Cascadia Revisited from European Case Studies: the Socio-Political Space of Cross-Border Networks

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Abstract

In this paper, I seek to analyse how cross-border spaces are constructed through the activities and strategies of established and emerging cross-border networks. In order to observe cross-border actors and public policies, I use three case studies, two in the European Union, i.e. the Rhineland Valley, also known as Upper Rhine (France-Germany-Switzerland) and the Mediterranean Euroregion (France-Spain), and one in North America, i.e. Cascadia (Canada-United States). I propose to draw our theoretical approach from a model suggested by P. Bourdieu, so that it is possible to compare a series of factors that structure these borderlands. The ultimate goal of this paper is to sketch the socio-political space of these networks in each cross-border region and eventually to suggest new research lenses for Cascadia.

Introduction

Cross-border regions, especially in Europe, are often labelled as ‘laboratories’ of integration processes, either by public and private players or by scholars. This metaphor as “laboratories” of Europe conveys political and performative goals for several levels of governance, including cross-border and multilevel networks, for instance in the Rhineland Valley: in this European borderland at the periphery of three Nation-States (France-Germany-Switzerland), claiming that this region is a social laboratory for political and economic integration or an example in Europe may generate a renewed representation of the territory. In other words, it is intended to create a new political and economic centrality to the Rhineland Valley (Newrly, 2002).

It is interesting to notice that European laboratories or cross-border regions are presented outside Europe as explicit examples or models. In this respect, recent academic works consider that some European case studies may be valid points of comparisons for North American cross-border spaces (Blatter, 2001; Clarke, 2002; Smith, 2002; Brunet-Jailly, 2004).

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In such comparative exercises, many facets of cross-border phenomena are better known (e.g. institutionalization processes, multilevel governance practices, evolutions of cross-border and cross-cultural representations, regional and local reception of supra-national and international policies, and so forth). Nevertheless, there is a gap in the way cross-border networks are socio-politically constructed in these cross-border regions. Therefore, it is difficult to understand current specific dynamics that propel or slow down cross-border initiatives. Actually, one of the main issues in Europe and North America is the complex deepening of border regions. This research related to the socio-political space of cross-border networks aims to help understand the potentialities and limits of diverse cross-border policies and initiatives.

Thus, in this paper, I seek to analyse how those cross-border spaces are constructed through the activities and strategies of established and emerging cross-border networks. In order to observe cross-border actors and public policies, I use three case studies, two in the European Union (EU), i.e. the Rhineland Valley, also known as Upper Rhine (France-Germany-Switzerland) and the Mediterranean Euroregion (France-Spain), and one in North America, i.e. Cascadia (Canada-United States). Those three territories have a rich history as cross-border spaces, as they emerge since the 1960’s as functional territories that are superimposed to existing levels of governance. They incrementally create new solidarity networks across the border (Bach and Leresche, 1995). In comparing the factors that structure both spaces, my ultimate goal is to draw the socio-political space of these networks in each region, to compare them and to suggest new research lenses for Cascadia.

In order to draw the socio-political maps of Cascadia, Upper Rhine and Mediterranean Euroregion, I use a model created by Pierre Bourdieu (1979) that will allow analyzing relative social positions of cross-border networks. I proceed with three key questions: first, how distinct territorial issues are represented, created and institutionalized in Europe and North America? Second, to what extent do private-public mix and political conflict shape cross-border relations within and outside these networks? Is it possible to formulate the specific characteristics of multi-level governance (Marks, 1996; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; 2003) that would apply to cross-border networks? Third, what kinds of cross-border issues should be examined with similar analytical lenses – i.e. cross-border “low gravity” principle – in both continents?

If we want to visualize the three aspects of this paper (i.e. socio-political construction of territorial problems, private and public partnerships / divisions, and cross-border “low gravity” principle), it might be useful to sketch a figure in three dimensions, in order to map the relative social positions of the different cross-border actors and networks, inspired by a socio-political map drawn by Pierre Bourdieu (1979). In the volume titled Distinction, Bourdieu bases his work on an analysis of the French society: social positions are determined by the “economic capital”, the “cultural capital”, and the sum of both capitals. For instance, among segments who represent the social elite, Bourdieu seeks to represent the relative distribution of capitals in our industrial countries: for instance, those who have a high amount of economic capital but less cultural capital (e.g. captains of industry) are pretty distinct from those who have a high amount of cultural capital but less economic capital (e.g. faculty members). Bourdieu underlines that this social space is relational, since the position of each individual is not determined in itself, but in relation to the other actors’ total capital: as a consequence, variations may be observed and represented on the figure
with increasing or decreasing social positions. Additionally, although Bourdieu considers that economic and cultural capitals are two fundamental types of structuring resources in contemporary Western countries, he considers that other resources may be integrated, in order to reflect specific socio-political hierarchies.

Starting from this model, it is possible to think about the social construction of groups. In this perspective, Figures 1 to 3 show that a large part of the national and regional political activity is aimed to mobilizing socio-political players, to gather them symbolically, in order to produce an esprit de corps (Blumer, 1969) and to generate mobilized groups, movements or networks, in what we call a “hegemonic cross-border network”. This mobilization is more likely to succeed if social categories that are sought to be mobilized are objectively closer in this social space.

**Figure 1. Socio-political space in Cascadia**

Thus, it is possible to observe how are structured the entities that have recently emerged in Cascadia, in the Upper Rhine and in the Mediterranean Euroregion. These entities appear to be either included into a cross-border hegemonic network or may be excluded from it.
At this point, it is possible to provide at least four comments: (i) social networks are *a priori* more numerous, diverse, and located on a quite near area in Cascadia, e.g. Cascadia, Pyrenean and Rhineland networks are on the upper part of the figure, and rather well-balanced in terms of economic and cultural capitals; (ii) the sum of both capitals may be correlated with the territorial issues and subsequent definitions of the cross-border region, e.g. Pacific NorthWest Economic Region (PNWER) and the Discovery Institute suggest a larger definition of Cascadia than the definition suggested by environmentalist activists; (iii) cross-border policy networks in the Upper Rhine exclude some social movements, e.g. association of cross-border workers, environmental coalitions, that need therefore to find other interlocutors at the national or European levels: as the cross-border level is a poor level of policy making and decision making, the level of reference for those groups are increasingly defined by the supranational level; conversely, in Cascadia, the lack of cross-border and supranational levels of governance explains why some demands exist but are hardly addressed: (iv) the various cross-border policy networks are not only constructed, at the cross-border level, by their relative social position on the regional / national socio-political space – which nurture in turn the leaders’ political choices at the cross-border level, but also and above all by their relative position at the middle of the political arena, which tends to produce a rather consensual political governance in the cross-border arena, both in Cascadia and in the Upper Rhine; this continual consensual process also explains the hyper-activism of these networks and why they have some difficulty to find solutions.

**Figure 2. Socio-political space in the Upper Rhine**
After presenting the theoretical lenses and goals of this research, cross-border dynamics seem to be widespread, giving rise to three pressing issues.

Figure 3. Socio-political space in the Mediterranean Euroregion

Defining Cascadia(s) as a borderland: institutionalizing multiple territorial issues

Looking at the institutionalization of several specific issues at the cross-border level is useful, since cross-border networks seek to define a cross-border region according to their own interests. Hence, it is possible to observe that actors, organizations and networks in Cascadia and Europe advocate for restricted definitions of border regions. For instance, various concepts define Cascadia as a manifold construct that follows various sectoral and
territorial strategies. However, this North-American example is not isolated, as European case studies tend to show it.

Patrick J. Smith is right to emphasize that Cascadia, besides alternative notions – e.g. Ecotopia, Pacifica (Smith, 2002: 117), the New Pacific, North Pacific West or Northeast Pacific Rim (Hansen, 2002) – encompasses at least four different conceptions, related to its variable-geometry area: (i) Cascadia as “Georgia Basin” or “Puget Sound” corresponds to a small geographical definition focused on the Puget Sound, the Straits of Georgia and Juan de Fuca, including Victoria, Nanaimo, Vancouver, Seattle, Bellingham, Tacoma and Olympia. (ii) “Main Street Cascadia”, also called “Cascadia Corridor”, refers to the coastal strip extending north to south from Whistler to Eugene, facing the Pacific Ocean, back to the Cascade, Coast and Rocky Mountain ranges. (iii) A third definition of Cascadia refers to an institutional or “traditional Cascadia” (Smith, ibidem), including the states of Washington, Oregon and province of British Columbia. (iv) Finally, an extensive conception of the Pacific North-West cross-border region includes British Columbia, Alberta, the Yukon Territory, Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Idaho and Montana.

Behind this apparent Russian doll in which Cascadia’s changing scale is perceptible, a variety of actors and organizations seek to legitimize and impose their own interests on a single or various agendas (e.g. political agenda at various levels, media agenda, etc.). In other words, several organizations try to prioritize certain socio-political issues (e.g. environment, free market, urban planning) that are territorially or spatially definite within a specific cross-border approach. Accordingly, Georgia Basin and Puget Sound refer to an environmentalist definition of Cascadia (e.g. supported by official initiatives such as the “Georgia Basin Action Plan”, formerly known as the “Georgia Basin Ecosystem Initiative” created in 1998, or civil society’s non-profit initiatives including “People for Puget Sound”), whereas “Main Street Cascadia” is adopted by the Seattle-based public policy think-tank “Discovery Institute”, created in 1990. With the addition of Alaska, the institutional Cascadia knows a variation that is relevant to the “Pacific Corridor Enterprise Council” (PACE), which was created in 1989, “as a non-profit, business organization to promote cross-border transactions and advocate the removal of barriers that impede the legitimate flow of people, goods and services across the Canada/USA border”. PACE gathers more than 200 small and medium size business entities. Finally, the largest definition of Cascadia applies to the PNWER, a partnership of private sector and political representatives, issued from the “Pacific NorthWest Legislative Forum”, in 1989. In 1991, PNWER was formally established “by uniform legislation passed in each of the member jurisdictions”. Therefore, suggesting a number of definitions of Cascadia through at least four competing spatial approaches reveals the attempt from partners or competitors to impose to the political field – and also other social fields like the media – their dominant and legitimate definition of the cross-border region. Changeover of political power between parties influences this agenda as well (for instance, BC Premier Michael F. Harcourt from 1991 to 1996 supported the sustainable development of Vancouver, and signed in May 1992 the Environmental Cooperation Agreement (ECA) with Washington Governor Booth Gardner, that contributed to establish the “Puget Sound-Georgia Basin International Task Force”).

Due to these differentiated networks, Cascadia seems to function and work without a solid and unified institutional skeleton. This limited institutional framework has been analyzed, at least in four different ways: (i) it has been interpreted as a “lack of coordination and
leadership” that disclose conflicting strategies between regional players – some of them supporting a strict BC-Washington space, other in favor of a larger cross-border territory that may carry some weight within the US domestic political arena (Artibise, 2005: 257-258); (ii) institutions are “not strong enough” to arbitrate disputes and have a redistributive function, but are rather described as a pattern of ‘multi-polity governance’ where nation-states are complemented by cross-border networks (Blatter, 2001: 201-201); (iii) Cascadia experiences a “growing institutionalization (...) fostered by a melding of earlier definitional alternatives”, with a more active role from state/provincial levels of governance (Smith, 2002: 140); (iv) Susan Clarke seeks to analyze these conflicting interests that are geographically visible in identifying three competing networks of Cascadia (2001; 2002): first, bioregionalist activists include the “broader sustainable development community” (Clarke, 2002: 8), e.g. Georgia Basin Action Plan, People for Puget Sound, Save the Georgia Strait Alliance, Greenpeace and other environmentalist social movements (Alper, 2004). Second, free marketers promote a cross-border region ‘in an international context of competitive growth’ (ibidem), e.g. PACE and in some aspects PNWER. Third, citistate advocates suggest to “create a sense of the need to devolve authority in order to achieve other goals such as greater competitiveness, more responsive decision processes, and more contextualized decisions” (ibidem), e.g. PNWER. However, other elements of this typology could be suggested, such as recent border security advocates, Pacific North-West First Nations, existing convergent political parties or global events promoters (e.g. 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic Games).

Nevertheless, the existence of multiple definitions for a borderland is not specific to Cascadia. European cross-border case studies reveal variable-geometry spaces as well, either from a diachronic or synchronic approach of cross-border region institutionalization.

The European Union (EU) suggests a supranational and intergovernmental process through a set of several policy-making developments (Morata, 2005). In the regional policy field, and more specifically in the cross-border field, the EU is confronted – and also produces – competing definitions of cross-border regions. Two examples may be emphasized, the Rhineland Valley and the Mediterranean Euroregion.

In the Rhineland Valley, several definitions of the Upper Rhine co-exist over time and reflect variable and competing interests within the area: the Upper Rhine Conference, created in 1975 by the Bonn Agreement\textsuperscript{10}, is monitored by the French State, the German Länder of Baden-Württemberg and Rheinland-Pfalz and the Swiss cantons of Basel-Stadt and Basel-Landschaft; other levels of governance from the Rhineland Valley are only considered as observers. Moreover, at the initiative of the European Commission (EC), two INTERREG programs co-exist in the Upper Rhine: in 1988, financed by article 10 of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF - promoting innovative actions and pilot operations of knowledge diffusion, evaluation and experimentation so as to test new types of community funds), the EC proposed to implement a pilot program of cross-border common operations\textsuperscript{11}. Several European networks of cross-border local and regional actors responded to this proposal. Among them, in the north of the Upper Rhine, a network called PAMINA was officially created after the Declaration of Wissembourg, in 1988\textsuperscript{12}. During this two-year pilot program, since PAMINA was one of the eligible partners of the Commission, pilot operations were developed on a very wide range: information and communication, cartography, cultural heritage, potentialities of forestry and breeding, education or
prospective studies for future cooperation projects. Not surprisingly, in 1990, these pilot programs were considered as successful by the cross-border networks, the European Commission and the member states. Then, on May 2, 1990, the European Commission created twelve Community Initiatives (art. 11, Regulation CEE no 4253/88) that gave the possibility to manage one part of the structural funds to the Commission, in order to carry on public actions that were not included in the existing measures and that would have a specific interest at the Community level. One of these twelve initiatives was labelled “INTERREG”. It was meant to fight border area specific problems and to prepare these border territories to the advent of the common market. The INTERREG Initiative had a 914 millions of ECU budget, coming from the ERDF, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund and the European Social Fund. But this INTERREG division, within the Rhineland Valley and produced by the EC, was afterwards perceived as counter-productive by Brussels. Another type of entity, the Rhineland Council encompasses levels of governance (e.g. municipalities, departments, Kreise) that are excluded from the Upper Rhine Conference: created in 1997, it seeks to be a cross-border entity aimed at fostering political information and dialogue; its internal divisions reveal another competing approach of the Rhinelander territory, with three sub-spaces (Pamina, Centre and TriRhena). Finally, recent Eurodistricts draw a multiple micro-scaled approach of the Upper Rhine (e.g. Eurodistrict Strasbourg-Ortenau, Eurodistrict Pamina and Eurodistrict Trinational of Basel). From a synchronic perspective, internal divisions reflect conflicting interests (e.g. political and administrative oppositions between different levels of governance, socio-economic competitiveness, etc.). Several politico-institutional networks co-exist in the Upper Rhine, create and promote their own agenda, and seek to share INTERREG subsidies. Overall, how to explain current cross-border institutional activity which is in contradiction with very tight investments? A shared symbolic vision for the Rhineland Valley, and the role of European and international strapontin for regional and local leaders may be pertinent factors that reconcile this apparent paradox.

In the ‘Mediterranean Euroregion’, formed in 1991 by the governments of Catalunya and Regional Councils of Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrénées, another cross-border approach was redrawn in 2004 into a ‘Pyrenees-Mediterranean Euroregion’, when Pasquall Maragall, President of the Generalitat de Catalunya, proposed to enlarge it by including the governments of Aragon, and Illes Balears, so as to establish himself against his predecessor and political opponent, Jordi Pujol, to be a more legitimate interlocutor with the EC and its reshaped Euro-Mediterranean policy framework. Additionally, the C6 network, created in 1991, gathers six regional capitals (Montpellier and Toulouse in France, Barcelona, Palma de Mallorca, Valencia and Zaragoza in Spain) that are overlapped by the Pyrenees-Mediterranean Euroregion. Moreover, the Working Community of the Pyrenees (WCP), created in 1982, puts together all Pyrenean regions and Andorra. Finally, the European Commission also created a vast INTERREG program including all French and Spanish regions along the Pyrenean border, where the current Pyrenees-Mediterranean Euroregion is only one portion of this trans-regional space. For Jean-Baptiste Harguindéguy, there is not only a gap between the visibility of such institutions and their actual political influence, but also a lack of consistent strategic policy for the mountainous region. Additionally, some major issues, such as improving economic development or bringing together public services, are barely addressed (2004: 321-322).

Consequently, although the spatial divisions within cross-border regions are less apparent and obvious in the EU, they can be clearly identified. Moreover, institutional differences
between Nation-States tend to undermine cross-border institutional building in the Upper Rhine and in the Mediterranean Euroregion. Finally, although some initiatives emerge (e.g. European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation – EGTC\textsuperscript{14} or groupement local de coopération transfrontalière\textsuperscript{15}), the lack of sustainable legal framework for cross-border networks has been patently obvious and has represented an obstacle to the deepening of European cross-border networks (Eckly, 1995; MOT, 2002; Interact, 2007). This is why Cascadia is not an institutional exception, but its huge area and the distances between the main cities correspond to challenges that European cross-border regions are most likely less or not confronted to.

As it has been shown with Cascadia, the Upper Rhine and the Mediterranean Euroregion, defining a borderland can be analyzed as an attempt to institutionalize specific issues by political, economic and social networks. Nevertheless, this perspective does not help us to figure out how they are concretely organized. Therefore, it is necessary to examine how these actors are structured: to do so, I suggest to focus on their private and public architecture, as well as on their specific modes of multilevel governance.

**Private and public partnerships and confrontations at the cross-border level: differentiated models of multilevel governance?**

Important differences exist between Europe and North America concerning public and private partnerships in cross-border regions. A priori, the EU cross-border areas are dominated by a hegemonic public sector whereas Cascadia is influenced by a strong private sector (Hansen, 2002).

In Europe, cross-border cooperation represents a unique public policy, assuming at least one spatial invention. However, this recent territorial invention, initially based on informal relations, meets significant institutionalization problems as we noticed in the previous development. At the EU level, this inventive policy is characterized by an original multi-sector-based investment policy, materialized by the funding, creation / importation and implementation of small cross-border operations, driven by INTERREG funds (Leibenath, 2007). In general, EU public policies follow national precedents; but in this specific case, this cross-border EU policy innovates in a field in which Nation-States were regarded as hegemonic, with reduced public policies in an administrative and neighboring perspective. In this matter, the qualitative and quantitative turn observed at the beginning of the 1990s is due to the intrusion of a new actor, the EC, in charge of coordinating the INTERREG cross-border regions. In practice, the EC is one of many cross-border entrepreneurs that are organized following a multilevel arrangement specific to each borderland (Perkmann, 2007).

Another aspect of current European cross-border cooperation, illustrated by the Rhineland borderland, refers to marginal public policies, carried out by secondary networks of actors. These networks have been characterized by three traits in a previous work (Dupeyron, 2005): first, as the EC spreads its INTERREG subsidies too thinly in European cross-border regions, one may observe a demand for an immediate political profitability; this political profitability is related to the need of spending Community subsidies, which generates a strong heterogeneity of cross-border operations, reinforced by flexible EC selection.
criteria\textsuperscript{16}. Second, cross-border networks are marginal since their lack of homogeneous political coordination refers to a lack of consistency among sub-national networks: but surprisingly, this lack of consistency is maintained by these networks that perceive it as an asset in order to preserve their own interests (Lamassoure, 2005: 13-14). Third, cross-border cooperation, also called ‘neighborly diplomacy’ (i.e. \textit{diplomatie de bon voisinage}), by peripheral regional and local actors, is regarded as a worthwhile and legitimizing policy implemented at an accessible European level (Bitsch, 2003)\textsuperscript{17}.

In summary, cross-border cooperation in Europe is affected by a dual weakness (Dupeyron, 2008): on the one hand, cross-border policies are limited by small budgets and inconsistent ‘micro-projects’; on the other hand, a majority of actors cannot mobilize efficiently, due to internal rivalries in their domestic arenas. In Cascadia, cross-border networks mobilize more easily as pressure groups or think-tanks. Thus, they are able to make clear cross-border demands. Nevertheless, empirical operations or cross-border outcomes are quite limited.

Conversely, Clarke assumes that North American cross-border cooperation is typically characterized by its ‘bottom-up’ (or private) strategies that should be re-thought, in order to adopt a more effective “top-down” approach. But although private networks easily mobilize, public-private coalitions can be observed on a very broad spectrum of issues, with a consensual key denominator through the concept of ‘sustainable development’ (e.g. 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games). For Alan Artibise and Jessie Hill (1993), an ‘innovative governance system’ for the Georgia Basin should be implemented on the basis of economic and social sustainability. Nevertheless, although various initiatives have taken into account this ecological concern in Cascadia (e.g. Georgia Basin Initiative, Puget Sound Initiative, BC Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy, Environment Cooperation Council), none of them have generated a governance body in order to unify all existing ones. In this perspective, such an institutional failure may support Clarke’s strong bottom-up perspective in the Pacific North-West, but also show the divisions among social movement organizations, organized into a competing environmental “social movement sector” (McCarthy and Zald, 1977).

On the contrary, the EU would be typically shaped by a ‘top-down’ perspective in cross-border matters. Even though it is possible to accept in part this postulation (Koch, 1974; Beck, 1997; Keller, 1998; Newrly, 2002), it is necessary to emphasize the lack of academic attention towards so-called ‘bottom-up’ civil society mobilizations in European cross-border regions, that can be notably due to the exclusion of a majority of private actors from INTERREG operations (Dupeyron, 2003), as long as they are not co-opted by cross-border public policy networks.\textsuperscript{18} This exclusion is reinforced by the deficient regional and local media attention to cross-border initiatives that are not sponsored by recognized players.

A relevant example of this focus on a healthy bottom-up approach – that does not exclude the broader context in which it is inscribed – is the research carried out by Philippe Hamman, in the Rhineland Valley, concerning cross-border workers (see, for instance, Hamman, 2005; 2006). Another example is provided by Joachim Blatter: although Blatter (2003: 511) considers that the \textit{Badisch-Elsässische Bürgerinitiativen}, a very loose cross-border network of environmentalist movements in Baden and Alsace, represents a non-
governmental actor at the cross-border level that is included in the broader Rhineland policy network, other observations in the Upper Rhine show that such environmentalist networks, “not very responsible” according to the president of the Upper Rhine Centre-South INTERREG monitoring committee, cannot play a role in official cross-border networks (Dupeyron, 2005: 56, 76 and 196). As a consequence, a vast research field is open for scholars who, like Romain Pasquier and Julien Weisbein (2004), speak in favor of an EU ‘political sociology’ that would shift from an analytical approach based on sectors to another fruitful analytical approach based on actors.

Therefore, it seems difficult to formulate a strict classification of cross-border multilevel governance\(^{19}\) that would apply to a ‘Type II’ model. Thus, some of the cross-border cooperation case-studies we know may only fit partially into Hooghe and Marks’ ‘Type II’ approach (Marks, 1996; Hooghe & Marks, 2001; 2003): in the Upper Rhine and the Mediterranean Euroregion, (i) jurisdictions are not necessarily task-specific; (ii) jurisdictions may overlap; (iii) the number of jurisdictional levels is large, but can be analyzed through the EC Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) classification\(^{20}\); (iv) jurisdictions are hardly flexible and rather tend to proliferate (see Table 1 and Table 2).

**Table 1. Types of Multi-level Governance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type I</th>
<th>Type II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General-purpose jurisdictions (Ia)</td>
<td>Task-specific jurisdictions (IIa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonintersecting memberships (Ib)</td>
<td>Intersecting memberships (IIb)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdictions at a limited number of levels (Ic)</td>
<td>No limit to the number of jurisdictional levels (IIc)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemwide architecture (Id)</td>
<td>Flexible design (IIId)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hooghe and Marks, 2003: 236

(Nota bene: italic text from the original version. In parenthesis, addenda by the author, to be used in Table 2.)

Neither would it follow a mere ‘top-down’ approach in Europe versus a ‘bottom-up’ one in North America. As we have noticed earlier, many academic perspectives on the EU have adopted a top-down approach centered on the role of the EC, so that a myriad of regional and local actors has remained invisible. Additionally, INTERREG II and III (respectively 1994-99 and 2000-06) do not allow to talk about a mere top-down model, as regional and local actors have contributed actively to support and renew INTERREG I (1991-93): the Committee of Regions (CoR), the Assembly of European Regions (ARE), the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR) and multiple INTERREG steering committees have been collectively mobilized in this matter to lobby the EC and member states. Moreover, constitutional frameworks (federal in North America, multiple in Europe) in each continent and regional integration processes (existence of a supra-national level in Europe) have profound effects on cross-border cooperation. For instance, INTERREG funding creates a certain type of impulsons for many regional and local cross-border operations -but other less visible initiatives are present as well; in North America, the lack of equivalent to INTERREG is compensated by other drives issued by various governance levels (e.g. financial or symbolic support by regional political leaders). Therefore, it is essential to transcend unidirectional perspectives (top-down or bottom-up) in order to integrate, in a more comprehensive perspective (vertical, horizontal and
multilevel), the complexity of the relations between the numerous players committed in cross-border cooperation projects, as they can be observed.

Table 2. Characteristics of multi-level governance for European cross-border networks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cross-border region</th>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Type I or Type II characteristics (from Table 1)</th>
<th>Hegemonic public (P) or private (p) sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Rhine</td>
<td>Upper Rhine Conference, Rhineland Council, EUCOR, INTERREG Committees.</td>
<td>Ia, Ib, lc, lId</td>
<td>P exclusively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(France-Germany-Switzerland)</td>
<td>(Pamina, Upper Rhine Centre-South, France-Spain)</td>
<td></td>
<td>P exclusively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean Euroregion</td>
<td>Mediterranean Euroregion, C6 network, Working Community of the Pyrenees</td>
<td>Ia, Ib, lc, lId</td>
<td>P exclusively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(France-Spain)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>P exclusively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cascadia</td>
<td>PACE</td>
<td>Ia, Ib, lc, lId</td>
<td>p mostly; P (may have joint activities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Canada-USA)</td>
<td>People for Puget Sound, PNWER</td>
<td></td>
<td>p mostly; P (may have joint activities)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, is there a duality of multilevel governance models that separates each continent, which might be congruent with the continental integration processes, namely the EU and NAFTA? Since our focus is on the concept of governance (and not on the concept of government which conveys a notion of hierarchy), it is important to remind that private and public actors share a role in a multilevel governance scheme. The question is accordingly how this governance is shared between public and private players in borderlands. In Europe, although cross-border cooperation is dominated by the public sector which sponsors some private actors, both a horizontal network at the regional level and a vertical network that extends to the supra-national level mutually benefit from their interdependence; nevertheless, recent INTERREG programs tend to impose a tougher selection of private and public actors at the horizontal level, which leads to more political activism at the cross-border level and to a stronger cross-border Darwinism. At the same time, the responsibility, legitimacy and social representation of this cross-border collective action are unequally distributed to all actors involved in those horizontal and vertical networks; specific institutional legacies, leaderships and given political cultures shape the distribution of these resources. Nevertheless, the effects of such tiny resources remain in general quite limited outside the cross-border field and do not modify radically the political economy of cross-border relations within a given space, but rather stress existing political, economic and social dynamics and tensions. In Cascadia, cross-border actors from the private sector are also dependent from public leaders, but this second model of governance is fragmented by an additional issue, the cross-border ‘low gravity’ factor.
Cascadia as a border region: North American example of a dual European cross-border paradox?

In Europe, deepening cross-border cooperation is confronted to structural obstacles: European cross-border cooperation is constrained by a dual key paradox, often referred to as ‘intrinsic weakness’ (i.e. in which cross-border cooperation is conditioned by limited resources, a fragile social fabric, and low institutionalization) and ‘low gravity’ (defined as the attraction of small projects toward the local and regional levels, while major projects are pushed up to the national level) (Dupeyron, 2005: 491-505). We will examine this couple of principles in the Rhineland Valley, Mediterranean Euroregion and its possible usefulness and consequences for Cascadia. As a matter of fact, cross-border cooperation in both continents seems to have similar issues that need to be scrutinized with identical lenses of analysis. Consequently, it is uneasy to suggest that European border regions should be examples for North American ones.

In the Upper Rhine, the “low gravity” metaphor describes the attraction of small projects toward the sub-national levels, e.g. Upper Rhine history and geography cross-border textbook that was successfully produced and distributed but massively unused in the Rhineland Valley (ADIRA, 1999). Also, “low gravity” takes us back to major projects that are pushed up to the national level. Thus, the Rhineland cross-border textbook (Dupeyron, 2007), a small project attracted to the regional level, has been followed by a major project, propelled by a bi-national initiative: on May 4, 2006, German and French Ministers of Education, Peter Müller and Gilles de Robien, presented to the press a common French-German textbook, with the same content, published in French (Geiss & Le Quintrec, 2006a) and German (Geiss & Le Quintrec, 2006b). This textbook has been conceived for French and German high-school students, in order to focus on the same history program for their final high-school exam – baccalauréat in France and Abitur in Germany. Originally, this project had been proposed in 2003 by the French-German Youth Parliament, during the celebration of the 40th anniversary of the very brief Elysée Treaty which sets “the organisation and principles of cooperation between both States”. It had then been implemented politically by President Jacques Chirac and Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. A group of eight historians, supervised by Peter Geiss and Guillaume Le Quintrec, wrote a history textbook for high-school students in their last year, Histoire/Geschichte. L’Europe et le monde depuis 1945 (Geiss & Le Quintrec, 2006a). But this bi-national textbook is not limited to the last year of the high-school curriculum, as it is going to be extended to the two previous years of the high-school curriculum as well: two books will supplement this one in the forthcoming years: the second one, to be published around 2007-2008, will be entitled From the Vienna Congress to the Second World War, and the third one, to be published around 2008-2009, will cover From Antiquity to Napoleon. Contrary to the cross-border textbooks, the bi-national textbooks are supported by the highest political levels, published by significant domestic publishers and follow the specific high-school curricula (i.e. French seconde to terminale classes, and German 10. to 12. / 13. classes) with three consistent volumes that can be purchased by teachers and students.

Other INTERREG operations in the Rhineland Valley, such as building new bridges along the Rhine or the 2004 Landesgartenschau (Kehl-am-Rhein, Germany and Strasbourg, France) stress this low gravity principle. Bridges along the Rhine are an issue between France and Germany, even after the Second World War, most likely for military reason (i.e. Cold War).
However, in the 1990s, regional and local authorities are unable to convince their respective national authorities to simplify procedures to build bridges until 2001, when an agreement is eventually signed between both countries in order to make simpler administrative and political measures: before this agreement, cross-border bridges for traffic had to be concluded between nation-states. While the Pierre Pflimlin bridge, opened in 2002, has two traffic lanes, and two pedestrian routes, other bridges built in the 1990s are only meant to serve pedestrians and bikers, in fact because of this lack of administrative simplification between various government levels.

The Landesgartenschau is a German initiative born in Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria in 1980 and extended since then to the rest of Germany and Austria. Its purpose consists in promoting every year, in a different city, an urban quality of life and an environmental agenda through the development of gardens and flower shows. In 2004, the municipality of Kehl-am-Rhein (Germany) proposed to the city of Strasbourg (France) to create a cross-border Landesgartenschau, sponsored by INTERREG subsidies. In spite of many assets, this initiative has been stained by the inexperience of local leaders who found safety in the intervention of national political leaders.

In the Mediterranean Euroregion, the existence of a determined agenda has not led to tangible results, which shows a cross-border ‘intrinsic weakness’ with specific factors: long-standing domestic political party conflicts, in France between Martin Malvy and Jacques Blanc, and in Spain between Jordi Pujol and Pasqual Maragall, may be considered as key-issues. These conflicts have considerably undermined, in the Eastern Pyrenees in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a fragile cross-border cooperation, its institutions and the political commitment of sub-national entities.

Additionally, the “low gravity” paradox is also persistent on the French-Spanish border: one of the three main projects of the Euroregion, the creation of the Cerdanya cross-border hospital, has been saved by INTERREG III A subsidies, supported by French and Spanish national administrations. This project has been re-scheduled on the bi-national and cross-border agendas with a “new deal”, in October 2004, with the creation of a newly stimulated Euroregion, and in March 2007, with the creation of an EGTC regarding the management of the Hospital de la Cerdanya project. This EGTC, which has been formally signed between the French national state and the Catalan public health administration, reveals that national actors must be present in order to achieve many cross-border initiatives.

In Cascadia, at least four examples illustrate this ‘low gravity’ principle: softwood lumber, fishery, and other issues. Softwood lumber dispute has been a strong ‘irritant’ for BC-Washington relations (Smith, 2002: 135), but its resolution has been made at the bi-national level (e.g. NAFTA decisions in 2003 and 2006; in 2006, trade ministers from Canada and the United States agreed to sign the final legal text of the softwood lumber deal) and at the multilateral level (e.g. in 2006, World Trade Organization was appealed by Canada to overturn an earlier decision by the U.S. International Trade Commission). Conversely, the fishery issue may be analyzed has a bi-national problem with cross-border consequences, that cannot be resolved at the cross-border level, although some efforts were made in 1997 between BC, Washington and Oregon. Other issues, in the environmental field for instance, reveal cross-border problems that find solutions only in part at the cross-border level (e.g. cross-border cooperation in the Puget Sound area in order to improve air quality).
In short, both in the European Union cases and in Cascadia, ‘intrinsic weakness’ and ‘low gravity’ principles show how the Achille’s heels of cross-border governance tend to fizzle out a certain amount of fragile projects, institutions and initiatives and to kick out to upper levels too ambitious operations. Alleged “successful” cross-border operations (e.g. Rhineland cross-border textbook or Cerdanya cross-border hospital), provided that they are attentively and empirically studied, show that EU territories have similar issues as the Pacific Northwest in the cross-border field.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, we have used one of Pierre Bourdieu’s theoretical models in order to compare border regions – the Upper Rhine, the Mediterranean Euroregion and Cascadia – in two distinct continents. We have first studied how definite spatial issues are represented, re-created and institutionalized at the cross-border level in Europe and North-America. In addition, after analyzing how private and public groups shape cross-border governance schemes in each borderland, we have defined the characteristics of multi-level governance for cross-border networks. Finally, we have used the same critical lenses – “low gravity” principle – in order to be able to analyze similar cross-border issues and avoid a “degreeist” perspective.

Now, if we synthesize and superimpose Figures 1, 2 and 3 on a single map (Figure 4), we observe that the hegemonic network area is pretty much larger in Cascadia than the ones illustrated by the couple of European case studies. We also notice that more actors are excluded in the European cases, for instance environmental groups.

Two factors may be highlighted in conclusion. First, this may be caused by the political party proximity that ties one part of the political party spectrum in Cascadia and social movements (liberals and democrats), correlated with the regular political changeovers at the provincial / state level. In contrast, in Europe, political parties are extremely consensual on cross-border matters, and tend to exclude the same types of actors from the cross-border field. On Figure 4, a dividing line between conservative and liberal votes emphasizes the fact that some entities tend to be more excluded, especially in Europe, given their political or partisan distance with their respective hegemonic cross-border network.

Additionally, in Cascadia, the propensity to gather a larger amount of organizations may also be due to the specific informal definition of the Pacific Northwest borderland, a definition based on the concept of sustainable development, shared by all political parties and promoting a sort of ecological positivism. Therefore, in spite of the partisan changeovers in the main jurisdictions of Cascadia and the conjectural moving closer toward political allies, no exclusion seems possible, unless the risk be taken to give up a central symbolic feature of Cascadia. Conversely, the Rhineland Valley and the Mediterranean Euroregion are not mainly defined by environmental values, but rather by economic and symbolic principles. As those principles are defended by the regional and local media, excluding social actors from hegemonic cross-border network is not really expensive in political terms. Nonetheless, in the last couple of years, some “conscience-constituents” journalists (MacCarthy and Zald, 1977) tend to question this hegemonic network and attempt to give more media attention and more legitimacy to current excluded social movements.
Figure 4. Superimposition of previous socio-political spaces

Source: Bourdieu, 1979

Endnotes

1 An early version of this paper, titled “Cascadia Revisited: Lessons from the Field and From European Case-Studies”, was presented at the 2007 Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. I would like to thank Stéphane Roussel and John McDougall for their useful comments. I am also grateful to Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly for his suggestions concerning the last version of this research.

2 Cross-border cooperation may be defined as “all types of negotiated actions between the public institutions of, at least, two neighboring countries. These negotiated actions must take place within the border territories of these states in order to reinforce the relations of these states and of their territorial institutions by all the means possible” (Pérez González, 1993: 545-564, cited by Harguindéguy, 2005: 1). However, since I consider that cross-border cooperation cannot be restricted to public actors, I suggest that this notion should be defined as “common public
policies and/or private strategies between organizations located in, at least, two adjacent border spaces, in order to develop joint practices in all possible fields”.

3 Public and private players who promote this concept of “laboratories” or Europe may be the European Commission, the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) or Interreg Steering Committees. For scholars who use this notion as well, see for instance: Van Houtum, 2000: 7-8; Blatter, 2003: 505.

4 However, having a “developmentalist” perspective – i.e. assuming for instance that some borderlands are more advanced than other transnational regions – may represent a steady risk; this has already been raised by Giovanni Sartori who labels this as “degreeism” (Sartori, 1991: 248-49) or by Jean Blondel (Blondel, 1994).

5 For recent works concerning transnational networks lato sensu, see Tarrow, 2005.

6 I conducted this research using three complementary methods: semi-direct interviews with regional and local political representatives, representatives of various partners in charge of Interreg operations and individuals from the civil society field involved in cross-border matters (Europe). I also realized a textual analysis of documents and press articles related to cross-border issues (Europe and North America). I eventually had access to various political and administrative documents from different organizations (e.g. minutes of meetings, reports, mails and emails in Europe and North America).


9 However, one common drive refers to the regional integration in North America – through the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) that came into force in 1989 and the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in 1994 – that is limited to a “functional interdependence of border cities and regions” (Scott, 1999: 610).


11 After 2007, Upper Rhine Centre-South and pamina will be merged into one interreg program.

12 Pamina is first of all a reference to one of the characters in the Magic Flute, an opera by Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart (Strasser, Corinne, “L’espace pamina : un modèle de coopération transfrontalière”, Revue d’Allemagne et des pays de langue allemande, tome 33, n° 2/3, avril-septembre 2001, dossier “La coopération transfrontalière infranationale – Alsace-Allemagne-Suisse”, p. 227-242). It is also a French-German acronym for Palatinat (PA), Mittlerer-Oberrhein (MI) and Nord-Alsace (NA). The first references to ‘Pamina’ date back to the preparatory works of the Declaration of Intention of Wissembourg, signed on December 12, 1988. This declaration follows closely European regional policy reforms. It represents a token of allegiance toward the European Commission: this French-German cross-border network promotes a ‘concept of development’ in the expectation of getting community funds dedicated to cross-border projects. However, prior to this symbolic milestone in 1988, a few preliminary cross-border exchanges (i.e. meetings between elected representatives) are from time to time cited as well, but they hardly hide the fact that the cross-border agenda in the Upper Rhine was very poorly nurtured before the intrusion of the European Commission.


European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON) and Interact Program, Cross-Border Cooperation – Cross-Thematic Study of INTERREG and ESPON Activities, Luxemburg and Viborg (Denmark): Espon and Interact, 2007, see in particular conclusions, pp.54-57.

See in particular the contributions from regional political actors.

Regarding the concept of “public policy network”, see for instance: Marsh and Rhodes, 1995; Rhodes and Smith, 2001.

Hooghe and Marks define the concept of governance “as binding decision making in the public sphere” (2002: 233), which may exclude the intervention of private actors.


It is especially the case for partners in charge of Interreg project that are either public actors (frequently members of the steering committee as well) or affable private players.

The two others being on the one hand a project of high-speed train railway connection between Barcelona and Montpellier, and on the other a water transfer from the Rhone River (France) to Barcelona (Spain).

For recent information about this Interreg operation, you may visit the following webpages from the Generalitat de Catalunya: http://www10.gencat.net/catsalut/cerdanya/ca/index.html, last accessed on 10.07.2007.

References


