Branding Cascadia: Considering Cascadia’s Conflicting Conceptualizations - Who Gets To Decide?

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Abstract

This article examines the notion of branding – or place marketing - through the experience of Cascadia – the transborder region of Pacific NorthWest North America. It assesses the Cascadia city-region ‘brand’ in the context of competing definitions about the cross-border region, asking whether a multiplicity of conceptualizations is a definitional disadvantage or strength. It concludes that the urban conception is the most sustainable ‘brand’, and one in keeping with the initial branding of Cascadia around ecological imagery. It examines some of the cooperative – and occasionally conflictual – activity in the Cascadia region and concludes with lessons for city regions – particularly those which are not ‘top-tiered’ in world city terms – from this Mainstreet Cascadia experience, noting that seven ‘globalist’ characteristics stand out as ‘best strategies’ for rebranding local-global relations in terms other than ‘globalized.

Introduction: The ‘Branding’ Approach

This article explores the notion of branding – or what Gert-Jan Hospers calls “place marketing” – in this case around conceptualizations of sub-national/global city regions.¹ It looks at this idea of branding as “imagined space” or agreed identity in the context of Cascadia – a region in the Pacific Northwest of North America, which has a multiplicity of definitional forms or brands. It questions whether a degree of definitional clarity or branding is potentially advantageous and whether this would lead to an argument for more conceptual clarity or agreement for the Cascadia region. If so, then the city-regional definition or branding of Cascadia is perhaps the most sustainable/advantageous. Given that idea, an assessment of the institutional and policy determinants of such an emerging bi-national, subnational, international global city-region is posed; and some lessons for any city-region contemplating ‘going global’ or ‘globalist’ are suggested.

Amongst the earliest of proponents of ‘place branding’ are Philip Kotler, Donald Haider and Irving Rein - in Marketing Places: Attracting Investment, Industry and Tourism to Cities, States and Nation (1993), and John Gold and Stephen Ward – in Place Promotion: The Use of Publicity and Marketing To Sell Towns and Regions (1994). Kotler and colleagues provided a “how to” for

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what they term “place auditing” and “strategic market planning”. Gold and Ward focused on “place image” at various scales and contexts – from festivals and fairs to industrial towns, suburbs and cities, then to notions such as “the countryside” or “the American West” and finally to a national scale: on Eastern Europe and China. Their emphasis throughout was on “place promotion”, starting with creating “a vocabulary” and “grammar” of place promotion using communications theory.

The ‘branding approach’ emerged out of the marketing, management, public relations and industrial location/promotion fields. This early marketing work morphed into creating new ‘brands’ for commercial products, and broadened to include cross border regions such as the Copenhagen-centred Oresund Region. It also came to cover tourism promotion, and even – out of the experiences like Union Carbide experience of Bhopal, India 1984 disaster and similar places in crisis – corporate lessons in crisis management and places in crisis branding.

By the mid 00’s of the 21st century’s first decade, the branding notion had produced its own academic journal, as well as ‘review’ articles such as “Place Branding: A Review of Trends and Conceptual Models”, The Marketing Review(2005). The journal Place Branding and Public Diplomacy describes itself as “the first to concentrate on the practice of applying brand strategy and other marketing techniques and disciplines to the economic, social, political and cultural development of cities, regions and countries.” Perhaps nowhere are these lessons more clearly applied than in the EU’s “Oresund” region.

Before that comparative case, however, briefly, in this article, the notion of place branding is applied (i) comparatively through the Oresund EU cross-border region case; (ii) in an examination of what are competing definitions or brands of the Cascadia region; and, finally, (iii) with an argument made for the benefits of branding consistency via the Mainstreet Cascadia urban-city region sustainability brand. Conclusions include the idea that while branding is generally an economic project, it is possible to develop regional self-definition along other – in this case environmental and sustainability - lines.

**Branding the Oresund Region: Comparative Lessons for Cascadia?**

The Oresund experience is perhaps the most relevant example of a fairly single-minded branding of “an imagined space”; this North European example offers useful comparative lessons on cross-border regional institution-building for other such territories – like Cascadia. The Oresund region (Map 1) links parts of Denmark (Zealand/Copenhagen) and southern Sweden (Scania/Malmo-Lund) in the EU. It is 20,859 sq. kms, half the size of Switzerland.

Oresund comparison suggests, competing conceptions or brandings of a region can affect processes of institutionalization, agenda setting and developing regional policy-making capacity. This was something that the creators of Oresund sought to avoid. Initial research conclusions here are that some territorial definitions of Cascadia matter more than others and definitional coherence may have an impact on global ‘niche-ing’. Simply put, branding matters – so who gets to decide is not without consequence.
In the Oresund case, when local interests began to contemplate ways to develop more regional cooperation and establish a clearer niche brand for their region in both European and broader global terms, they confronted several obvious obstacles:

**economic obstacles:** little pre-existing interdependence in the Danish and Swedish economies existed before regional entrepreneurs and local elites started to discuss links and cooperation as well as ways to develop a global niche.

**geographic obstacles:** little infrastructure to facilitate extensive regional interaction - and a major body of water - the Oresund - stood between the Zealand and Scania areas.

**political obstacles:** this initially included the jurisdictional fact that Sweden was not a member of the EU while Denmark was.

**definitional obstacles:** how to define or brand a new region in terms that placed it well in European and world standings was an important initial consideration for the local elites who undertook this project.

The major political obstacle was overcome with Sweden’s entry into the EU. That EU umbrella has allowed for more significant cross-border rethinking than NAFTA has for Cascadians.
In Oresund, the *geographic obstacles* were overcome next with major investment in infrastructure improvements. Here two stand out: (1) the mega-project construction of the Oresund Bridge - a $3.5billion CDN, 16km bridge/tunnel to link “the first cross-national integrated large-city region outside the European centre.”\(^{10}\) (2) another $25billionCDN in other area improvements - mostly on air/rail/transit/road/bridge transportation improvements (including another new fixed link with Scandinavia and the European continent) and a new airport and university.\(^{11}\)

The *economic obstacles* were grounded in two sub-regional economies with relatively little interaction. For Matthiessen and colleagues, the shift centred on “transformations from politics to economics, from welfare orientation to market orientation, and from spatial equalization policy to a focus on metropolitan competition.”\(^{12}\) In population size, the Zealand region of Denmark, including Copenhagen was about 1.8 million; the Malmo-Lund area in Scania, South Sweden has just 3/4 million - a then total of about 2.5 million, just slightly larger than Greater Vancouver and metropolitan Portland but smaller than Greater Seattle. In European population tables, the combined Oresund urban agglomeration was only 27th in Top 30 rankings - well behind Moscow (12 million), Dortmund/Dusseldorf/Cologne (10.8 million), Paris (9.6 million) and London (9.6 million). [Oresund’s current population is 3.6 million.\(^{13}\) Individually, neither Copenhagen nor Malmo-Lund made the top 30. Thus a strategic decision by the local elites working on this rebranding was made to develop more commonalities and synergies economically.

That led to a search to overcome what Oresund advocates saw as *definitional obstacles*: a conscious effort was made to make sure conceptual ducks were all lined up in one row – or, simply put, to establish a single Oresund brand. To do so, Oresund proponents examined a series of comparative European standing lists. That included population - where the new region ranked near the bottom of a top 30 Euro-list; then top 30 Urban Agglomeration “Gross Agglomeration Product” (GAP); here Oresund moved up to 11th - between Rome and Madrid (above) and Stuttgart and Brussels-Antwerp (below). Oresund’s GAP was $77billion USD. Dortmund-Dusseldorf-Cologne, Paris and London were all (in mid 1990’s figures, when the project was early in development) above $200billion USD, with the Dortmund region close to $300billion USD. Copenhagen by itself would have been ranked 19th in the EU; Malmo-Lund would not have made the top 30 list.\(^{14}\)

Seeking comparative advantage by definitional certainty, other lists were consulted, such as International Air Traffic: on this Top 30 Euro list, London, Paris, Frankfurt and Amsterdam regions ranked as the top 4. Oresund landed at #9 - with virtually all (96.4%) of their numbers based on Copenhagen air traffic.\(^{15}\) Further urbanization lists considered included rankings by firms, jobs, infrastructure, finance, culture, meetings, the media, etc. Combining many of these, Copenhagen fell into a fourth class set. The one area - given a heavy concentration of university/research facilities in Copenhagen and Lund - where the Oresund Region came out well was as a research centre: The combined Oresund research output - measured by academic research output - placed Oresund as 5th in Europe’s ‘top 30’, behind London, Paris, Moscow and Amsterdam-Hague-Rotterdam-Utrecht.\(^{16}\) Perhaps, not surprisingly, this research emphasis – particularly research with a medical-pharmaceutical focus and IT - became the major component of the new Oresund brand. With that determined, all other aspects of the region were brought into line with this branding - on regional culture, for example.\(^{17}\)
There is one other aspect - size - which raises a question about the variety of definitions of Cascadia. The Oresund region now contains approximately 3.6 million people. The Oresund conurbation lies within 50 kms of Copenhagen airport; and the distance between Copenhagen and the main urban areas of Scania is only 18 kms. As one proponent of building this region suggested, the bridge was more important symbolically that in reality, but it would not have been built without agreement on what the new region was to be. Greater Seattle’s geographic size is 217 sq. kms; Greater Vancouver itself is just under 3000 sq. kms. Perhaps, more importantly, there was no counter-definition which challenged this central conception of the Oresund region as one of the EU’s major research centres. Some of the definitions of Cascadia - from Alaska to the California border cover thousands of sq. kilometers. Even small definitions such as the Georgia Basin/Puget Sound and Mainstreet Cascadia take 8+ hours of motorway driving to cross. These Cascadia definitions are not only based on different jurisdictions, but also have included ones which began with different foci - from environmental to economic.

The Oresund is just one EU global region. The range of such entities varies considerably. However, what the Oresund case suggests is that definitional clarity helps with institution building. Oresund University is one example of what definitional clarity can produce: with 120,000+ students, this virtual university is made up of the major post secondary research centres in Oresund - making it the largest university in the EU.

To sustain itself, the regional initiative known as Cascadia seems to have less certainty about the potential value of definitional integrity and clear branding: entities such as the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER) began with an economic conception of a rather large Cascadia region [5 states, 2 (now- as of July, 2008, 3) provinces and one territory]; other definitions such as the Georgia Basin Initiative (GBI) are much smaller (a small part of British Columbia and Washington state) have espoused an environmental focus. Global region-building successes may depend more on developing either broader globalist policy stances or narrower niche’s such as Oresund. In either case, as the branding literature attests, definitional clarity and identity has its benefits.

**Cascadia’s Competing Brands**

In few places in North America is subnational, binational, international activity being played out more fully than in the Canadian-American West/Pacific NorthWest - Cascadia – region; this cross-border activity is being played out at every jurisdictional level, and in both governmental and nongovernmental settings. In terms of understanding the branding of Cascadia, this raises several questions:

- What are the determinants of such subnational international activity in North America’s West/Pacific NorthWest/Cascadia?

- Who is responsible for particular brandings of Cascadia? What interests are most central in Cascadia branding/re-branding?

- Are multiple brandings of the Cascadia region an advantage or disadvantageous?
What are some of the lessons from the literature on place branding – and from the experiences of other branded sub-national/bi-national regions (e.g., Oresund in the E.U. - for thinking about the Cascadia brand?

Might a more convergent brand –such as exemplified by the emerging, more urban-focussed city-region, generally referred to as Mainstreet Cascadia offer a clear brand – one with significant historical roots?

Before that analysis, however, a review of definitional differences of the territory called Cascadia - including the Cascadia ‘brand’- is useful.

**Cascadia’s “founding brand”: An Ecological Region**

The initial notion of Cascadia emerged in the 1970’s and 1980’s. It was environmentally-conceived and referred to that portion of Pacific NorthWest North America between the Cascade Mountains and the Pacific Ocean; its initial name was taken from the waters which ‘cascaded’ down from the Cascade mountain range to the ocean. This initial ecological branding was introduced and popularized by David McCloskey, and by Joel Garreau.

David McCloskey, a Seattle University Sociologist, coined the initial term Cascadia in the late 1970’s/early 1980’s. According to McCloskey, this “initial’ Cascadia included parts of seven jurisdictions (Northern California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Western Montana, British Columbia and South East Alaska), running in the north from the top of the Alaska panhandle to Cape Mendicino, California in the south – and covering all the land and “falling waters” from the continental divide at the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. [Map 2] McCloskey, founder of the Cascadia Institute and co-chair of Seattle University’s New Ecological Studies Program saw this Cascadia brand as something which transcends political – even geographic – definitions; it is more an ideological notion with the environment at its centre.21

**Figure 2 – The Cascadia Region**

Map designed by David McCloskey of the Cascadia Institute
While other conceptions followed, this first ‘enviro-branding’ has had significant staying power thanks to being followed shortly after McCloskey by Joel Garreau’s *Nine Nations of North America* (1981): Garreau’s *Ecotopia* [one of the Nine Nations of North America, 1981]: included the Pacific Northwest coast west of the Cascade Range stretching from southern Alaska in the north to coastal areas of British Columbia, down through Washington state, Oregon and into California just north of Santa Barbara. Its capital is San Francisco, its symbol ‘the tree’ and its keyword ‘water’. [See Map 3]. According to Garreau, Ecotopia is a land of individualism and the environment.22 For Garreau, these nine ‘nations’ replaced existing boundaries in North America, “each with its own economic, political and cultural characteristics.”23

Figure 3 - Ecotopia [and the other 8 ‘nations of North America]
reflecting the environmental emphasis which had gripped the Cascadia/Ecotopia region in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Callenbach’s Ecotopia was of a seceded Washington, Oregon and Northern California – a portrait of a future, ecologically sustainable society. Callenbach’s Ecotopia was a portrait of a future, ecologically sustainable society. Callenbach’s Ecotopia was a portrait of a future, ecologically sustainable society. Callenbach’s Ecotopia was of a seceded Washington, Oregon and Northern California – a portrait of a future, ecologically sustainable society.

Nowhere was this regional emerging environmentalism better reflected than in the Berkeley, California-based Portola Institute’s series of the Whole Earth Catalog. Begun in 1968 with The Last Whole Earth Catalog: Access to Tools published in 1971 - the intent of the books was to allow “the individual to conduct his own education, find his own inspiration, shape his own environment, and share his adventure with whoever is interested. Tools that aid this process are sought and promoted by the Whole Earth Catalog.”

Other works, such as Raymond Gastil’s Cultural Regions of the United States, offered early reflection on similar themes for the region. These were followed by a cluster of later and ongoing works on regional iterations such as the Northwest (music) “sound”, “cuisine”, and “architecture”.

Cascadia’s Counter-Branding: An Economic Region

If Cascadia’s founding brand was environmental, by the late 1980’s/early 1990’s, there was a much more conscious effort to re-brand the region. The emphasis of this re-branding was predominately economic. The most significant of these efforts was in the creation of the Pacific NorthWest Economic Region (PNWER). Formally established by the seven jurisdictions of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana and Alaska, plus British Columbia and Alberta, in 1991 (Yukon joined in 1994-and Saskatchewan in 2008), the organization was first posed by Alan Bleuchel, then a Washington State Senator, with western Canadian roots, in 1988 as the Pacific NorthWest Legislative Leadership Forum (PNLLP). The Pacific NorthWest Economic Region (or PNWER) is also the largest definition of Cascadia: it is now a public-private partnership ‘composed of legislators, governments, NGO’s and businesses’ from British Columbia and Alberta (plus Yukon Territory; and as of July, 2008’s 18th PNWER Regional Summit, with Saskatchewan joining) in Canada and the states of Washington, Oregon, Alaska, Idaho and Montana in the USA. It is "the only regional planning and facilitation organization set up by statute ... to deal with transboundary policy and planning in the Pacific Northwest. The population of PNWER is now over 20 million, and its economy - at more than US$700 billion - would place it as the 10th largest national economy in the world.”

Figure 4 - Pacific NorthWest Economic Region
The goals of PNWER are to:

Promote greater regional cooperation;

Enhance the competitiveness of the region in both domestic and international markets;

Leverage regional influence in Ottawa and Washington, DC; and

Achieve continued economic growth while maintaining the region’s natural beauty and environment.\(^{33}\)

Neighbouring California, with over 38 million population is the 9th largest economy in the world.\(^{34}\) That is not insignificant as some efforts to define this larger region – as exemplified by recent jurisdictional carbon tax and carbon trading cooperative initiatives - now include a fifth, larger, concentric circle notion of an I-5 ‘Pacifica’ corridor from British Columbia (or Alaska) in the north to California and even Baja, Mexico in the south.\(^{35}\)

Variations on the economic brand also exist. These include, simply, the **Pacific NorthWest**: This regional, more geographic reference includes five jurisdictions – the US States of Washington, Oregon, Idaho and Montana and Canada’s British Columbia:

**Figure 5 – Traditional Cascadia**

Then **‘Traditional’ Cascadia:** this jurisdictional conception includes the three central provincial/state jurisdictions of Oregon, Washington and British Columbia. *(See Map 5, above)* In this iteration, ‘Cascadia’ contains over 16 million citizens and has a GDP of more than $490 billion (USD, 2004)\(^{36}\), which would place it as the world’s 21\(^{st}\) ranked ‘country’, tied with South
Africa and above Argentina, Chile and the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{37} There are a number of institutional iterations of this provincial-state iteration; interestingly, these focus particularly around environmental protection on matters such as oil spills.

**The Cascadia economic branding** has also produced ideas for organizations such as the Pacific Enterprise Corridor Commission (PACE) and the Cascade Corridor Commission (C.C.C.) – the latter “an advisory body of the governments of Canada, the United States, the Province of British Columbia, and the states of Washington and Oregon... [to] develop a strategic plan for environmentally-sound economic development and urban management in the Cascadia region.”\textsuperscript{38} The idea for CCC membership - from ‘traditional Cascadia - is to include “representatives from...regional planning agencies, municipal county/city governments; and port districts in the urbanized Cascadia region” as well as from the national/state governments. While not yet fully in place - as “the commission would involve a federal treaty and would represent a layer of decision-making that might contradict local plans” - the Cascadia Corridor Commission mandate was to “address environmental, transportation, growth and trade issues in the Portland-Seattle-Vancouver corridor.”\textsuperscript{39} As such – to the extent that it includes all these aspects of its mandate - it corresponds to a broader policy phase evident in the region in the late1980’s, 1990’s and 2000’s.

Other Pacific NorthWest economic development initiatives have included the **High Speed Ground Transportation Committee**: this committee recommended to the state Governor “that Washington, in cooperation with Oregon and British Columbia, begin immediately designing a system to haul passengers at high speed between Vancouver, B.C. and Eugene, Oregon”\textsuperscript{40} – that is along what is called “Mainstreet Cascadia”. “Studies to date have concluded that HSGT is compatible with a regional transportation plan, is environmentally friendly, has significant ridership potential, would support an international northwest economy and would cover costs within 12 to 15 years, but not capital costs.”\textsuperscript{41} Prior to the creation of the 240kph rail transportation link, in related developments AMTRAK reintroduced its conventional rail link – the Cascades – from Eugene, Oregon through Salem and Portland, then Olympia, Tacoma and Seattle in Washington state and on to Vancouver, British Columbia, a distance of 466 miles along Mainstreet Cascadia.\textsuperscript{42} This was not introduced without cross-border issues such as train speed through urban areas. However, more environmentally-friendly transportation improvements are central to a variety of organizations, governments and initiatives within the region: for example, more economically-focussed groups such as PNWER and the Discovery Institute in Washington worked on a Transportation NorthWest Action Plan - a so-called “evergreen document - as a basis for promoting re-authorization of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA). ‘Gateways’ to efficient transportation/trade within and external to the region are central here.\textsuperscript{43} As the Pacific NorthWest has many more vehicles than drivers, getting a handle on the transportation issue is central to efficient movement of goods and trade for the cross-border region.\textsuperscript{44} It is also essential in resolving air quality concerns. At its late July, 2008 18th Annual Summit in Vancouver, PNWER announced the creation of twice daily BNSFRR/AMTRAK trains by the 2010 Vancouver Olympics along this route and a $4.5million infusion of BC spending to facilitate re-alignment and a ‘passing track’ in the province, south of Vancouver – one of the system bottlenecks.\textsuperscript{45} This was entirely in keeping with the theme of the 2008 PNWER Summit: “Global Challenges – Regional Solutions”.

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\textsuperscript{37} African, Chile and the Netherlands.

\textsuperscript{38} Strategic plan.

\textsuperscript{39} Commission mandate.

\textsuperscript{40} High Speed Ground Transportation Committee.

\textsuperscript{41} High Speed Ground Transportation Plan.

\textsuperscript{42} Transportation NorthWest Action Plan.

\textsuperscript{43} Pacific NorthWest.

\textsuperscript{44} Environmental protection.

\textsuperscript{45} Provincial-state.

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Back to the Future Branding: The Fusion of Economy and Environment?

If there is a Cascadia brand with staying power, then the initial branding – as an environmentally-defined cross-border region – is the image that most consistently has defined Cascadia. The idea of initial imagery and history as a guide to key branding and brand impact is not new in the PR/Communications literature. This original enviro-branding finds expression in several initiatives, many of which involve close governmental-to-governmental cooperation. Perhaps two enviro-brandings stand out – each with its own sub-iterations.

The first is the Georgia Basin / Puget Sound (Map 6): this is largely a bioregional and environmental branding centred on the Gulf waters of the Pacific - British Columbia’s Strait of Georgia, including much of the east side of Vancouver Island, with the provincial capital, Victoria and the Vancouver-centred ‘Lower Mainland’, combined with the Washington State waters of Puget Sound, including Seattle, Tacoma and the state capital of Olympia. This definition has an official status, with, for example, BC’s Georgia Basin Initiative (GBI), given policy emphasis by BC Premier Mike Harcourt (1991-1996), focusing on the environmental sustainability of this essentially urban bio-region. This definition of Cascadia has much in keeping with McClosky’s and Garreau’s initial ecological definitions but is perhaps more urban-focused.

Figure 6 – Georgia Basin/Puget Sound

This brand provides a basis for cross-border discussions – sometimes on cross border policy areas in dispute. On air and water quality, transborder transmissions of pollutants have long provided irritation on both sides of the Cascadia border, between BC and Washington. In the
Pacific NorthWest, the impact of Greater Vancouver's CO₂ emissions across into northern Washington state counties has been one example. Between the Canada-US Agreement on Air Quality, efforts such as the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990, and local/regional governmental cooperation on efforts to improve air quality in the Georgia Basin/Puget Sound such issues had become relative successes in binational and regional cooperation on their common environment, even where air and water quality issues remain. The continuing proposals for electricity generation on the Washington state side of the line - Sumas II - has thrown some of these co-operative calculations off and demonstrated that regional air quality issues run across both sides of the borderlands region.

The other continuing and equally ecologically-focussed brand for Cascadia is **Mainstreet Cascadia**. Mainstreet Cascadia is also one of the smaller definitions of Cascadia, emphasizing the essential urban components of Cascadia as the megalopolis along the Highway 99 / I-5 corridor from the Whistler ski resort, just North of Vancouver, though Seattle, Tacoma and Olympia in Washington to Portland, Salem and Eugene in Oregon’s Willamette Valley.

It is also sometimes called the **Cascadia Corridor**. Former Seattle Mayor Paul Schell referred to this ‘city-regional’ definition as “an integrated, 400-mile urban integrated strip” called the Cascadia Corridor, ‘Downtown Cascadia’ or Mainstreet Cascadia.

Within this branding of the region, more than 10 million people live. Its proponents include some with the strongest economic/trade concerns. It also includes those with the clearest views on a single regional environment: this is expressed at the provincial-state level; and in urban/‘Mainstreet’ iterations such as the High Speed Train Link, the Cascadia Mayor’s Council and joint meetings of the Portland Metro, Puget Sound Regional Council and Metro Vancouver boards. As such, the idea of Mainstreet Cascadia represents the clearest attempt to combine what might be competing brand identities of economy or ecology and the strongest forces to counteract a more singular re-branding of Cascadia in economic terms. From local governments through major metropolitan authorities, there is a considerable focus on environmental sustainability across Cascadia.

The idea of a ‘city-region’ was popularized by Jane Jacobs. It describes what Jacobs identifies, simply, as “the city and its nearby hinterlands.” Successful city-regions are the bases for national economies, replacing imports (both domestic and foreign) with ‘goods of their own production’ and ‘improvising innovations on that foundation’. Others have called this ‘the functional city’. For Savitch and Vogel, for example, “a more accurate definition of a ‘city region’ might rely on the MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area) as a regional entity, but this poses other problems. Some MSA’s run across state lines, MSA boundaries are not often coterminous with political institutions, and MSA’s do not reflect community regional identities.”

One ‘way out’ of these definitional difficulties, according to Savitch and Vogel, is to flexibly tailor city-regional definitions “to locally relevant conditions and criteria…. Although not offering fixed and neatly drawn definitions, this approach ensures that (city-) regions are a product of local meaning, connected to realities of economic intercourse, social identities, and political institutions.” That is exactly the approach to defining city-regions identified by Jacobs: “City-regions have many of the characteristics of import-replacing cities themselves, but they are not cities. For better or for worse, they are the creatures of the nuclear cities and they remain so.” Such thinking informs discussion about a Cascadia city-region – one based on three metropolitan cores, and known as Mainstreet Cascadia.
Cascadia Branding: Is The Mainstreet Brand The Most Sustainable?

The conclusions about what is now generally referred to as Mainstreet Cascadia - or the Cascadia Corridor, its bio-regional urban-centred counterpart, the Georgia Basin/Puget Sound, and Willamette Valley - challenge traditional notions of both ‘local’ and ‘global’, the significance of existing boundaries and how we think of city-regions. Though we are far from Ohmae’s borderless world, in North America, the Cascadia city-region represents a new prism through which to view what Savitch and Vogel have termed “post-city politics” and the impact of the urban tsunami on the 21st century.

Bayless Manning calls such city-based responses to globalization activity ‘intermestic’ (“simultaneously ... both domestic and international”) policy development; this provides a basis for new understandings of such emerging ‘global city regions’ as urban Cascadia and
elsewhere in terms of more traditional conceptions of international, subnational, local-global and urban multilevel governance relations.

In seeking to understand and generalize about the branding of ‘Cascadia’ several factors stand out; some of these may even be seen as pre-conditions in establishing and enhancing the urban-regional developments that have become the city-regional “Mainstreet Cascadia” brand:

a long-standing experience in what Kincaid calls “constituent diplomacy”: while much of this is within the region, a good deal of such activity - as with municipal twinings from the 1940’s and 1950’s to the present - is not directed at or through the region. However, the policy learning and institutional capacity developed by major city jurisdictions within Cascadia such as Vancouver, Portland and Seattle, through such international activity were not insignificant factors in subsequent Cascadia regional developments. Importantly, much of this activity was city-centred – beginning with Vancouver’s 1944 ‘twinning’ with Odessa, Seattle’s 1957 sister city relationship with Kobe, Japan, and Portland’s 1959 ‘twinning’ with Sapporo, Japan.

an increasing Cascadia-based interdependence - both internationally and regionally: although British Columbia is Canada’s third largest province and Washington state America’s 20th state in population, the main ‘Peace Arch’ border crossing between Vancouver and Seattle is one of the busiest in North America. That traffic is indicative of both international and intrarregional trade and economic linkages: trade between Oregon, Washington and British Columbia, for example, is now over $20 billion. It grew by almost 100% in the past decade – and this tri-jurisdictional Cascadia has a current population of 16.5 million. Even where, as Cascadia-skeptic Matthew Sparke notes, much of the economies of the three central Cascadia jurisdictions – Oregon, Washington and British Columbia – do not inter-relate, each has a significant common outlook toward Asia.

An increasing global (or ‘globalist’) perspective: the shift from resource dependent economies in the Pacific Northwest of North America to increasingly tertiary (and some continuing significant secondary - e.g. Boeing or Microsoft in Seattle) manufacturing sectors, in regional jurisdictions, has coincided with a more internationalist outlook; British Columbia, for example, despite a significant US trade link, like all parts of Canada - and even with the impact of often-problematic softwood lumber trade and recent downturns in US housing starts - has the least North American-oriented economy in Canada. Territorial location and inclination has made the whole Cascadia region very much part of the Asia Pacific economy, even while much of its history links it to Europe. This finds translation in various Cascadia ‘joint ventures’ - such as Seattle’s efforts to sell the first two-nation Olympic bid, the region’s idea of the “two-nation vacation” or in attempts to sell a regional environmental cleanup capacity, by firms across all of Cascadia, as a single package within the EU and Asia. The Port Metro Vancouver remains Canada’s busiest, and with #1 in North America in foreign exports; Portland now has nine sister cities and Seattle, with more than twenty-one formal city-international linkages, leads the way within Cascadia in a variety of other city-based global connections.

When some of the determinants of subnational global policy-making – and the development of policy-making capacity - in Mainstreet Cascadia are examined, it is possible to identify a series of policy phases. While not entirely new, this more globalist policy thrust of city-region ‘constituent’ actors has expanded rapidly, both in terms of extent and type:
in extent, for example, significant growth management and environmental concerns (such as the 2000/2008 ongoing debates over possible cross-border pollution from a Sumas 2 electrical generating plant across the US line in Whatcom County near Vancouver’s Fraser Valley- and CO\textsuperscript{2} emissions from BC’s metropolitan centre across the Washington state border), Georgia Basin sustainability, Mainstreet ‘fast train’ connections and the possibility of a sustainable Olympics in 2010 stand out. Like many issues, the resulting interactions have expanded in number and cross the border, transcending local and provincial/state perspectives – even as they strengthen the Cascadia city-region and its more environmental focus. Similarly, with regard to other city-based intermestic policy making, there has been a significant expansion in activity; for example, between 1944 (when the first Canadian city - Vancouver - was twinned)\textsuperscript{66} and 1967, only nine Canadian municipalities had twinned themselves with non-Canadian communities. Over the past forty+ years since then, this pattern has accelerated considerably to include several hundred such formal subnational international exchanges and far more globalist forms.\textsuperscript{67} In the United States, there are currently over 1000 cities with more than 2000 sister city affiliations, most of this extension since the mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{68} Seattle alone has more than twenty such ‘twinnings, and was one of the first US cities to engage in such activity.\textsuperscript{69} Portland (1959) was not far behind. Both these initial US twins were with Japanese cities. Vancouver has five formal ‘sister city’ relationships and developed a new connection with Frankfurt - in the early 2000’s - added in terms of modeling a harm-reduction vs. war on drugs strategy for dealing with urban drug issues.\textsuperscript{70} Whether this most recent ‘link’ will survive a shift back to more rightist city government – since the end of 2005 – remains less clear. Vancouver did host an international gathering of ‘Harm Reduction cities’ in 2006, prior to the World Urban Forum (which it also hosted); and It has just proposed Canada’s first “legal brothel” to be run by a co-operative to be set up in time for the Olympics – with Mayor/City support.\textsuperscript{71} Some have taken to referring to this set of positions on issues generally at odds with the rest of North American governments as “Vansterdam-ization”. More importantly, in terms of Mainstreet branding, this emphasis on social aspects of sustainability is entirely in keeping with sustainability as having four legs: environmental, social, economic and political.

in type, more importantly, as the number of subnational – particularly city-regional governments involved internationally has grown, so too have the types of global activity and exchange; initially, often cultural and educational, these shifted to more strategic, business-oriented forms and now, potentially to a broader, more ‘globalist’ and sustainable policy phase. This development of differing - and subsequent - forms represents a maturing of city-regional/subnational constituent diplomacy and suggests that these territorial redefinitions matter. As such, they represent useful lessons for other city-regions contemplating any re-thinking of their global branding. The issue of who gets to brand Cascadia then becomes the final question. As suggested in concluding, there are still two major competing visions here – each with significant implications for the Cascadia brand.

It is also possible to identify four policy phases in examining subnational city-region internationalist policy making in jurisdictional settings in Mainstreet Cascadia:\textsuperscript{72}

(i) an ad hoc phase, indicative of relatively immature policy intent and capacity, running incrementally, in early instances, from the Second World War (and even before) and continuing into the late 1950’s, 1960’s and early 1970’s; here the emphasis was mostly cultural and
educational – in keeping with Eisenhower’s “people to people exchanges” idea which became the sister city movement in the USA.

(ii) efforts to develop a more rational approach to and institutional support for such international activities in the 1970’s and early-mid 1980’s - particularly at the city level; this clearly occurred in Seattle, Vancouver and Portland where budgets and ongoing international offices/institutional capacity developed.

(iii) the development of a more strategic subnational internationalist policy position in many local jurisdictions in the mid/late 1980’s/1990’s; here the branding was more economic/business-defined; and,

(iv) a globalist policy stance - a developing fourth phase, with iterations in the late 1990’s and 2000’s – though with some early antecedents in the peace and environmental movements; this phase offers a broader, more prescriptive and mature policy alternative beyond these earlier iterations. This latter – globalist – phase offers perhaps the most useful lessons for any city-region branding – at least for those not in the top tiers of world city rankings. In terms of branding, it also represents a potential counter-offer (based on an earlier enviro/sustainability focus) to what might be described as Cascadia’s more recent economic-business branding efforts.

Each policy phase has reflected a series of choices by appropriate governmental and non-governmental actors and a different set of policy objectives in keeping with shifting policy determinants. Each also has represented different policy implications for affected political jurisdictions and the region’s citizenry. The shift from incremental to more rational forms - and then to more mature strategic and globalist responses - also has been reflected in a growing institutionalization of Mainstreet Cascadia city-region global policy-making process and form. This institutionalization of global activity in the Cascadia city-region has occurred in support of both broadly-based ‘external’ international linkages beyond the region - as exemplified by much of the city-based ‘twinnings’ and ‘within region’ responses such as those variations in the Mainstreet Cascadia option, like the Cascadia fast train connection, the ‘two-nation vacation’, and the Georgia Basin Initiative (GBI). All these latter aspects include sustainability dimensions.

This Pacific NorthWest regional concern on the environment, resource use and sustainability has emerged from increasing recognition of the limits to growth. On resource use, it found reflection in local idioms such as Brazil of the North - a critique which resulted in reforms to B.C. forest practices. It was clearly reflected in the work of the Puget Sound/Georgia Basin International Task Force - a BC-Washington state initiative establishing an Environmental Cooperation Council, out of a 1992 Environmental Cooperation Agreement between the two jurisdictions. The Task Force mandate was to “promote and coordinate mutual efforts to ensure the protection, conservation and enhancement of ... shared marine environment.” By the mid 90’s, the Task Force had established and considered reports of a Marine Science Panel, obtained federal funding for a variety of transboundary projects, done research on habitat classifications, exotic species, met with interests such as the Sound and Straits Coalition, developed sampling and analysis protocols as well as a number of other initiatives.

Such environmental cooperation built on earlier work such as with the States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force. Policy antecedents of this ecological dimension included the 1989 Gray’s
Harbor/Nestucca Washington and Prince William Sound/Exxon Valdez Alaska oil spills, which led to the creation of the Oil Spill Task Force “formed to develop plans for oil spill prevention along the coast and in the Georgia Sound/Puget Basin.”\textsuperscript{77} The latter reported in 1990; due to jurisdictional and other issues (e.g., “lack a federal resources for the Coast Guard”)\textsuperscript{79}, many of the recommendations were not implemented – but the regional cooperation remained. In terms of provincial/state foreign policy-making, the other interesting feature of this initiative was that the Canadian federal government objected to B.C. proceeding in the way it did with its U.S. regional neighbours. The end of 1980’s Vander Zalm B.C. Government went ahead despite these Federal Government reservations.\textsuperscript{80}

More recent cooperative ventures in Mainstreet Cascadia include the Cascadia Mayors’ Council: “originally formed and convened in 1998 by then Seattle Mayor Paul Schell, the Cascadia Mayors’ Council addresses a wide range of issues that impact cities and small towns up and down the Cascadia corridor and throughout the region”\textsuperscript{81} Its goal “is to expand cooperation on issues of common interest that confront (Cascadia’s) cities and towns.” As the council – like Artibise and Hill\textsuperscript{82} - have noted, “existing institutions do not have a broad enough reach to effectively address the challenges mayors face”, particularly in light of federal and provincial/state cutbacks, “especially to urban corridors.”\textsuperscript{83} It meets twice a year on Cascadia issues – the majority of which are about matters environmental and re: sustainability.

This mayoral initiative has a metropolitan/regional government counterpart as well in the Cascadia corridor: there are now annual meetings of the three major ‘regional governments’: Metro Vancouver, the Puget Sound Regional Council and Portland. Metro. Efforts at comparative regional policy learning and best practice indicator identification are high on their agendas. More importantly, such discussion, however limited, is a necessary stage in regional consciousness-raising and increased global city-region cooperation and regional sustainability.\textsuperscript{84}

Yet while resource concerns are important and have been irritants, environmental considerations now/again compete for agenda space. The Columbia River has spawned legal action - such as by Oregon’s NorthWest Environmental Defense Center, initiated in 1994. On this front, more cooperative efforts are possible, however. Transborder environmental cooperation - such as with the development of a North Cascades International Park - stand out.\textsuperscript{85} Binational regional consensus on this component of the Northern Cascades Ecosystem has been promoted by a variety of Cascadia regional interests on both sides of the 49th parallel line.\textsuperscript{86} Across a variety of policy fronts - forestry, the fisheries, air and water quality, and other overlapping sustainable region concerns - there are what George Hoberg has called regional “threats and opportunities.”\textsuperscript{87}

Whatever their shape, size and brand, it is clear that foreign relations reality in the 21st century will include substantial city-regional and cross-border involvement. The trick will be to ensure that such is more often complementary than conflictual - and not necessarily with senior jurisdictional priorities. To sustain itself, a city-regional initiative such as Mainstreet Cascadia needs to think about clarifying its own brand. Success would appear to depend more on developing broader, deeper, globalist policy thrusts such as with environmental and social sustainability. That would appear to mean a return to politics as part of rethinking the local-global nexus - an appropriate outcome for any 21st century branding.
For such city-regions aspiring to develop a clearer globalist (vs. ‘globalized’) brand, there are several strategies to consider to become ‘globalist’; many of these are found within the Mainstreet Cascadia experience – even if Sparke is right on who has been most responsible for current economic branding:

Table 1 - Smith’s Globalist policy components: seven key elements:

1: An Economic/Development component - No world city, globalist or globalized, can fail to include an economic/development component. The question is what kind of economics is central: in globalized city-regions, so called 20:80 communities, major sections of the local population are excluded from most of the benefits of urban global participation. Markets do distribute, but not equitably without some direction.. A state role in steering is needed, if economic sustainability is the goal.

2: A Foreign Aid component - Though international twinnings attest to a local global outreach, a more globalist approach – including elements identified below - would facilitate such connections with more emphasis on global sustainability. These exist in Mainstreet Cascadia.

3: A Global Ecological component - Global city links and policy initiatives on matters such as recycling, automobile-alternative transportation, newer waste disposal forms, and alternative energy components in public transit systems, all reflect aspects of this component. The policy push is for preserving livability in cities and globally. Mainstreet Cascadia shows efforts in this regard.

4: A Social Equity component - Increasingly, because of senior governmental down- and off-loading, cities are confronting more of the implications of social policy abandonment: everything from homelessness, de-institutionalization of mental health patients previously in care, poverty and family breakdown, drug and alcohol abuse, un-/under-employment, crime and other iterations of increased social bifurcation. Many globalist components which do not initially appear ‘international’ can provide global exposure for a city-region. The relative safety of harm reduction vs war on drugs, the quality of public education, the embracing of growing city diversity all reflect aspects of a city-regional ‘social equity’ inventory.

5: A Community/Cultural Diversity component - Globalist cities embrace their diversity rather than confront it. Here the globalist response represents a shift from polis to metropolis towards cosmopolis. It includes more than recognition and empowerment of ethnic diversity, to civil society and a more gender-sensitive community. Any globalist city is multicultural and celebrates diversity.

6: A World Peace/Disarmament component - Much of the impetus for city-based twinnings grew out of the experience of World War II. In Europe, Canada, Japan and the United States, promotion of world peace through improved international understanding via people based exchanges began in the decade
following 1945 – with the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It continued into the 1950's and 1960's but by the 1970's was beginning to take on a different - more business-oriented - direction. In the 1980's, the original purpose began to be re-asserted.

7: A Good Governance component - Finally, it is increasingly recognized that many solutions to service delivery and equity issues are precluded without ‘good governance’. As the 4th leg in an economic, environmental and social equity equation of sustainable community development, good governance is essential.

It is important to note that even in major city-regions one does not find every component of such globalist thinking and policy. Going Globalist offers the most in opportunities for more intermediate city-regions considering a branding of their positioning in any world order. This is especially so, for city-regions which cannot aspire to ‘command and control’ status in the world economy. Finding a niche by utilizing many of the globalist elements identified above is what successful city-regions can do. In so doing, they also confront efforts at boosterism which seek to truncate the global city and subnational region branding to be no more than business and economics. Of all the efforts to challenge this view, Mainstreet Cascadia offers the best prospects for a more creative and sustainable brand.

Concluding Thoughts – on Cascadia and on Branding

Who brands? And Why? And what does the Cascadia case say about the notion of place branding? These questions are central to assessing competing brands of Cascadia and the idea of place branding itself. The literature on branding suggests understanding the history of brandings is important. Early brand efforts tend to have staying power. In Cascadia, it is clear that the early imagery was essentially ecological. According to Seattle Sociologist David McCloskey, “I would put ecology as the foundation of a new social order - and not power, politics or economics.” For McCloskey, “if the primary concern of Cascadia is to integrate the economies - branch offices, for instance - that’s the old story....I think a lot of people aren’t interested in imperialism being extended under a new guise. We have to restore the ecosystem, that’s the first obligation.”

With subsequent literary treatments and an environmental influx of like-minded population in the 1960’s and 1970’s, Cascadia’s first branding was clear; more importantly, it was understandable. As a result - and with ongoing iterations like Mainstreet Cascadia’s sustainability focus - this initial ecological brand continues to cut across what some have seen as potential downsides of increased B.C./Canadian economic integration with larger U.S. regional neighbours. Some indeed see the rebranding efforts of the 1980’s and 1990’s as a co-optation of the enviro-brand by economics:

The University of Washington’s Matthew Sparke, for example, offers a continuing critique of what he sees as this co-optation of the ecological Cascadia brand by the region’s business elite:

To the extent that Cascadia is an invention of economic boosters, or at least represents their cooptation and reworking of an older utopian imagining of
the region, we need to examine why they are using such a complex transnational concept when they could organize boosterism in each of the three main urban regions north and south of the border. Surveying the region it is clear that a certain amount of such individualized urban boosterism still continues, and Cascadia is more of a supplement to these efforts. However, the question remains: why bother with all the difficulties of transnational organizing and put financial and political capital into Cascadian collaboration at all? The answer, it seems to me, has to be more than just economic. Or, to put my hypothesis another way, the answer must reflect a far more complex political-economic reality that the simple economic integration imperatives advertised by the boosters. This integration itself needs to be further interrogated, because clearly the BC forest products industries, Washington's aerospace industry, and Oregon's evolving hi-tech sector share very little except a common outward orientation across the Pacific to Asian markets and investors. In other words, despite all the advertised advantages to regional trade made possible by CUFTA and NAFTA, the core of the so-called Cascadian economy is utterly un-integrated. The degree to which hoped-for cross-border agglomeration economies may be growing needs to be investigated, and this is why we can say that the boosters at least open-up a research question. But the singularized picture painted by PNWER of the 10th largest economy in the world is totally at odds with the currently diverse and disarticulated local economies. Even the 'window on the Pacific' commonality is superficial, for as David Edgington (1995) has shown, Asian investors like the large Japanese Sogo Shosha do not integrate their Cascadian distribution centers. This implies that there are few knock-on integrative effects of such Asian-oriented trading relations running through the region. In short, the depiction of Cascadia as a would-be economic power-house, opens up many more questions than it answers.

The points made by Sparke may go some way in explaining the continuing investment in common environmental and sustainability issues across Mainstreet Cascadia. Even at the more economically-focussed Discovery Institute, Cascadia Project Director Bruce Agnew, refers to Cascadia as “an alliance between the two countries addressing such issues as suburban sprawl and auto-oriented transportation policies needs to be formed to deal with the root causes of these air and water quality problems.” And with city-regional initiatives such as the GBI, its policy goals, established under former Vancouver Mayor/then BC Premier Mike Harcourt are consistent with a broader ‘globalist sustainability branding - including creating (a) “a common vision around shared resources - the land, water and air....”; (b) integrating “sustainability principles in decision-making, which recognizes that issues concerning the environment, economy and social well-being are inextricably linked and that solutions to problems in any one of these areas will likely impact on the others; and (c) “define priorities and take strategic steps on a broad front toward a viable sustainable future for the Region.” All this continues to occur under the Mainstreet Cascadia brand.

What does this say about the idea of branding itself? Several points are clear:
the roots of place branding are economic. They come from the fields of marketing, management, public relations and industrial location/promotion.

As such, their “usual” applications are “marketing”, crisis management in tourism promotion, retailing, goods and services, national branding, or, indeed, the ideological – and historical - basis of branding itself.

Can such an economic emphasis be ‘adjusted’ to reflect a non/less economic focussed branding? The Mainstreet Cascadia experience - and the historical versions of Cascadia - would suggest YES.

Branding may have its limitations; it may also have its non-economic uses. If so, the notion of branding may need to morph itself.

**Some Mainstreet Cascadia Lessons**

The policy implications of these alternative/competing brands of the Cascadia region - and their links to the increasingly interdependent global political economy - are apparent. More importantly, in terms of branding, some of this Mainstreet Cascadia activity has taken on a more globalist thrust and one which is re-iterating the original enviro-focus of the region – as well as suggesting alternative uses from the traditional branding literature.

As defined above, the more globalist city-region stance of Mainstreet Cascadia draws on the earliest brandings of the region: initiated as Ecotopia, then via the eco-cultural movement as Cascadia and Pacifica. Cascadia has practical globalist policy lessons for governmental and non-governmental actors within this cross-border region.

Having said that, there are several considerations that result:

Many city-regions have identified an economic component as central to their international strategy. This will not be enough.

More peripheral cities – certainly including all in Cascadia - must play a more multi-faceted international – and cross-border - game. Each must build linkages around a series of rationales – even where economic/ infrastructure investment is one component. Here a more Globalist strategy – as noted above – offers the best branding opportunity.

It is possible to develop a failed ‘going global’ city brand. Cities such as Baltimore and several failed efforts in Atlanta are illustrative.

Formal organizations and institutional capacity-building – as long as built on a local-regional community – form the best basis for ensuring long-term and continual cross-border and international exchange. Mainstreet Cascadia’s several venues for such – from state/provincial and local-regional perspectives – help ensure continuing strength in the Cascadia sustainability brand.
Having clear operational goals – certainly beyond mere civic/city-regional boosterism - helps sell such civic internationalism to a sometimes skeptical local population.\(^{106}\)

Having a clear organizational centre for such city-based activity is also important. Here Seattle’s International Office stands out.

Not leaving out the local population in the benefits of “going cross-border regional’ and broader international is also essential to sustaining this civic effort over the long haul. This cannot occur without sharing benefits. Again, the economy alone is not enough.

With a clearer globalist strategy, city-regions like Mainstreet Cascadia can sustain their broader global outreach and maximize both benefits and contributions to regional and global betterment; In Cascadia sustainability remains central.

Going Globalist offers a clear basis for ensuring holistic advantages of the city-region’s internationalist and cross-border branding accrue locally and contribute most globally.

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**Endnotes**


7 In November, 2004, the journal *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* was launched, from the UK.


Ibid.

Ibid., p.322.


Matthiessen, et.al, op.cit., p.325.


The 1968 edition was initially edited by Stewart Brand; so was the last one in Spring 1971 (Berkeley, CA; Portola Institute/Random House, 1971). Its editors also included Ken Kesey.

See, for example, Linda Straley, American Regional Foods - Pacific Northwest Region, @ www.americanregionalfoods/americanregionalfoods/pacificnorthwest.htm (accessed July 12, 2008).


On such rankings see Index Mundi @ www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?c=as&v=65 (Accessed, march 3, 2006). See also French Chamber of Commerce and Industry Abroad, @ www.ccifl.org/usa/seattle/infocountry/data/geography.htm (Accessed March 2, 2006)


See for example, the Livable Region Strategic Plan and the Sustainable Region Initiative in Metro Vancouver @ www.metrovancouver.org/about/publications/Publications/MV-SustainabilityFramework.pdf (accessed July 27, 2008) or Puget Sound Regional Council Regional Technical Forum – Climate Change and Sustainability, January 16, 2008 @ psrsc.org/boards/advisory/RTF_Agenda_011608.pdf.


Ibid., p.41, plus Ch.3 “Cities Own Regions”, pp.45-58.

Ibid.

Jane Jacobs, op. cit., p.58.


Under President Dwight Eisenhower, the US Sister City program was established in 1956 to encourage “people-to-people” exchanges. See, for example, www.sister-cities.org


Author conversation with Bruce Agnew, Director, The Cascadia Project, Seattle Wa., March 2007

See, for example, “Two Nation Vacation” @ www.tourismvictoria.com/Content/EN/699.asp (accessed July 23, 2006)


On such city-based constituent diplomacy in Cascadia, see P.J. Smith, “The Making of a Global City: The Case of Vancouver”, Canadian Journal of Urban Research, vol.1, no.1, pp.90-112. For a recent list and some of the range of sustainability projects involved, see also www.fcm.ca (the website of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities.


British Columbia was so described in a 36 page Greenpeace Newsletter, Vancouver, B.C., 1990; see also Natalie Minunzie, The Chainsaw Revolution: Environmental Activism and the BC Forestry Industry, M.A. Thesis, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, June, 1993, for a discussion of environmental-resource organizations and public policy in B.C.


For example, David Anderson’s Report to the Premier on Oil Transportation and Oil Spills (Victoria, November, 1989), pp.162 and Final Report, States/British Columbia Oil Spill Task Force, October, 1990, pp.127.

Bruce Agnew, op. cit., pp.8.

Ibid., p.9


See “Cascadia Mayors Council” @ www.discovery.org/cascadia/cascadiaCorridor (accessed March 4, 2006)


Cascadia Mayors’ Council, op.cit..

See, for example, “Georgia Basin/Puget Sound Research Conference Co-Sponsorship”, Report to GVRD Planning and Environment Committee, January 10, 2005, Hugh Kellas Manager.

See, for example, Nature Has No Borders: A Conference on the Protection and Management of the Northern Cascades Ecosystem, (Washington, DC).


Cited in Gill, op. cit.

In ibid.

“Cascadia and the End of the Nation-State: Interrogating the Bases of Transborder Boosterism” @ sparke@uwashington.edu. Accessed, May 14, 2007.


Bruce Agnew, op. cit., p.8.

Ibid., pp.1-2.


103 For example, by David McCloskey, Chair, Department of Sociology, Seattle University. MacCloskey produced a ‘map’ of Cascadia - see Ian Gill, "A Green Island In A Sea of Envy; Welcome to Cascadia, the West Coast Ecotopian’s Dream State" THE GEORGIA STRAIGHT, June 5-12, 1992, pp.7-9.


105 See, for example, Levine, in Caroline Andrew, et.al., eds., World Class Cities: Can Canada Play?, (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1999) and Smith/Stewart, CPRN Study for Calgary, op.cit., on this.

106 On this see Kincaid, “Rain Clouds, 1989, op.cit.