarts and identifiers who are attracted by radical policy stances for which there is no equivalence among the other parties.

We begin by distinguishing between anti-major party protest votes and those cast by individuals who identify[2] with the Reform Party's radical policy stances, the former anticipated to be shared among the opposition parties, the latter uniquely associated with Reform. The model includes measures for retrospective (*Retrospective Finance*) and prospective (*Prospective Finance*) estimations of the respondent's household financial situation; a three-item political disaffection scale (*Political Disaffection Scale*) measuring perceptions of political parties as not caring for ordinary people (*Parties Don't Care*), as not being needed in Canada (*Parties Not Needed*) and an item measuring satisfaction with the way democracy works in Canada (*Canadian Democracy Works*), as well as a separate item measuring perceptions of whether it makes a difference who is in power (*Doesn't Care Who Wins*). The model also includes approval/disapproval scales for each of the party's leaders (*Chretien, Charest, McDonough, Manning and Duceppe*) and party identification terms for each party (*LiberalID, ProgConID, NDPID, RefID* and *BlocQID*).

It is Reform's more radical policy prescriptions with respect to immigration and government support for aboriginal peoples that most sharply distinguish it from the other parties in opposition. To tap these, the model includes a measure for individuals' attitudes toward the level of Canadian immigration (*More Immigration*) and government spending for Aboriginal peoples (*More Aboriginal Aid*). These attitudes are examined for variation in support for Reform's message. The influence of region in Reform voting is pursued across the "East/West"[3] divide (*EastWest*) which contrasts Alberta and British Columbia against the rest of Canada; and across five regions (*Regionz5*) grouped

as Atlantic, [4] Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan, Yukon and Northwest Territories, and Alberta and British Columbia.

Figure 1 captures the fact that in 1997 Reform's seats were secured overwhelmingly in British Columbia and Alberta, and its support in this region – in terms of both identifiers and voters as shown in Figure 1 – was double that of its next most supportive region, Saskatchewan and Manitoba.

Figure 1
Reform Party Identification and Vote by Region, 1997

Source: 1997 CES.
See variables Refvot97, Refid97 and Regionz5 in Appendix.Quebec is excluded in this table as Reform did not field candidates there and was not included in the vote and party identification survey items in that province.

Our multivariate models also include controls for the effects of individuals' most important demographic characteristics. Thus, the model includes items tapping the respondent's gender (*Female*), age (*Age*), level of education (*High Education*) and union membership (*Union Member*).

Measures for various other social attitudinal appeals in Reform's campaign used later in the analysis, include: Opposition to minor group special rights (*Oppose Minority Rights*); opposition to bilingualism (*Oppose Bilingualism*); support for grassroots solutions to national problems (*Support Grass Roots*); support for the notion that anyone can find work if they want to (*Anyone Can Find Work*);

opposition to adapting moral behaviour to changed times (*Oppose Moral Change*); feeling aboriginal peoples have more influence than they should (*Oppose Aboriginal Influence*); feeling that racial minorities have more influence than they should (*Oppose Minority Influence*); feeling that welfare recipients have more influence than they should (*Oppose Welfare Influence*); feeling recent immigrants don't want to fit (*Immigrants Must Fit*); agreement that the government wastes tax money (*Government Wasteful*); agreement that the government is run by crooks (*Government Crooked*); lack of confidence in the federal government (*No Confidence: Federal Govt*); and feeling less confidence

in the federal than in the provincial government (*More Confidence in Prov'l Govt*).

These measures allow us to examine the impact on the Reform vote of short-term, performance-oriented concerns associated with protest voting and deep-seated ideological attitudes linked to policy voting. These attitudes are examined for variability by region to help us to understand variation in Reform's appeal across Canada and the coalitional dynamics that underpinned its development.

Testing Protest and Policy Voting Effects

Table 1 reports the results of multinomial logit models predicting House of Commons vote in the 1997 election. [5] Each column reports the effects of the variables in predicting a vote choice between one of the opposition parties and the incumbent Liberal Party. We use economic performance and political disaffection variables for identifying protest voters, and radical issue stances for capturing policy voters. Leadership effects are also considered as it has been argued they may play a role in encouraging voters to forego existing partisan allegiances to vote for a new party (see Tverdova, 2010 for an explanation). In regard to protest voting, we see that those who felt their household economic situation had been made worse by the federal government's policies were significantly more likely to vote for the Reform than the governing party. However, Reform was not alone in realizing vote gain from the incumbent party on this issue, with the NDP also receiving a significantly higher share of votes as a result of this effect.

With respect to the prospective financial situation of the household, however, the pattern runs counter to the secular appeal of minor parties on the first measure. Reform was the sole significant beneficiary of vote gain from the Liberals for respondents who anticipated worse economic prospects. Reform's critique of the government's economic program and highlighting of economic concerns had considerable, and exclusive, sting. Others have noted that economic evaluations of this kind were one of the 'deeper fault lines' of the election and that they varied by region (Gidengil, et al., 1999, p. 262).

Protest voting associated with political disaffection benefitted Reform as well the Progressive Conservatives and the NDP. Voters who felt the political parties and government had become unresponsive were focused on finding an alternative to the Liberals – only the Bloc Quebecois's electoral fortunes being insignificantly affected by this issue. A second factor associated with political disaffection, whether or not it is important who is in power, prompted no significant effects on vote choice for any party. A regionally distinct pattern of sensitivity to this issue likely explains its lack of overall importance across the nation. Those in the East may have felt disaffected by not believing there was any real alternative between the parties (especially since Reform had little chance to win seats). Those in the West may have felt disillusionment with other parties, but felt Reform was a clear and viable alternative with a realistic chance of securing a majority of the seats in the West. Quebeckers, similarly, had a clear regional alternative to the Liberals.

Reform then was a beneficiary of those issues associated with performance-based protest voting. But, these gains, except for those generated by prospective economic concerns, were shared with other parties in opposition. These patterns are consistent with our expectation that populist parties, despite their high profile unorthodoxy, attract votes on performance-oriented issues in ways and on themes that are essentially indistinguishable from their more orthodox counterparts in opposition. In this attitudinal dimension, at least, Reform was anything but a radical alternative.

Table 1.   1997 Canadian House of Commons Vote: All of Canada
Multinomial Logistic Regression: Liberals are Reference Group

Independent Variables	Prog Con/ Liberals	NDP/ Liberals	Bloc Q/ Liberals	Reform/ Liberals
More Aboriginal Aid	.002	.26	-.78*	-.38**
	.18	.21	.43	.20
More Immigration	.20	-.07	-.51	.30
	.19	.24	.53	.22
Doesn't Care Who Wins	.11	-.13	.36	.22
	.13	.15	.28	.14
Political Disaffection Scale	.30**	.46**	-.11	.29*
	.15	.17	.33	.17
Retrospective Finance	-.22	.65**	.11	.46*
	.24	.30	.60	.28
Prospective Finance	-.05	-.06	.47	.37**
	.20	.23	.50	.22
Leader Eval'n: *McDonough*	.05	.72**	.14	-.09
	.06	.08	.14	.07
Leader Evaluation: *Chretien*	-.59**	-.49**	-.49**	-.35**
	.06	.07	.12	.07
Leader Evaluation: *Charest*	.55**	.01	.006	-.03
	.07	.07	.14	.07
Leader Evaluation: *Manning*	-.10*	-.13*	-.75**	.64**
	.06	.07	.15	.06
Leader Evaluation: *Duceppe*	-.03	-.25**	.88**	-.29**
	.07	.09	.15	.08
Female	-.05	.58**	-1.49**	-.11
	.24	.30	.61	.29
High Education	-.13	-.40	.91	-.57**
	.27	.34	.68	.30
Union Member	-.006	.60**	-.36	.34
	.26	.30	.60	.29
Age	.004	.00004	-.02	.004
	.008	.01	.02	.01
NDP ID	-.34	2.01**	-1.89	.47
	.75	.51	1.60	.64
Liberal ID	-1.17**	-.96**	-.40	-1.04**
	.32	.35	.77	.36
ProgCon ID	1.52**	-.52	.10	.58
	.36	.56	1.02	.41
Reform ID	1.65	-----	-----	4.21**
	1.32	-----	-----	1.08
BlocQ ID	.67	-----	3.90**	-----
	.86	-----	.93	-----
Constant	-.42	-2.79**	-.22	-2.46**
	1.07	1.23	2.43	1.22

n=1055   Pseudo R^2 = .61
Source: 1997 Canadian Election Study. See Appendix for details on all variables.
Figures in table are regression coefficients and, on line below, standard errors.
* Significant at .10 level.   ** Significant at .05 level.

Contrary to expectations, Reform's more radical appeals on the issues of opposition to aboriginal aid and opposition to increases in immigration levels did not neatly garner it exclusive support. Though opposition to aboriginal aid significantly drew votes from the Liberals to Reform, it did as well to the new minor party, the Bloc Quebecois. At the same time, the immigration issue insignificantly affected the likelihood of vote draw from the Liberals to any of the opposition parties. This may reflect the fact, as shown in other research, that Reform stalwarts were not incensed about immigration numbers, per se, but about their unwillingness to 'fit in' to the larger Canadian culture (see Archer and Ellis, 1994, p. 297). All told, while the results in Table 1 suggest that Reform was not a unique electoral beneficiary of these radical issue appeals, the pattern of vote draw toward the two minor parties is consistent with the expectation that they, alone, could affirm the radical policy stances to attract votes on those issues.

A third vote choice calculus evident in Table 1 is the role of leader evaluations. While Preston Manning was not widely regarded as a charismatic leader, Reform party candidates tended not to be known. Manning by default was the party for many voters (Sigurdson, 1994, p. 276). There was a clear cut regional effect for Manning's evaluations, with Ontarians in particular not taking to him while Westerners did (Gidengil, et al., 1999, p. 267). Overall, the effects for evaluations of Reform's leader are as anticipated: positive evaluations of Preston Manning resulted in a significantly higher likelihood of voting Reform over the Liberals – a beneficial effect that is uniquely realized by Reform.

The other leaders' evaluations show that negative perceptions of the Liberal leader and Prime Minster, Jean Chretien, prompted vote drain from the Liberals to any of the opposition parties. Unlike Manning's exclusive effect on Reform

support, positive evaluations of the New Democrat Alexa McDonough and the Tory Jean Charest were associated with support for three of four opposition parties, the exception being Reform, suggesting it was seen differently by voters. Clearly, in the shadow of the Progressive Conservative's 1993 annihilation, and the dramatic losses of support for the NDP at the same time, no party or leader would seem to have carried the mantle of opposition in the 1997 election.

In summary, the patterns in Table 1, as expected, point to Reform playing a non-exclusive role in terms of attracting votes from the incumbents on (retrospective) economic evaluations and attitudes involving political disaffection. However, with respect to the two ideological issues, aid to Aboriginal minorities and immigration levels, the anticipated exclusivity of vote draw toward Reform failed to materialize. Leadership effects were complex and multi-directional, suggesting no leader managed to drive the overall vote toward his or her party. Given the significance of regional distinctiveness in 1997 voting (Gidengil, 1999, pp. 247-248) and the variety of issues that Reform trumpeted during the campaign, there would seem to be analytic justification in both broadening the range of issues under assessment and examining those issue orientations by region and party.

A Regional Analysis of Policy Voting for Reform

Many studies have noted the importance of regional variation in Canadian politics and the East/West distinction in issue and vote patterns in the 1997 election in particular. Gidengil, et al. (1999), for example, argue that regional differences in the 1997 election are not attributable to distinctions in voters' socio-economic backgrounds. Rather, they reflect fundamentally different attitudes in

different regions of the country. It is not simply that the residents of different regions have different beliefs or differ in their political judgments, important as these differences are. The impact of region is both more subtle and more profound. It lies in differences in the political agenda from one region of the country to another. This is particularly clear in the results for issue-positions and economic perceptions (Gidengil, 1999, p. 271).

Table 2 allows us to explore the exclusivity of policy effects for Reform voting for the key variables found in Table 1. These are presented as pairs of mean scores: for those voting Reform and for those who voted for any other party. Fifteen alternative social attitudes and issues are also reported as a way to expand the consideration of those factors responsible for Reform party support. They are presented for the whole of Canada (column 1), for those living in Alberta/British Columbia (column 3), and those living outside of Alberta/British Columbia (column 2). This allows us to identify if there are uniquely Western attitudinal orientations, or if there are significant differences in the strength of those attitudes for Reform voters in different regions.

Evident in these results are two important patterns. First, Reform voters hold significantly more conservative positions on virtually all of these social attitudes and issues than do voters for the combined other parties. Second, these results show that these attitudes are equally sharply held by Reform voters in the East as well as the West. In virtually all cases, mean scores for these social attitudinal measures are essentially comparable, whether for Canada as a whole, for those living in Alberta/BC, or for those living outside of Alberta/BC. Only three issues (prospective economic evaluations; feeling it is not important who is in power; and feeling government is run by crooks) have scores that vary appreciably by region. The patterns in Table 2, then, provide support for Reform's distinctiveness as being the result of its voters holding significantly more conservative attitudes than other voters – but those patterns cannot be seen as unique to the West.

Protest and Policy Voting Partisan and Non-Partisan Reform Voters

Table 3 reports the percent of the Canadian Election Survey (CES) respondents who identified themselves as Reform partisans, the proportion in the campaign-period survey who said they intended to vote for Reform, and the proportion of post-election respondents who said they ultimately voted Reform. Two important patterns are apparent. First, only 7.2% identified with the Reform Party, while 20% ultimately voted Reform. Second, half of Reform's votes came from non-identifiers with the party – late-deciders who made their vote choice during the final few weeks of the campaign, since the campaign-period survey shows only 11% intending to vote Reform.[6]

Table 3 reveals Reform's voters are a combination of partisans (those with a self-identified affinity for the party) and those who, in the waning days of the campaign, decided to cast their votes for Reform. It is a distinction that has a decidedly regional basis.

Table 2. Social Attitudes Mean Scores by Reform/not Reform Vote
For Canada, non-Alberta/British Columbia, and Alberta/British Columbia

Independent Variables	Party Voted For: Reform/Other	Means Canada	Means Non-Alberta/ BC	Means Alberta/BC
Basic Logit Model				
Political Disaffection Scale	**Reform**	.29**	.28**	.30**
	Other Party	-.21	-.19	-.31
More Aboriginal Aid	**Reform**	1.67**	1.63**	1.70**
	Other Party	1.98	1.98	2.04
More Immigration	**Reform**	1.50**	1.47**	1.51**
	Other Party	1.69	1.67	1.80
Retrospective Finance	**Reform**	2.33**	2.29**	2.36**
	Other Party	2.13	2.14	2.10
Prospective Finance	**Reform**	1.93**	1.95	1.91*
	Other Party	1.86	1.86	1.81
Doesn't Care Who Wins	**Reform**	2.53	2.70**	2.41
	Other Party	2.44	2.46	2.31
Alternative Social Attitudes				
Oppose Minority Rights	**Reform**	3.45**	3.55**	3.38**
	Other Party	3.05	3.03	3.15
Oppose Bilingualism	**Reform**	3.53**	3.53**	3.54**
	Other Party	2.57	2.54	2.74
Support Grassroots	**Reform**	3.07**	3.14**	3.03**
	Other Party	2.78	2.81	2.64
Anyone Can Find Work	**Reform**	2.94**	3.01**	2.88**
	Other Party	2.75	2.76	2.70
Oppose Moral Change	**Reform**	2.91**	3.08**	2.78**
	Other Party	2.46	2.43	2.62
Oppose Aboriginal Influence	**Reform**	.72**	.65**	.78**
	Other Party	-.18	-.12	-.47
Oppose Minority Influence	**Reform**	1.50**	1.49**	1.51**
	Other Party	-.03	-.03	-.03
Oppose Welfare Influence	**Reform**	.65**	.73**	.58**
	Other Party	-.08	-.001	-.52
Government Wasteful	**Reform**	2.80**	2.80**	2.79**
	Other Party	2.64	2.67	2.51
Government Crooked	**Reform**	2.46**	2.43	2.48**
	Other Party	2.37	2.38	2.27
Immigrants Must Fit	**Reform**	3.00**	3.06**	2.96**
	Other Party	2.68	2.71	2.52
No Confidence: Federal Govt	**Reform**	2.87**	2.88**	2.87**
	Other Party	2.55	2.55	2.51
More Confidence: Prov'l Govt	**Reform**	.30**	.20**	.37**
	Other Party	-.05	-.06	-.02

Source: 1997 Canadian Election Study. See Appendix for details on all variables. Figures in table are means. Means score significance levels derive from Levene's tests for equality of means.
* Significant at .10 level.   ** Significant at .05 level.

Table 3

1997 House of Commons Vote and Seats, Party Identification, Intended Vote and Vote

Party	Official Results: Vote Percent[1a]	Official Results: Seats Won[1b]	'97 CES Survey: Party ID: Percent[2]	'97 CES Survey: Intended Vote: Percent[3]	'97 CES Survey: Vote: Percent[4]
Liberal	38.4	155	27.3	21.6	31.3
Prog Con	18.9	20	13.8	11.4	16.0
NDP	11.0	21	7.3	7.3	10.7
Reform	19.4	60	7.2	11.1	20.0
Bloc Q	10.7	44	7.3	6.4	9.1
Other	1.6	1	1.0	1.6	1.7
Total	100.0	301			

[1a and 1b] Source: 1997 Canadian Federal Election Results. Source: Elections Canada. See website detail provided by the University of British Columbia: http://esm.ubc.ca/CA97/results

[2] Source: 1997 CES. Campaign Period Survey (CPS) variable: CPSK1. (Note: The deletion of those with no ID, and those who refused or replied "don't know" means percentages do not tally to 100%)

[3] Source: 1997 CES. Campaign Period Survey (CPS) variable: CPSA4. (Note: The deletion of those who would not vote, and those who refused or replied "don't know/undecided" means percentages do not tally to 100%)

[4] Source: 1997 CES. Post Election Survey (PES) variable: PESA4. (Note: The deletion of those who did not vote, and those who refused or replied "don't know" means percentages do not tally to 100%)

Figure 2 shows the proportion of Reform's partisan loyalists and non-partisan supporters who decided their votes "early" (before the campaign had begun) and "late" (during the campaign itself). Reform's party identifiers were party loyalists who were much more likely to have decided their vote before the campaign (74%) than during it (26%). Their vote was not shaped last-minute electioneering, including the campaign's debates, advertising and news coverage. At the same time, Reform's non-partisan voters were far more likely to have decided their votes during the final campaign period (59.3%) than before it

(40.7%) – indicative of reliance on election-specific factors in deciding their votes, and not an ideological commitment to Reform's overall platform.

Small survey numbers makes impossible the analysis of vote decision-making timing across the various regions. Yet in tandem with Figure 1, these results confirm that Reform's partisan and non-partisan support varied significantly across Canada's regions in 1997 with the attendant implications for protest and policy support as well as voters' expectations regarding the likelihood of successfully electing representatives to send to Ottawa.

Figure 2
Reform Party Identification and Vote Decision Timing,
amongst Reform Voters, 1997

Source: 1997 CES
See variables Refvot97, Refid97 and Erlyvot1 in Appendix.

While Figure 1 makes clear that a majority of Reform's Western voters were identifiers, the ranks of Reform's voters in the East were dominated by non-identifying late deciders. These late deciders are unlikely to be voters who affirmed or changed their opinions on key issues – as research by Blais, et al. (no date) has shown. Rather, they are most likely to be performance-oriented voters who, in the end, cast a Reform vote because they felt disdain for the major party alternatives or, perhaps cast their votes for Reform to prevent the Bloc Quebecois from becoming the official Opposition (Gidengil, et al., 1999, p. 251).

If true, we would expect distinct issue orientations and intensity for those voters who identify with the Reform party and those who do not. In particular, non-identifying Reform voters are anticipated to hold higher scores on performance-oriented issues, while Reform partisans are expected to have the strongest scores on social issues associated with policy voting. Table 4 reports the mean scores for all the issues assessed in previous tables, for two groups of Reform voters: those who identified with the party and those who did not.

Table 4.   Social Attitudes Mean Scores for Reform Voters
by Reform/not-Reform Party ID

Independent Variables	Reform Party ID or Not	Means
Basic Logit Model		
Political Disaffection Scale	**Reform ID**	.33
	No Reform ID	.27
More Aboriginal Aid	**Reform ID**	.161
	No Reform ID	.170
More Immigration	**Reform ID**	1.41**
	No Reform ID	1.56
Retrospective Finance	**Reform ID**	2.37
	No Reform ID	2.32
Prospective Finance	**Reform ID**	1.89
	No Reform ID	1.95
Doesn't Care Who Wins	**Reform ID**	2.21**
	No Reform ID	2.76
Alternative Social Attitudes		
Oppose Minority Rights	**Reform ID**	3.48
	No Reform ID	3.44
Oppose Bilingualism	**Reform ID**	3.59
	No Reform ID	3.52
Support Grassroots	**Reform ID**	3.21**
	No Reform ID	3.01
Anyone Can Find Work	**Reform ID**	2.99
	No Reform ID	2.92
Oppose Moral Change	**Reform ID**	3.02*
	No Reform ID	2.84
Oppose Aboriginal Influence	**Reform ID**	.93
	No Reform ID	.59
Oppose Minority Influence	**Reform ID**	1.86**
	No Reform ID	1.28
Oppose Welfare Influence	**Reform ID**	.97**
	No Reform ID	.41
Government Wasteful	**Reform ID**	2.86**
	No Reform ID	2.76
Government Crooked	**Reform ID**	2.51
	No Reform ID	2.43
Immigrants Must Fit	**Reform ID**	3.15**
	No Reform ID	2.92
No Confidence: Federal Govt	**Reform ID**	2.98**
	No Reform ID	2.79
More Confidence: Prov'l Govt	**Reform ID**	.39*
	No Reform ID	.23

Source: 1997 Canadian Election Study. See Appendix for details on all variables.
Figures in table are means; significance levels derive from Levene's tests for equality of means.
* Significant at .10 level.   ** Significant at .05 level.

The results show that Reform voting partisans and non-partisans do hold distinct issue orientations. Party identifiers hold issue positions that are more conservative than their non-identifying counterparts on all social issues. Nine of those differences are statistically significant. In the area of economic evaluations and political disaffection, however, in no case do Reform identifiers have significantly different scores than their non-identifier counterparts, while on one issue (feeling it is not important who is in power) non-identifiers are significantly more disaffected than identifiers. In short, Reform voters may be seen as comprised of two reasonably distinct groups who vary by their issue orientation and intensity.

The patterns in Table 4 suggest that many social issues in 1997 had become closely identified with Reform and its leader, Preston Manning, given the significant differences between the issue opinions of Reform voting partisans and those of Reform's non-partisan voters. The implications are two-fold: First, Reform party identification strongly correlates with most of the radical social issues considered. Second, those issues are important predictors of Reform voting, but primarily through the ranks of party identifiers who, as we have seen, predominantly resided in Reform's Western heartland. Clearly, then, Reform's electoral success in Alberta and British Columbia can at the very least be partly attributed to its ability to convey the politics of its radical policies to larger numbers of supporters who had come to identify with the party and its platform. Reform's weaker showing in the East reflects its perception by the vast majority of its voters to be mainly a protest party unlikely to generate sufficient appeal to build majoritarian support.

These different issues and the distinctive groups of voters who are drawn to them continue to have important implications for conservative politics in Canada. Policy positions to do with government accountability and transparency

that attract disaffected protest voters and more traditional conservative concerns such as crime, taxation, and immigration that attract ideological policy voters have been central to the platforms of the new Conservative party since the 2004 election (see Conservative Party Election Platforms 2004 to 2011).

Conclusion

As with all parties that pursue government in single member plurality electoral systems, the Reform Party of Canada relied for its success on a coalition of somewhat disparate sub-groups each seeking a means of expressing their political preferences. This dynamic reflects the relative bluntness with which majoritarian electoral systems address diversity in policy preferences, a frequent corollary of which is the build-up of unmet policy demands over time. This is particularly the case in Canada, where voters' policy preferences are shaped by ethno-linguistic and regional diversity. Majoritarian and relatively inflexible electoral and parliamentary systems require parties to construct support bases across this diversity in their attempt to win government. In so doing, federal Canadian political parties face a steep gradient of integration as they attempt to synthesize policy diversity into a single political movement.

A central tenet of the Reform Party's organizational ethos, articulated by its founding leader, Preston Manning, was the goal of becoming a major party. His willingness to disband the Reform Party in creating its first successor party, the Canadian Alliance, is evidence of this commitment. The integrative strategy required for success in this context led then to the founding of the modern Conservative Party via a merger of the Canadian Alliance with the older Progressive Conservative Party, aimed at broadening the appeal of this once overtly populist movement. Our analysis indicates that the first stage of this strategy saw Reform build a coalition of two

types of voters; policy voters, with relatively radical and unconventional policy views, and more orthodox non-ideological protest voters unhappy with the then major parties, the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives.

The Canadian case is significant for conflating these two types of voters with regional variations – such that part of the explanation for Reform's success in the West in 1997 was the larger number of voters who were attracted to, and remained bound to, the Reform party because of its unconventional stances on a variety of radical social issues. This helps to explain why Reform voters' issue stances were consistently sharper and more conservative than those for other parties' voters and contributed to its success in the West when these issue orientations themselves did not vary appreciably by region. These social issues played a significant role in prompting Reform votes because they were held disproportionately by its partisans, who predominated in the West.

While protest votes are worth as much as policy votes, insurgent parties are unlikely to break through and win seats unless they are able to convey a sufficiently vibrant set of issue appeals to challenge major party dominance. Reform's electoral strategies helped to assure the regional distinctiveness of both its supporters' attitudes and its share of the vote and seats. Not content with minority party status, Manning and Reform tapped long-simmering disdain for the country's electoral centre and its unwillingness to pay attention to the West, and forged a radical set of ideological stances that played off of the other parties' inability to assume sharp-edged stances.

The result was the fueling of both voter passions and a self-fulfilling dynamic in the West, where a latent majority was consolidated into winning margins. Reform's exclusive opposition to the Charlottetown Accord was important in its self-promotion as a party distinctly different from politics as usual. While it was critical in securing its majority-level support in the

West, it was also significant in relegating it to a protest party thorn in the side in those regions where opposition to distinct status for Quebec was more limited. After the 1997 election (as with the 1993 election, in which Reform secured one seat in Ontario, and no others in Eastern provinces) the differential viability of Reform's candidates in the West and East served to underscore Reform's two regionally distinctive profiles.

In the East, Reform's radical appeals appear to have fared less well, leaving the party more reliant on the protest voters disillusioned with the alternatives that are traditionally associated with minor parties. At the same time, because Reform had virtually no likelihood of securing seats in Eastern provinces, its role as a mere residual catchment of voters disenchanted with the major parties was self-fulfilling. In the West, however, where dozens of candidates were all but certain to be sent to Ottawa to convey Reform's policy demands, voters could embrace the party as a purposive, programmatic vehicle of their concerns. Reform then began a process which forged a 'major' Western party and a 'minor' Eastern protest party into the Conservative Party that formed minority governments in 2006 and 2008 and secured a majority in their own right in the 2011 Canadian federal election.

The regionalizing impulse of FPP in a diverse country has been a key driver of partisan politics in Canada. It has long been noted that Canadian political parties must manage the shocks that accompany the process of melding together disparate coalitions; they are often referred to as brokerage parties in part because of this demand (Carty, Cross and Young 2000). Internal coalitions are likely to be regionally based and consist of voters whose major interest is dispersed along at least two orthogonal electoral or policy dimensions, in this case protest and policy voters. This is the logically minimal condition under which a party might avoid deep contradictions and under which policy shocks among the coalition are of a type that may be absorbed using strategies such as offering policy wins

to each of the coalitional elements. These findings confirm Cairns' contention (1968) that melding regional impulses of this kind

is perhaps the central task of national parties in Canada.

–––––

Works Cited:

Archer, Keith and Faron Ellis. 1994. "Opinion Structure of Party Activists: The Reform Party of Canada," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 27(2): 277-308.

Barney, Darin. 1997. "The Recline of Party: Armchair Democracy and the Reform Party of Canada," *American Review of Canadian Studies,* 26(4): 577-605.

Bélanger, Éric and Jean-François Godbout. 2010. "Why do Parties Merge: The Case of the Conservative Party of Canada," *Parliamentary Affairs,* 63(1): 41-65.

Bélanger, Éric. 2004. "The Rise of Third Parties in the 1993 Canadian Federal Election: Pinard Revisited," *Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique* 37(3): 581–594.

Betz, Hans-Georg. 1998. "Introduction" in Hans-Georg Betz and Stefan Immerfall eds. *The New Politics of the Right*, New York: Macmillan.

Bickerton, James. 1996. "Parties and Regions: Alternative Models of Representation" in A. Brian Tanguay and Alain-G. Gagnon eds. *Canadian Parties in Transition*, Second Edition, Scarborough: Nelson Canada.

Blais, André Elizabeth Gidengil, Richard Nadeau, and Neil Nevitte. 1997. *The Canadian Election Study, 1997.* Electronic Data File. Toronto: Institute for Social Research, York University.

Blais, André, Richard Nadeau, Elizabeth Gidengil, and Neil Nevitte. "Campaign Dynamics in the 1997 Election," Canadian *Public Policy – Analyse de Politiques* 25(2): 197-205

Cairns, Alan C. 1968. "The Electoral System and Party System in Canada, 1921-1965," *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* 1(1): 55-80.

Canovan, Margaret. 1999. "Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy," *Political Studies,* 47(1): 2-16.

Conservative Party of Canada Election Platform. 2011.

http://www.conservative.ca/media/2012/06/ConservativePlatform2011_ENs.pdf Accessed May 20, 2014.

Conservative Party of Canada Election Platform. 2008. http://www.conservative.ca/media/20081007-Platform-e.pdf

Conservative Party of Canada Election Platform. 2006. http://www.davevankesteren.ca/media/20061222-RO-Promises%20Made%20Kept.pdf Accessed May 20, 2014.

Conservative Party of Canada Election Platform. 2004. http://www.cbc.ca/canadavotes2004/pdfplatforms/platform_e.pdf Accessed May 20, 2014.

Carty, R. Kenneth. 1992. "Three Canadian Party Systems" in R. K. Carty ed, *Canadian Political Party Systems*: *A Reader*, Peterborough: Broadview Press.

Carty, R. Kenneth, William Cross and Lisa Young. 2000. *Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics*, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Dalton, Russell J., and Christopher J. Anderson. 2010. *Citizens, Context and Choice: How Context Shapes Citizens' Electoral Choices.* New York, Oxford University Press.

Denemark, David and Shaun Bowler. 2002. "Minor Parties and Protest Votes in Australia and New Zealand: Locating Populist Politics," *Electoral Studies*, 21(1): 47-67.

Duverger, Maurice. 1954. *Political Parties,* New York: Wiley.

Flanagan, Tom. 2007. *Harper's Team: Behind the Scenes in the Conservative Rise to Power,* Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press.

_____. 1995. *Waiting for the Wave: The Reform Party and Preston Manning,* Toronto: Stoddart.

Gagnon, Alain-G. and A. Brian Tanguay. 1996. "Minor Parties in the Canadian Political System: Origins, Functions, Impact," in A. Brian Tanguay and Alain-G. Gagnon eds. *Canadian Parties in Transition*, Second Edition, Scarborough: Nelson Canada.

Gidengil, Elizabeth, André Blais, Richard Nadeau and Neil Nevitte. 1999. "Making Sense of Regional Voting in the 1997 Canadian Federal Election: Liberal and Reform Support Outside Quebec," *Canadian Journal of Political Science,* 32(2): 247-272.

Gomery, John. 2006. Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities. *Restoring Accountability– Recommendations*. http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/sponsorship-ef/06-02-10/www.gomery.ca/en/phase1report/default.htm accessed May 18, 2014.

Gomery, John. 2005. Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities. *Who Is Responsible? Fact Finding Report. http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-bcp/commissions/sponsorship-ef/06-02-10/www.gomery.ca/en/phase1report/default.htm* accessed May 18, 2014.

Harrison, Trevor, Bill Johnston and Harvey Krahn. 1996. "Special Interests and/or New Right Economics?," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology*, 33(2): 159-179.

Harrison, Trevor and Harvey Krahn. 1995. "Populism and the Rise of the Reform Party in Alberta," *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology,* 32(2): 127-150.

Johnston, Richard, André Blais, Henry E. Brady, and Jean Crête. 1992. *Letting the People Decide: Dynamics of a Canadian Election,* Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Kirchheimer, Otto. 1966. "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems" in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner eds. *Political Parties and Political Development*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1997. *The Radical Right in Western Europe*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Laycock, David. 1994. "Reforming Canadian Democracy? Institutions and Ideology in the Reform Party Project," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 27(2): 213-247.

Manning, Preston. 1996. "Reform's Fresh Start for Canada," Speech, Oct. 17, 1996, *Canadian Speeches*, 10(7): 53-60.

McCormick, Peter. 1991. "The Reform Party of Canada: New Beginning or Dead End?" in Hugh G. Thorburn ed. *Party Politics in Canada*, Sixth Edition, Scarborough: Prentice-Hall.

Nevitte, Neil, André Blais, Elizabeth Gidengil, Richard Johnston, and Henry Brady. 1998. "The Populist Right in Canada: The Rise of the Reform Party of Canada" in Han-Georg((Betz and Stefan Immerfall eds. *The New Politics of the Right*. New York: Macmillan.

Pinard, Maurice. 1971. *The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Rosenstone, Stephen J, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus. 1984. *Third Parties in America*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Sayers, Anthony M. 2001 "Regionalism, Political Parties and Parliamentary Politics in Canada and Australia" in Lisa Young and Keith Archer eds. *Regionalism and Party Politics in Canada*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Simpson, Jeffrey 2013. "For Conservatives, this, too, Shall Pass unless it doesn't," *Globe and Mail*, May 22, 2013.

Sigurdson, Richard. 1994. "Preston Manning and the Politics of Postmodernism in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 27(2): 249-276.

Tverdova, Yuliya V. 2010. "Follow the Party or Follow the Leader? Candidate Evaluations, Party Evaluations, and Macropolitical Context" in Russell J. Dalton, and Christopher J. Anderson, *Citizens, Context and Choice: How Context Shapes Citizens" Electoral Choices.* New York, Oxford University Press.

Appendix
Variable Codes, Scales and Measures

Political measures
Refvot97   A dummy variable (0, 1) for a Reform vote in the 1997 election: 1 = 'Reform'; 0 = 'Other'; 'Liberal'; 'Progressive Conservatives'; 'New Democratic Party'; or 'Bloc Quebecois' (original CES variable: pesa4).
Refid97   A dummy variable (0, 1) for Reform party identification in 1997: 1 = 'Reform'; 0 = 'Liberal'; 'Progressive Conservatives'; 'New Democratic Party'; 'Bloc Quebecois'; or 'Other'(original CES variable: cpsk1).
Erlyvot1   A dummy variable (0, 1) measuring the timing of respondents' vote choice for Reform: 1 = 'before the campaign'; 0 = 'before the debates'; 'during or after the debates'; 'in the last two weeks of the campaign'; or 'on Election Day' (original CES variable: pesa4c).

  Political Disaffection Scale   A 3-variable scale, derived from factor analysis scores, measuring political disaffection. The three component variables are:

     Parties Don't Care   A 5-value variable measuring the perception of political parties' concern for ordinary people: 1 = 'political parties in Canada care what ordinary people think'; 5 = 'political parties in Canada don't care what ordinary people think' (original CES variable: mbsi4).
     Parties Not Needed   A 5-value variable measuring the perception of parties as important for the Canadian political system: 1 = 'political parties are necessary to make our political system work'; 5 = 'political parties are not needed in Canada' (original CES variable: mbsi5).
     Canadian Democracy Works   A 4-value variable measuring satisfaction with 'the way democracy works in Canada': 1 = 'very satisfied'; 4 = 'not at all satisfied' (original CES variable: mbsi1).

Factor analysis of 3 measures in the political disaffection scale

      A principle components factor analysis derived 1 factor, with factor scores:
        Factor 1

Parties Don't Care	.75990
Parties Not Needed	.73520
Canadian Democracy Works	.75121

  Care Who Wins   A 5-value variable measuring the perceived difference of who is in power: 1 = 'it makes a difference who is in power'; '5 = "it doesn't make a difference who is in power' (original CES variable: mbsI13).
Chretien   An 11-point scale measuring likes/dislikes of the Liberal Party leader, Jean Chretien: 0 = 'strongly dislike'; 10 = 'strongly like' (original CES variable: mbsI8a).
Charest   An 11-point scale measuring likes/dislikes of the Progressive Conservative Party leader, Jean Charest: 0 = 'strongly dislike'; 10 = 'strongly like' (original CES variable: mbsI8b).
McDonough   An 11-point scale measuring likes/dislikes of the New Democratic Party leader, Alexa McDonough: 0 = 'strongly dislike'; 10 = 'strongly like' (original CES variable: mbsI8c).

Manning   An 11-point scale measuring likes/dislikes of the Reform Party leader, Preston Manning: 0 = 'strongly dislike'; 10 = 'strongly like' (original CES variable: mbsi8d).

Duceppe   An 11-point scale measuring likes/dislikes of the Bloc Quebecois Party leader, Gilles Duceppe: 0 = 'strongly dislike'; 10 = 'strongly like' (original CES variable: mbsi8e).

Social policy measures

More Immigration   A 3-value variable measuring perceptions of government spending for Aboriginal peoples: 1 = 'less'; 2 = 'about the same'; 3 = 'more' (original CES variable: cpsj10).

More Aboriginal Aid   A 3-value variable measuring perceptions of whether Canada should admit more immigrants: 1 = 'fewer immigrants'; 2 = 'about the same'; 3 = 'more immigrants' (original CES variable: cpsj18).

Economic policy/conditions measures

Retrospective Finance   A 3-value variable measuring perceived effects of federal government policy on the financial situation of the respondent's household as compared with 12 months ago: 1 = 'better off'; 2 = 'haven't made much difference'; 3 = 'worse off' (original CES variable: cpsc3).

Prospective Finance   A 3-value variable measuring perceived anticipated financial situation of the respondent's household 12 months from now: 1 = 'better off'; 2 = 'about the same'; 3 = 'worse of' (original CES variable: cpsc2).

LiberalID, ProgConID, NDPID, RefID, BlocQID   Separate dummy variables for measuring the party identification of respondents with the Liberal, Progressive Conservative, NDP, Reform or Bloc Quebecois parties. NOTE: The inclusion of self/party left-right placement measures resulted in dramatic loss of respondents. Party identification measures were included instead to prevent this loss of n. While especially minor party affinities may resist the sort of socialized affinities traditionally associated with partisanship, the use of partisan measures instead of self/party left-right placements in the Australian/New Zealand study yielded fundamentally comparable results. We pursue the issue of the majority of, especially, Reform voters not identifying with their partisan choice in the course of the analysis (original CES variable: cpsk1).

Demographics

Female   A dummy variable for respondent's gender: 1 = female; 0 = male (original CES variable: mbsj2).

Age   A continuous variable for respondent's age (original CES variable: mbsj1).

High Education   A dummy variable for respondent's level of education: 1= some college or completion of any college degree; 0 = completed secondary education or less
(original CES variable: cpsm3).

Union Member   A dummy variable for respondent's/household member's union membership: 1= union member; 0 = not a union member (original CES variable: cpsm9).

EastWest   A dummy variable for respondent residence in 'the West': 1= lives in Alberta or British Columbia; 0 = lives in any other province or territory (original CES variable: province).

Regionz5   A 5-fold variable specifying 5 regions in Canada: 1 = Atlantic (Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia); 2 = Ontario; 3 = Saskatchewan and Manitoba; 4 = North West Territory and Yukon; 5 = Alberta and British Columbia. Note: Quebec is excluded from this array because Reform did not field candidates in Quebec in 1997; thus the CES did not include Reform in its items in Quebec versions of the CES survey about Reform vote and party identification. Original CES variable: province.

Other social attitudes measures: (NB: positive values=conservative stance)

Oppose Minority Rights   A 4-value variable measuring agreement with the statement that 'minority groups need special rights': 1 = 'strongly agree'; 2 = 'agree'; 3 = 'disagree'; 4 = 'strongly disagree.' (original CES variable: mbsa14).

Oppose Bilingualism   A 4-value variable measuring agreement with the statement that 'we have gone too far in pushing bilingualism in Canada': 4 = 'strongly agree'; 3 = 'agree'; 2 = 'disagree'; 1 = 'strongly disagree.' (original CES variable: mbsd7).

Support Grass Roots   A 4-value variable measuring agreement with the statement that 'we could probably solve most of our big national problems if decisions could be brought back to the people at the grass roots': 4 = 'strongly agree'; 3 = 'agree'; 2 = 'disagree'; 1 = 'strongly disagree.' (original CES variable: mbsd3).

Anyone Can Find Work   A 4-value variable measuring agreement with the statement that 'if people really want work, they can find a job': 4 = 'strongly agree'; 3 = 'agree'; 2 = 'disagree'; 1 = 'strongly disagree.' (original CES variable: mbsa12).

Oppose Moral Change   A 4-value variable measuring agreement with the statement that 'the world is always changing and we should adapt our view of moral behaviour to these changes': 4= 'strongly disagree'; 3 = 'disagree'; 2 = 'agree'; 1 = 'strongly agree.' (original CES variable: mbsa8).

Oppose Aboriginal Influence   A 13-value variable (-6 to +6) measuring the difference between the perceived level of influence aboriginal peoples have and the level of influence they should have. Positive/higher scores reflect the respondent feeling aboriginal peoples have more influence than the respondent feels they should have. Negative/lower scores reflect the respondent feeling aboriginal peoples should have more influence than they have (original CES variables: mbsc9a and mbsc9b).

Oppose Minority Influence   A 13-value variable (-6 to +6) measuring the difference between the perceived level of influence racial minorities have and the level of influence they should have. Positive/higher scores reflect the respondent feeling racial minorities have more influence than the respondent feels they should have. Negative/lower scores reflect the respondent feeling racial

minorities should have more influence than they have (original CES variables: mbsc10a and mbsc10b).

Oppose Welfare Influence A 13-value variable (-6 to +6) measuring the difference between the perceived level of influence people on welfare have and the level of influence they should have. Positive/higher scores reflect the respondent feeling people on welfare have more influence than the respondent feels they should have. Negative/lower scores reflect the respondent feeling people on welfare should have more influence than they have (original CES variables: mbsc11a and mbsc11b).

Government Wasteful A 3-value variable measuring perceptions of whether people in government: 3 = 'waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes'; 2 = 'waste some of it'; or 1 = 'don't waste very much of it' (original CES variable: mbsb6).

Government Crooked A 3-value variable measuring perceptions of whether people running government are crooked: 3 = 'quite a few' are crooked'; 2 = 'not very many are crooked'; 1 = 'hardly any are crooked' (original CES variable: mbse9).

Immigrants Must Fit A 4-value variable measuring agreement with the statement 'too many recent immigrants just don't want to fit into Canadian society': 4 = 'strongly agree'; 3 = 'agree'; 2 = 'disagree'; 1 = 'strongly disagree.' (original CES variable: mbsg4).

No Confidence: Federal Govt A 4-value variable measuring the level of confidence in the federal government: 4 = 'none at all'; 3 = 'not very much'; 2 = 'quite a lot'; 1 = 'a great deal.' (original CES variable: mbsf8).

More Confidence: Prov'l Govt A 7-value variable (-3 to +3) measuring the level of confidence in the provincial over the federal government: Positive/higher scores reflect the respondent feeling less confidence in the federal government than for the provincial government. Negative/lower scores reflect the respondent feeling more confidence in the federal than the provincial government (original CES variables: mbsf8 and mbsf9).

Appendix A: Data and methods

This paper uses data from the 1997 Canadian Election Study (CES) (Blais, et al., 1997). The CES survey database derives from three surveys examining the 1997 federal election: a campaign period wave rolling cross-section survey (CPS); a post-election cross-section survey (PES); and a mail back survey (MBS). The CPS was a computer-assisted telephone interview, conducted during the campaign period between the time when the election writs were issued and the day before the election. The PES, conducted using computer-assisted telephone interview techniques, commenced on the day following the election and was completed in subsequent days. The mail back survey, containing approximately 100 items, was sent to all respondents who consented, upon completion of the PES. Twenty-nine of the items used in this study derive from the mail back survey (See Appendix), while seven derive from the campaign period survey and one from the post-election survey. All told, the 1997 CES is a large, nationally-representative survey database from a critical election focused on populist themes.

Endnotes

[1] Nevitte, et al. (1998, p. 176) conclude similarly that, after voting overwhelmingly for the Progressive Conservatives in 1984, their failure to be more responsive to regional priorities 'led many Westerners to conclude that, at bottom, both of the country's major parties were driven by the same dynamic, namely, priority to central Canada and special treatment for Quebec at the expense of the West'.

[2] The Canadian vote model uses party identification measures for each party instead of self/party left-right placement measures. While the traditional Party ID assumption of long-term, socialized attachments to a party is problematic in the context of emergent parties, the broader notion of partisan affinity is, we contend, valuable and important to tap. Furthermore, the introduction of party/self left/right placement measures was found to be responsible for significant loss of n in the models, due to non-response. This, likely, reflects the fact, as Nevitte, et al. (1998, p. 178) have argued, that left/right and class labels are not used by most Canadians to describe themselves. At the same time, other research has shown that the replication of models using party identification instead of left/right placements yielded no appreciable change in the results patterns (see Denemark and Bowler, 2002, footnote 8).

[3] We use Alberta and British Columbia as the notional 'West' because these two provinces represented Reform's heartland. See the discussion of Figure 1 and Figure 2.

[4] The Atlantic region consists of Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.

[5] The Multinomial Logistic Regression analysis in this paper (Table 1) reports the independent effect of the variables listed – that is, the effect for each factor, controlling for the effects of the other factors in the model. The regression coefficients denote the strength of a given factor in prompting a vote for a given party as against the Liberal Party (which is the excluded reference in each paired test: Progressive Conservative in column 1; NDP in column 2; Bloc Quebecois in column 3 and Reform in column 4). Positive signs for a factor's coefficient show that the higher the value of the variable listed, the more likely voters were to vote, for example in column 4, Reform and not Liberal. Negative signs show that the lower the value of the variable listed the more likely voters were to vote Reform over Liberal. Standard errors are reported below the regression coefficients. The ratio of a regression coefficient to its standard error produces the level of significance, reported here with asterisks, which are defined in the note below the table. Key effects for this analysis are highlighted. The Appendix details the coding of all measures used in this paper.

[6] In fact, among those completing the post-election survey, Reform was the only party to gain votes from the campaign-period 'intended vote' to the post-election vote tally. Its total rose from 425 to 518 votes, while the Liberals lost 26 votes to 811, the Progressive Conservatives lost 21 votes to 415, the NDP lost 1 vote to 277, and the Bloc Quebecois lost 10 votes to 235.