Multi-level Governance: Getting the Job Done and Respecting Community Difference – Three Winnipeg Cases

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Abstract
Multi-level governance is seen by different commentators as addressing a varied array of concerns. Some see it as a means of fulfilling the norms of the new public management, and thereby of freeing the administration of government programs from the constraints imposed by centralized bureaucracy. Some assess it in terms of dealing with policy problems so complex that they can only be addressed by concerted and co-ordinated efforts of more than one level of government and, often, a variety of agencies. At the same time, multi-level governance is also associated with the attempt to introduce a greater degree of flexibility into federal policy-making, in order to ensure that federal policies respect the unique characteristics of different communities. In this study, we bring all of these concerns to bear on three case studies of the multi-level governance of federal properties in Winnipeg, the James A. Richardson International Airport, the Kapyong Barracks and The Forks. The three properties are all administered by agencies at least one step removed from direct government supervision. We posed two research questions: 1) Are the operations of these agencies, and the character of their relations with federal and municipal governments, appropriate to the ends they are meant to serve? 2) Do they respect community difference? In all three cases, we find that the objective of effective management is reasonably or very well served, but respect for community difference is much less evident.

Introduction
There is widespread agreement that multi-level governance represents an emerging political reality, but the rationale for it is explained in noticeably different ways by different commentators.

Multi-level governance is distinct from the traditional intergovernmental relations in that the latter is largely restricted to the study of federal-provincial relations, while the former treats cities, and sometimes communities, as visible and significant partners in the interplay among levels of government, and not simply as creatures of provincial government. The emergence of these changes in the way the federal system is studied is seen as being related to the enhanced economic and political importance of cities in a world marked by greatly increased freedom of movement for goods, people, ideas and money. In a world marked by free movement, cities become magnets for wealth and production on one hand and problems on the other. In the process their political importance is magnified. (Young and Leuprecht, 2006; Castells, 1996, pp. 395-410)
Why multi-level governance?

That is a very brief encapsulation of points on which there is widespread agreement, but specifically, what are the intentions of governments as they develop increasingly complex interrelationships among all three of their levels, interrelationships that sometimes include direct participation of local communities and community groups, as well as various organizations and agencies not directly controlled by government departments? In answer to that question, there are various explanations, each of which highlights a different aspect of the complex changes underway.

One explanation interprets changed relations among levels of government as a series of attempts to conform to the norms of the new public management, whereby governments are advised that they should “steer”, but not necessarily “row”. (Garcea and Pontikes, 2006) In that interpretation, the federal and provincial governments are seen as recruiting local governments, and other agencies and organizations operating at the local level, as partners in governance, partners that will do a better job because they are not part of a vast, centralized bureaucracy.

A second answer to the question focuses on the nature of problems that confront policy-makers. In that emphasis, complex systems of intergovernmental co-operation are needed in order to deal with “wicked problems and complex files”. Bradford (2005) cites the example of concentrated poverty in urban neighbourhoods, facing “a mix of difficulties ranging from labour market weaknesses and racial, gender or other discrimination to limited social contacts and a fraying community infrastructure of housing, education, health, transit…” In such a situation, a federal labour market program, for example, may fail if “provinces do not ensure an adequate supply of child care, or municipalities do not arrange transit…” (Bradford, 2005, p. 4)

A third rationale for multi-level governance is evident in Bradford’s account, and cited in passing in that of Garcea and Pontikes. Bradford invokes the importance of “seeing like a community”, citing James C. Scott’s Seeing like a state (Scott, 1998; Bradford, p 5), an insightful dissection of how large-scale, centralized government projects fail through ignorance of local conditions and circumstances. For their part, Garcea and Pontikes note that one of the reasons provincial governments engage in multi-level initiatives is that they enhance “flexibility and sensitivity in meeting local conditions, needs and preferences” (Garcea and Pontikes, p. 338).

In other words, both accounts cite the importance of tailoring policy to the particularities of different communities. That rationale has been in the literature at least since the 1990s, when European Union studies invoked the concept of subsidiarity, which was described as the principle that a decision be made or activity performed at the lowest level of government possible (Norton, 1994, pp. 28-31). It is that rationale that one of the authors of this study has placed at the centre of his studies of multi-level governance. In that interpretation, an important test of the efficacy of multi-level governance is whether it produces respect for community difference in national policy. (Author, 2006; Author, 2006)

This paper is a study of such multi-level governance, one piece of a much larger venture, a Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada Major Collaborative Research Initiative (MCRI) on multi-level governance and public policy in Canadian municipalities. Our purpose is to look at how the federal and local governments in Winnipeg interact in the formulation and implementation of policy regarding federal property. We do this by means of three case studies of how three important tracts of federal land in Winnipeg are administered. The three are the former Canadian Forces Base Winnipeg, known as Kapyong Barracks; the Winnipeg International Airport (recently renamed the James A. Richardson International Airport), and a public recreation space in the heart of the city, called The Forks because of its location at the confluence of the Red and Assiniboine rivers.
These case studies offer a rare glimpse into the seriously under-researched subject of federal-local relations, and they also offer an opportunity to examine some major issues of 21st century governance. In researching the operations of these three agencies, we sought answers to two questions central to judging the efficacy of a particular instance of multi-level governance:

- Are the operations of these agencies, and the character of their relations with federal and municipal governments, appropriate to the ends they are meant to serve?
- Do they respond appropriately to community difference?

The first question covers such considerations as the policy’s effectiveness, efficiency, equity and optimality. It encompasses Bradford’s point that a policy process must be equal to the complexity of the problem being addressed as well as Garcea’s and Pontikes’s concern with an appropriate determination as to whether a government should “steer” or “row”, that is whether the policy in question requires the direct intervention of a federal government department, or whether it can be managed as well or better by a different agency or another level of government.

The second question considers whether each of these initiatives in multi-level governance does its job in a manner appropriate to Winnipeg. The Kapyong Barracks land is on the verge of being redeveloped into a new neighbourhood on a large piece of real estate in a prime location. The question of how this area is developed has important land use planning implications for the entire city, and is important, as we learned in the course of our study, to at least three different community groups that have direct stakes in its development. The airport is located a short distance from the centre of the city, and its operation has crucial economic and environmental implications for the city as a whole, as well as obvious neighbourhood effects. The Forks is a highly valued public facility in a central location, and any development there invariably excites public interest, and often controversy. In all three cases, therefore, the question of whether the administration of federal land respects a variety of community particularities is critical.

Research methods

The research for this paper was done using standard case study research methods, backed, on the senior author’s part, by 35 years of experience with case studies. Our research draws on three kinds of sources: documents, interviews with as many as possible of the principles involved in the questions under study, and secondary materials. Because we drew on three independent types of data, as well as multiple sources within each type, we applied the principle of triangulation, meaning that we always sought confirmation or negation of alleged facts in other independent sources.

In other words, all alleged facts were greeted with skepticism if they could not be confirmed from at least one other, independent source. Given the frailty of human memory, as well as a more or less universal human tendency toward self-serving testimony, we were especially skeptical of alleged facts cited in interviews. Wherever possible, we treated interviews as sources of background and context, rather than sources of factual findings, and in all cases we sought confirmation elsewhere for any factual allegations cited in interviews. The senior researcher’s instruction to his co-workers was, “Get to the truth, even if it’s not interesting.” The careful use of these methods allows us to have a high degree of confidence in the factual correctness of our findings, and offers a firm basis for analysis of the findings.
The properties

The federal government properties covered in this study are in varying stages of development. The Barracks have only recently become surplus, and development planning has just begun in the past few years. The administration of the airport was honed to make it a keen instrument of economic development in 1997 when it came under private control; in the past few years, this has begun to pay off. The Forks, since its beginnings in the late 1980s and early 1990s, has been one of the most popular public spaces in Winnipeg.

All three properties are, or will soon be, controlled by an independent or semi-independent agency: Kapyong Barracks by Canada Lands Company, a federal crown corporation; the airport by the Winnipeg Airports Authority, a community-based corporation, and The Forks by The Forks/North Portage Partnership, a semi-independent agency governed by a board consisting of appointees from all three levels of government. Before the involvement of these agencies, each property was stagnant and either underused or completely unused. The Barracks was, and still is, simply a largely abandoned military base; the airport was little more than government-funded utilitarian infrastructure, and The Forks a set of railway tracks flanked by abandoned industrial structures.

These three case studies suggest the importance of involving an independent or semi-independent agency in the development of federal property. Left solely in the hands of Ottawa, the use of such property is likely to remain less than optimal. The government is simply too large and bureaucratic to give it the attention it requires. But once the government entrusts its management to an entity that can focus on the property, new possibilities for its development open up.

At the same time, the property becomes one large step removed from control by elected representatives. That is not necessarily the same as saying that it becomes a law unto itself, because, from battles over expressways in North America to public participation in public budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, many means other than representative democracy have been devised for securing responsiveness of public bodies to public demands and community needs. In these pages, we present the findings of case studies of each of the three federal properties, and consider whether their administrators have proven to be, or are on their way to becoming, effective instruments of economic development, as well as instruments of public policy that are respectful of the particular characteristics and concerns of the community they serve.

Kapyong Barracks

When Kapyong Barracks, officially referred to as CFB Winnipeg, locked its gates for the last time in 2004, it joined a long procession of military base closures in both Canada and the United States. When such a base is located in an urban area, as Kapyong is, its closing often yields valuable infill real estate. Kapyong, sandwiched between two of the most affluent residential neighbourhoods in Winnipeg – River Heights and Tuxedo – presents a unique opportunity for urban development. As one City of Winnipeg planner said, “land like this only comes around once a generation” (Marsh, 2006), and if its potential is to be realized, its development requires careful thought.

The wheels of the federal surplus property disposal process had began turning, or creaking to put it more accurately, well before Kapyong’s gates were officially closed in 2004. In November 2001, a meeting of the Assistant Deputy Ministers’ Committee on Strategic Properties declared the Barracks surplus federal property (Joshi, 2006). This designation signalled the beginning of the long and arduous process in which the property finds itself mired even to this day.
Federal property that is declared surplus is classified either as routine or strategic disposal. Either designation is intended to “ensure the best outcome for all Canadians” (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2001). According to Treasury Board, the federal entity responsible for issues of land development and management:

Routine disposals are generally properties or a portfolio of properties with lesser value that can be sold easily without any substantial investment. These properties are normally sold in their “as is” state on the open market. “As is” transactions imply that there is limited potential for increasing the value of the property prior to sale or transfer and that there are no strategic interests in the property (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2001)

On the other hand, the strategic disposal process is enacted when the surplus property in question possesses significant potential.

Surplus real properties subject to strategic disposal are properties or portfolios of properties with potential for significantly enhanced value, those that are highly sensitive, or a combination of these factors. Because of the complexity associated with these properties, they may require innovative efforts and a comprehensive management approach to move them into the market (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2001)

From the beginning of the process, there was little doubt Kapyong Barracks would be considered a strategic property. Former military bases were significant generators of economic wealth in their previous manifestation. Considering its large size and location in the southwestern quadrant of the Winnipeg urban core, which is considered by developers to be the most desirable real estate in the city, its value is evident. Michael Colatruglio, a property assessor with the City of Winnipeg, estimated its current worth to be just over $15 million (Colatruglio, 2006). The property, therefore, was a prime candidate for transfer to the Canada Lands Company (CLC), an arm’s length, self-financing crown corporation. The CLC purchases surplus strategic properties at fair market value from the federal government, then improves, manages or sells them in order to achieve optimal financial and community value for both the local community and the Government of Canada. (Canada Lands Company, 2006a)

In the disposal of strategic surplus federal property, Canada Lands embarks on a long process that often takes years to complete. After beginning by assessing all federal and non-federal interests, both the custodial department (in Kapyong’s case, DND) and CLC perform internal due diligence. Next, a third party appraises the value of the property to complement a business plan compiled by CLC that contributes to the determination of a final transfer price. After that, the custodial department develops its disposal strategy for the property. Once it receives approval from cabinet, it implements its disposal strategy. This involves the drafting of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale and CLC’s issuance of a promissory note to the Government of Canada. The CLC then carries out its plan, for a private sale or for planning and development by CLC. (Canada Lands Company, 2006a)

The process of takeover and development can be broken down into two phases: the acquisition phase, and the development phase. According to Ravi Joshi, Director of Real Estate in Manitoba at Canada Lands, Kapyong Barracks is in the acquisition phase at this writing, as it waits for DND to complete its due diligence. This process has been underway for some time now, having begun shortly after its designation as a strategic site. (Joshi, 2006) According to the CLC web site, the process consists of “completion of technical work such as title search, survey, and environmental studies” (Canada Lands, 2006). At the time of our research, Canada Lands
was hoping to own the site by fall 2006 (Joshi, 2006), but at this writing, at the end of November 2006, the news releases on the CLC web site contained no reference to a transfer.

As long the process is stalled in the acquisition phase, the City of Winnipeg is, for the most part, uninvolved. That is not to say, however, that the city has been standing idly by. According to David Marsh, the City of Winnipeg Project Manager of Kapyong, the Planning, Property, and Development Department have been engaged in discussions with Canada Lands since negotiations began. Having assumed his role in January 2003, he has overseen discussions that have examined, among other things, what processes are required and how to accomplish them, as well as the type of development contemplated. He is also responsible for briefing and educating pertinent municipal government actors. Originally, meetings were held once a month, but that regularity has decreased given the current stagnation in the transfer process (Marsh, 2006).

Once CLC gains ownership and the development phase begins, however, the city’s role will be elevated substantially. While the federal government normally has Royal Prerogative on federal land, meaning it can do what it wants without being subject to municipal by-laws, Canada Lands has the same status as a private developer. Legally, therefore, Canada Lands is subject to city planning authority. The city and the corporation will work collaboratively on the development. (Joshi, 2006). At present, the Kapyong site is zoned for agriculture although this designation is dated. The Kapyong land is now surrounded by urban development. This, obviously, will have to be addressed.
Initially, an area structure plan will be developed. This covers the layout of the site, including such matters as roads and underground utilities. Next, the land is subdivided and rezoned. Finally, interim use by-laws will have to be developed. The whole site will not be developed all at once. Instead of leaving large yet-to-be developed lots vacant on the property, these interim by-laws will allow the continued use of several of the site’s facilities, such as warehouses until they are ready for redevelopment. (Marsh, 2006).

Canada Lands is planning to develop Kapyong Barracks into a mixed-use residential neighbourhood designed according to principles of New Urbanism (Joshi, 2006;
Marsh, 2006). According to NewUrbanism.org, this design movement promotes “the creation and restoration of diverse, walkable, compact, vibrant, mixed-use communities... assembled in [an] integrated fashion... [to include amenities such as] housing, shops, entertainment, schools, parks, and civic facilities... all within easy walking distance of each other” (NewUrbanism.org, 2006).

The CLC has had previous experience with such developments, notably Garrison Woods, the former CFB Calgary that Canada Lands developed according to new urbanist design concepts. Located seven minutes from downtown, it has won numerous awards, such as Best Community from the Calgary Region Home Builders Association and the Honour Award for Planning Excellence from the Canadian Institute of Planners (Garrison Woods, 2006). The City of Winnipeg is fully supportive of this vision (Marsh, 2006).

Anyone familiar with Winnipeg city politics knows the city’s rigid zoning regulations hamper such innovative urban design. The current city zoning by-law, By-law 6400, encourages strict separation of uses and low densities – neighbourhoods that are everything that New Urbanism seeks to overcome. A New Urbanist development in Winnipeg, under the current by-law, would require the creation of its own special district. While this would not be impossible, as there are existing examples of this already such as the city’s French Quarter, the framework would still have to be created from scratch, creating more bureaucratic obstacles that would slow development.

There is good reason, however, to suppose that these obstacles are on the way to being overcome. Winnipeg is in the process of reviewing its zoning code. Under the proposed code, there is a designation called a Plan Development Overlay, which amounts to a formalized mechanism for custom zoning. CLC’s vision could happen under either system, but, assuming its passage, the new zoning by-law will facilitate the process (The Clarion Team, 2006; Marsh, 2006). On the basis of both the city’s words and its actions it looks as if good working relations between the city and CLC are likely to mark the Kapyong development process.

In summary, though things are perhaps moving more slowly than one might wish, it appears that the administrative machinery necessary for appropriate development of the Kapyong land is either in place already, or in the process of being put in place. As a corporation able to operate independently of direct government control, Canada Lands Company is capable of operating as a developer in a private enterprise milieu; it has a strong track record for bringing the type of development contemplated to a successful conclusion, and it enjoys a co-operative relationship with Winnipeg’s planning authority.

We posed two questions at the beginning of the study, and we can answer the first of these in the affirmative: The operations of CLC and the character of its relations with federal and municipal governments is appropriate to the ends it is meant to serve. We can turn then to the second question: Are CLC and the city government appropriately responsive to circumstances particular to the community they intend to serve?

This question is more difficult to answer, because we can never be certain that we have all the evidence. In the absence of a very convincing process of public consultation, it is always possible that very real public concerns are both being ignored altogether and failing to come to the attention of the wider public, the authorities, and researchers.

The city and the CLC are making all the right noises. Several public consultations, we are told, will be held in the course of the development. There will also be a citizen advisory/focus group, as well as an “ad hoc” military committee to ensure the land’s history is properly honoured. While the City of Winnipeg is mandating this citizen participation, CLC wholeheartedly agrees with it; these consultations would be held regardless.

Long-time observers of Winnipeg politics may be pardoned for greeting such statements with skepticism. To put the point as mildly as possible, the city government does not have a sterling reputation for openness to public participation. The city frequently puts on a show of consulting the public, but rarely does it provide full information as to available alternatives,
offer significant opportunities for public discussion, and respond seriously to the information the public provides.\(^2\)

However, we are not forced to rest our case on the thin reed of reputational evidence, because two issues have already arisen that provide some insights into the responsiveness of the CLC and the city to the public. The first has to do with the disposition of military housing adjacent to the Kapyong tract. Originally, the 358 housing units there were to be transferred to CLC along with the rest of the Kapyong land, but uncertainties arose as to just how many housing units the military would require in the immediate future, and how long those requirements would continue. As a result, the adjacent housing was temporarily severed from the land transfer process, and held in abeyance pending final determination of military requirements.\(^3\)

Meanwhile, a large number of houses stood vacant. At this writing, that situation had persisted for three years, and 149 of the houses were being maintained and heated at taxpayer expense while they remained unoccupied. An advocacy organization, the River Heights Ministerial Housing Action Group, argued that, in preference to standing vacant, the houses should be made available on a temporary basis to meet some of the ever-present need for well-maintained affordable housing. Although no one was arguing a contrary case, federal officials in Winnipeg were finding it difficult to obtain the authority they needed to take action on the request.

It could have been an ideal opportunity for the government that frequently bills itself as the one “closest to the people” to prove its mettle. A city council resolution followed by a mayoral appeal might have played a useful role in getting action from the Defence Department officials whose assent was required to make the vacant housing available. Considering that no one was making a case that the houses could not or should not be made available, it is difficult to see why a local government claiming to be committed to consultation and responsiveness could not manage that much.

The second issue concerns the possibility of Kapyong becoming an urban reserve. Before the Barracks were vacated, Manitoba’s Long Plain and Brokenhead First Nations made a claim for the land under Treaty Land Entitlement (TLE), a collection of agreements that give First Nations the right, and the money, to acquire surplus federal lands in those cases where they did not receive their proper allocation according to the numbered treaties signed between 1870 and 1910 (O’Brien, 2003; Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 2005).

There are conflicting accounts of what happened next. One is that, given the strategic nature of the site, the possibility of an urban reserve was never seriously considered, despite some attention in the local media. According to Marsh, TLEs are given pre-eminence in routine surplus property disposals. In strategic disposals however, the land is offered up to all federal departments, available to the highest bidder at fair market value. The acquisition process also becomes much more difficult. According to this account, the price of the land and the difficulty involved in securing it, acted as a deterrent and both First Nations abandoned the idea (Marsh, 2006; Perswain, 2006).

An alternative account suggests that the federal government was motivated, at least in part, by an unwillingness to have an urban reserve on Kapyong land. Chief Paul Harvey of Brokenhead disputes the suggestion that plans for an urban reserve were abandoned because of the cost of the land. Harvey claimed the federal government did not allow enough time to submit a proper proposal. Band authorities were only given 28 working days to prepare a business plan and to go through a tendering process, which Harvey considered to be wholly inadequate. He said the whole process, “left a bad taste in my mouth” (Harvey, 2006). In a similar vein, Chief Dennis Meeches of Long Plain First Nation characterized the strategic classification as a policy "specifically designed to keep First Nations out" (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2006).

There is no way to be certain which of these conflicting accounts is closer to the truth, but there are some grounds for the suspicion that the federal government, anxious for a repetition of the CLC’s success at Garrison Woods, was less than forthcoming in facilitating a bid for urban
reserve status. In short, though both the CLC and the city promise to be responsive to public demands, evidence of actual responsiveness, to either affordable housing advocates or First Nations, is lacking.

James A. Richardson International Airport

“If a member of the private sector is thriving, stay out of its way.”

This quotation is the credo of Mayor Sam Katz, according to Alex Robinson, a Senior Advisor to the Winnipeg mayor, and the former Vice President of Business Development at the Winnipeg Airports Authority (WAA) (Robinson, 2006). Both the quotation and Robinson’s previous job are indicative of relations between the city and the WAA, the governing body responsible for the operations of the James A. Richardson International Airport. Following devolution of responsibility from Transport Canada, the WAA is considered a private company, and the city has respected that status, employing a decidedly hands-off approach. The assumption behind both the devolution and the city’s stance toward the WAA – that an airport is better managed at an arm’s length from government – has gained some support from the WAA’s performance.

In 1990, all Canadian airports were owned and operated by the federal government’s Transport Canada, but, in Canada as elsewhere (Advani and Borins, 2001), support was building for a transfer of this responsibility to a local body equipped to respond to the unique needs of each community and airport. The next year, the Winnipeg Area Airports Taskforce was assembled to examine the viability of devolution. Its report, the Winnipeg Airports Authority Feasibility Analysis, produced a model of local ownership to control the planning, development, and operations of the Winnipeg International Airport and recommended that the Taskforce enter negotiations with Transport Canada to lease the Winnipeg International Airport (Winnipeg Area Airports Taskforce, 1992).

The Winnipeg Airports Authority Inc. was established that same year and by 1993, a memorandum of understanding was signed that provided the framework for negotiations with Transport Canada. On January 1, 1997, the transfer of authority was made official (Winnipeg Airports Authority, 2006a), and Winnipeg became the seventh city in Canada with a locally managed airport. Airports in Montreal, Vancouver, Calgary, and Edmonton had passed into local hands in 1992, and in Ottawa and Toronto in 1996 (Cash, 1996a).

With the signing of a 60-year ground lease agreement with Transport Canada, the WAA assumed the responsibility to manage, operate, maintain, and invest in the airport (Winnipeg Airports Authority, 2006a). Although its Board of Directors comprises representatives from both the public and private sectors, and it is subject to detailed conditions set out in the Ground Lease, it is an independent, entity, substantially removed from government oversight.

Relations between the WAA and the city are strong. According to Alex Robinson, “you would be hard-pressed to find any better.” Both parties benefit from a symbiotic relationship. The city reaps the direct benefits of the federal property’s payments in lieu of taxes, as well as taxes from spin-off enterprises the airport’s business creates. The WAA, in turn, benefits from its close proximity to downtown, Winnipeg’s geographic centrality and planning controls which ensure that development adjacent to the airport will not infringe upon its ability to operate 24 hours a day (Robinson, 2006).

The airports authority will rarely, if ever, exercise its royal prerogative. It will willingly abide by the municipal regulations of the city to keep their relations strong. Most private airports are bound by a Municipal Authority Agreement, spelling out the terms of their relationships with municipal governments. The WAA, however, is not. It has an informal, verbal agreement whereby it voluntarily submits itself to the standards of the city (Robinson, 2006).

In pursuit of its mandate to identify and adapt to local needs, and maximize the potential of the airport, the WAA set out to develop the airport as a 24-hour intermodal
transportation hub, to improve service delivery, to contribute to the development of the local economy and to engage the community (Winnipeg Airports Authority, 1997). However, the real priority was the development of the airport as a major cargo hub, a concept that had already been put forward and studied while the airport was still under government control.

Although Vancouver and Toronto were the two unrivaled strongholds of Canadian cargo (Bishop, 2006), proponents of the cargo hub idea aligned themselves with then-Mayor Susan Thompson’s energetic promotion of a mid-continent trade corridor, consisting of highway and rail connections from Winnipeg, through Kansas City, Oklahoma City and Dallas, to Guadalajara, Mexico. The corridor, it was argued, would connect the fourth-most-used Canada-US border crossing at Emerson, Manitoba, with the most-used US-Mexican crossing at Laredo. Because of its status as one of the few 24-hour airports in North America, Winnipeg would be an ideal transit point for cargo traffic between China and North America.

In early 1996, Winnport Logistics Ltd. a company created for this purpose, undertook to implement the idea. Winnport, in collaboration with partner Kelowna Flightcraft, acquired exclusive Canadian rights to ship cargo to and from the Chinese cities of Nanjing and Shenzhen. Plans called for eight trucks from Toronto, Chicago, and Minneapolis to drop off cargo to be shipped to China and ply the return routes. (Cash, 1998).

The Winnport project was a high-risk venture, and encountered numerous problems. Never before had Winnipeg attempted to assume such a significant economic role. Despite a surprisingly positive reception from freight forwarders, the airlines balked. Winnport had to inflate its costs by creating its own airline. It also proved difficult to generate the necessary traffic. While there was no problem filling the planes coming from China to Canada, it became clear that the North American market could not support the traffic necessary to make the return trips viable. (Bishop, 2006).

The immensity of Winnport required substantial capital investment, and initially it did garner strong support. Soon after its conception, it received almost $1 million from the province and the federal government, $1 million from private sources, and $5 million from the tripartite Winnipeg Development Agreement (Cash, 1996). The city also spent $8.2 million widening Brookside Boulevard, a major route north of the airport. These initiatives were undertaken in the hopes that they could serve as an economic catalyst (1996). But, despite strong support early on, Winnport did not have the financial wherewithal to continue. It halted operations on January 7, 1999, after only two months in operation, and was eventually sold to a Toronto company (Cash, 2002; Bishop, 2006). The failure of Winnport to acquire the capital it needed, and the difficulties of generating the traffic necessary for viability were compounded by the Asian economic downturn of the late 1990s.

This early experience fell well short of fulfilling the high hopes that had been pinned on arms-length administration of the airport, but outcomes since then have been much more favourable. Having learned first hand the risks entailed in such an ambitious undertaking as Winnport, it has shifted to a more incremental approach, involving gradual improvement of its facilities and vigorous marketing of the advantages it offers, including close proximity to downtown Winnipeg and ready access to three major North American rail lines (Canadian National, Canadian Pacific and Burlington Northern Santa Fe) as well as the mid-continent truck routes (Crockatt, 2006).

Accordingly, in 2003 the WAA built a new $4.2 million cargo apron. Allowing up to five 727 cargo jets to be loaded or unloaded at one time, it has greatly increased volumes of business (Bell, 2006). WAA officials claim that Winnipeg International Airport is the 12th fastest-growing cargo airport in the world, second in North America, and the fastest growing in Canada (Alongi, 2006a). In 2004 cargo tonnage increased by 24.7% from the previous year. In 2003, the percentage increase was 12.6%, and the year before, 2.47% (Winnipeg Airports Authority, 2006c). As of February 2006, there are 11 all-cargo carriers using the airport, including Purolator, DHL, Cargojet, FedEx, and UPS. (Winnipeg Airports Authority, 2006d, p. 10).
Tenants and Neighbours

Winnipeg

Airport Business Park West
1. Air Canada Maintenance
2. Boeing Canada
3. NavCanada
4. Flying Colours Pilot Training
5. North West Company
6. Winpak
7. MacDon
8. Stevenson Aviation Technical Training Centre

Airport Business Park South
1. Esso Avitat
2. Shell Aerocentre
3. Fast Air
4. Department of National Defence
The airport’s strategic location and its 24-hour operation are essential to the realization of these business opportunities. Company officials claim that nearly every cargo flight between eastern and western Canada comes through Winnipeg. For example, every UPS overnight flight from Montreal to Vancouver, as well as every FedEx overnight flight from Toronto to Edmonton, comes through Winnipeg (Crockatt, 2006, p. 2). These operations produce significant economic results. According to the WAA, each flight of a 727 cargo aircraft generates 48 jobs, $2.1 million in wages, $3.0 in GDP, and $7.3 million in economic output over the course of a year (Alongi, 2006a). The WAA derives revenue from these cargo operations via a $541 landing fee, a concession fee on fuel, and an $80 apron fee for each flight (Bishop, 2006).
Transport Canada has recognized the growing importance of the Winnipeg airport by designating it as one that air carriers are allowed to use in transit between two points outside the country. For example a cargo aircraft on its way from the United States to Asia is permitted to stop over in Winnipeg, and even store goods there, regardless of whether these rights are granted in Canada's bilateral air transport agreements. (Transport Canada, 2004).

It is the development of the cargo business that is the jewel in the WAA’s crown. The development of land adjacent to the airport has moved forward, but at a less impressive pace. The WAA owns approximately 800 acres of developable land in four business parks, referred to as the east, south, north, and west parks. (See map below.) Only the east and south parks are relatively developed. The small south park contains two petroleum companies, an air charter operation and a Department of National Defence facility. The WAA’s development priority is the Airport Business Park East, where the focus has been air cargo and aerospace industries.

Land to the north, some of which is in the Rural Municipality of Rosser, has not been touched. Plans for future development include initiatives such as an inter-modal facility, e-commerce distribution centres and foreign trade zone development (Winnipeg Airports Authority, 2006e). For the west park, the Winnipeg Airports Land Corporation was established in January 1999 with a mandate to undertake development in this area (Kirbyson, 1999) and the city has passed a secondary plan for the park (City of Winnipeg, 2002), but this is a long-term venture. Unlike the east and south parks, development in the north and west parks is impeded by a number of factors (MacLeod, 2006). Though a plan is in place, development of the infrastructure is in an early stage. A major investment will be required in order to service the land. Sewers, water feeder mains, and a major upgrade in the road system are among the missing elements. Further, one advantage of developing the east and south parks is their proximity to downtown, and the easy accessibility of major trucking routes Kenaston and Brookside boulevards. In the undeveloped north and less developed west, these advantages do not exist.

Nevertheless, the Winnipeg Airports Authority has proven highly effective in turning the airport into a vehicle of economic development, especially in the cargo business. As in the case of the Canada Lands Company, therefore, we can answer our first question in the affirmative: The operations of the WAA and the character of its relations with federal and municipal governments have shown themselves to be appropriate to the ends the corporation was meant to achieve.

In addition to economic growth, the other main pillar of the WAA’s self-imposed mandate upon assuming control in 1997 was a promise to become more engaged in the community. That sounds very much like a commitment to provide a basis for an affirmative answer to our second question: Is the WAA appropriately responsive to community concerns particular to Winnipeg?

The WAA’s program for public input into its decisions consists of two committees: the Community Consultative Committee and the Airport Advisory Committee on Environment. The first is an apparent vehicle for elite reconciliation and has an air of seriousness about it. The second seeks input from the wider community. Its organizational arrangements are suggestive of lack of seriousness.

According to the WAA’s web site (Winnipeg Airports Authority, 2006g), the 20-member Community Consultative Committee includes five WAA executives and two members from the WAA’s design and environment committees. The other 13 members are representatives of community bodies that obviously have seriously substantive interests in airport affairs, including the Chamber of Commerce; Western Economic Diversification Canada, a federal government body; Destination Winnipeg, the city’s tourism and economic development agency; Manitoba Transportation and Government Services, a provincial department, and representatives of the Consumers’ Association, a local Canadian Forces Air Command base, and labour, aviation and aerospace interest groups. The minutes of meetings were available for down-load from the...
Two positions – the aerospace interest group and a representative of the City of Winnipeg – were vacant at this writing.

By contrast six positions were vacant on the 17-member Airport Advisory Committee on Environment, and the composition of the committee falls short of signalling an avid interest in hearing from citizens or organizations with serious concern for the environment. To be sure, two members of the committee, representatives of Friends of Omand’s Creek and Friends of Bruce Park, are concerned with the preservation and development of streams located near the airport, but 11 of the 17 positions were reserved for appointees of local MPs and MLAs. Four of these positions were vacant, as were those that were to be appointed by the City of Winnipeg and the Chamber of Commerce. The remaining two appointees were non-executive employees of the WAA, and the committee’s minutes were not available on the web site.

The scope of this paper does not allow for a detailed examination of the workings of these two committees, but on the evidence available it is reasonable to suggest that the WAA is less than enthusiastic about responsiveness to the concerns of the community at large. Appointees of MPs and MLAs – by far the majority of the environment committee – are unlikely to be the best choice for a critical, well-informed examination of environmental issues. The vacant positions suggest that the bodies and individuals empowered to make appointments do not have a very high opinion of the committee’s importance, while the absence of minutes from the web site and the fact that the WAA appointees are not executives suggests that the WAA shares that view.

Moreover, the limitation of public input into airport operations to a committee concerned with environmental questions seems too fashionable by half. Although any right-thinking person will agree that the environment represents an important concern, there are likely to be other public issues arising out of airport operations, such as airport noise, impact of airport operations on neighbourhood businesses, or opportunities in the airport for local small businesses. On the available evidence, it appears that the WAA is very concerned with maintaining good lines of communication with the local elite – as any well-run corporation would be – but not greatly concerned with input from the wider public.

**The Forks**

For roughly two-thirds of the 20th century, rail yards, ports, and industrial districts, defined by rows of tracks, littered debris, and expansive warehouses sprawled across vast fields of gravel and pavement, were found ubiquitously throughout the urban fabric of the developed world. Very often, these uses were located in the heart of a city’s downtown, because the city centre was not only the city’s commercial heart, but also the main point of convergence for water and rail transport and the hub of local industry. But, as highways replaced rail and water as the main means of shipping, industry moved out of the city centre and these centres of industry became industrial wastelands. However, in the 1960s and 70s, a growing recognition of the potential value of a central location helped spur a renaissance of these underused parcels of land.

In Winnipeg, the confluence of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers had been a significant venue for trading and meeting for centuries before it became the East Yards of the Canadian National Railways, a major centre of transportation and industry. With the expansion of the road system and the growth of trucking, it began to decline, and after the creation of Symington Yards in southeast Winnipeg, a vast sixty-five acres of land lay unused in the centre of the city.

The idea of The Forks evolved over at least two decades. As early as 1968, Winnipeg Tribune columnist Val Werier, possibly inspired by similar revitalization efforts of old industrial land across North America, began touting the site as a public space that would honour the city’s heritage (St. John, 2003, p. 149). In 1972, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced the Byways and Special Places Program to commemorate historic communication routes and adapt
them for recreational use. Out of this program came the Agreements for Recreation and Culture, or ARC Program.

![Figure 3 - Aerial view of The Forks](image)

Figure 3 - Aerial view of The Forks, which extends northward from the confluence of the Red and Assiniboine rivers to the Provencher Bridge. (The bridge is in the centre of the aerial photo, and the Assiniboine River appears to be coloured green.) The bridge connects Pioneer Avenue with Boulevard Provencher and links the commercial heart of the city (west and North of The Forks) with St. Boniface, the French Quarter, east of the Red. Source: Google map.

With $14.1 million in federal funding, seventeen sites were developed along the Red River, including the St. Boniface Cathedral and the Selkirk Marine Museum (St. John, 2003, p. 150). However, The Forks would not see development until a second agreement in 1986 allocated $3.5 million for a Parks Canada national historic site. These 5.5 hectares were nestled against the Red from the confluence to the Provencher Bridge. They would come to include a
river walkway, a multi-use open area for festivals, a boat dock and an interpretive area (St. John, 2003, p. 151).

Figure 4 - The Forks Market, a renovated East Yards warehouse. Source: Faster Light Communication, Box 1776, Tisdale, Saskatchewan, Canada, S0E 1T0 (306-873-2004), accessed at: http://ensign.ftlcomm.com/Cities/Forks/forks2004/forks2004.html, 14 November 2006.

That was a first step, but the crucial turning-point in the development of The Forks was the establishment of the Core Area Initiative (CAI). The CAI, planned for five years but extended in 1985 for another five, was launched in 1980 as a massive attempt to revitalize Winnipeg’s lagging inner city (Layne, 2000, p. 250). Lloyd Axworthy, then a young, regional Cabinet minister with the federal Liberals, was the driving force behind the agreement that would come to total $196 million in government funding by the early 1990s, with each of the three levels of government committing one-third of the total.

It was an innovative initiative, bringing three levels of government into an agreement as equals, a sharp contrast with previous intergovernmental relations, in which jurisdictions were brick walls. The program also broke down policy walls, by integrating economic, physical, and social elements into a single program of downtown revitalization. The initiative formalized an “increased understanding of the complexity, multiplicity, and inter-relatedness of urban problems, and a corresponding acknowledgement that addressing these problems would require concurrent policy effort on several fronts” (Layne, 2000, p. 254).

In its first five years, the Core Area Initiative identified three key sites to help aid in physical development. These were the north Logan industrial area, the north Portage retail and commercial area, and the CN East Yards. While early progress was made on the first two, the East Yards were another matter. Axworthy did not succeed in acquiring the site from CN. The asking price was judged to be high, and CN demanded assistance for railway relocation (St. John, 2003, p. 152). In fall of 1984, however, Brian Mulroney and the federal Conservatives swept to power, and local MP Jake Epp, a member of Mulroney’s cabinet, helped to push the project forward.
In the end, the federal government turned over a $12 million office tower in downtown Vancouver to CN in exchange for 58 acres at The Forks, with CN retaining seven hectares along the railway tracks (St. John, 2003, p. 153). Responsibility for development was assigned to the CAI. Jim August, then-general manager of the CAI and now CEO of The Forks, said he felt CN wanted the land transfer to go through all along. It was simply a complicated deal whose complexities hindered the process. CN, he felt, lacked the “entrepreneurial spirit” to facilitate it (August, 2006).

In March 1986, the East Yard Task Force was appointed to review issues pertaining to the site, and develop concept and financial plans, as well as an implementation mechanism (Winnipeg Core Area Initiative, 1986, p. 1). With a goal of designing a public space that would honour the site’s past while remaining forward-looking, the Task Force studied the history of The Forks, as well as the existing buildings on the land. Members visited similar reclamation projects in Vancouver, Detroit, Toronto, Minneapolis, and Washington.

The task force recommended the establishment of The Forks Renewal Corporation (FRC), an independent body that could make decisions at arm’s length from government, always with a focus on The Forks. Here, as in the case of the Kapyong Barracks and the Winnipeg Airports Authority, federal property of great importance to Winnipeg was entrusted to a corporate body not directly accountable to any level of government, and certainly not to the citizens of Winnipeg.

In 1989, The Forks National Historic Site opened just as the East Yards redevelopment began taking shape. Since then, The Forks has continued its evolution into arguably the city’s most attractive and popular public space, welcoming nearly four million visitors annually (Forks North Portage Partnership, 2006).

Today, The Forks is owned and operated by The Forks North Portage Partnership (FNP). The FNP came to existence in 1995, in an attempt by the Forks Renewal Corporation to gain more financial security. After five years of success, and in an era of increased government fiscal conservatism, both the federal government and the province began to withdraw monetary support. As a result, the FRC merged with the North Portage Development Corporation, allowing the former to draw upon the latter’s revenue from parking and landholdings (St. John, 2003, p. 165). To this day, The Forks on its own loses approximately $1 million a year; financial solvency is only achieved through North Portage (August, 2006).

While the Forks North Portage Partnership is governed by a tri-level Board of Directors, it can act as though it were a private developer. It is managed internally; the City of Winnipeg has few mechanisms of control over the site’s development. Therefore, any study of intergovernmental relations at The Forks must be done through a lens of the FNP as an intermediary.

As explained above, the majority of the site’s land came out of the East Yard Task Force reports and is now owned by the FNP. However, Parks Canada still has custodial responsibilities for the 5.5 hectares of The Forks National Historic Site. Therefore, its relations with the FNP are worth considering. Barb Ford, the manager of Heritage Programs and Client Services at the National Historic Site, describes them as excellent, saying they are “joined at the hip”. They work together in two capacities. In terms of programming, they team up on a daily basis, collaborating in many different ways such as a joint volunteer program. Ford also sits on The Forks Heritage Advisory Committee. However, in terms of land use and development, she only described them as “good”, though she noted this grade was simply a result of less frequent relations (Ford, 2006).

August generally agreed with this assessment, but acknowledged the level of the Parks Canada bureaucracy can be frustrating at times (August, 2006). Any issue of political or public policy significance, or any matter of site development, has to be referred to the Manitoban national park superintendent’s office, or even, at times, regional headquarters in Calgary (Ford, 2006). That is probably unavoidable, but Ford suggested that coordination between the two
bodies could be improved. She noted that the public often become confused between the two jurisdictions for tours, riverboat information, and other programming. This, she said, could be better harmonized (Ford, 2006).

The historic site’s relations with the city, on the other hand, are not nearly as close. They do have agreements with the city concerning matters such as the co-ordination of river walk cleanup, the use of the site’s docks, cross-promotion, and the use of city police for security during events. However, because it is federal property, its land use and development policies are conceived autonomously from the city. Parks management has been unafraid to exercise its royal prerogative, a tool many federal properties refrain from using in a sign of good faith to the municipality.

A parks manager herself acknowledged this freely. Ford (2006) described a time in the mid-1990s when Parks Canada was re-doing signage on the site. Initially, local managers applied for Winnipeg permits, but later withdrew the applications upon deciding that the process was too long and complicated.

Despite the Forks North Portage Partnership’s relative independence, the City of Winnipeg does have two controls over it. First, the city is a stakeholder, with two members on the FNP’s Board of Directors. These members are named and accountable to the mayor. The mayor, in turn, is accountable to City Council (Patterson, 2006). The Board has to approve The Forks Concept Plan, which sets out all plans for future development. Second, just as with any other developer, the city has the power to approve all developments. They must also meet Winnipeg zoning regulations (August, 2006). The city therefore has the power to intervene in the affairs of The Forks, and, as we will see, it has occasionally exercised that power.

The City of Winnipeg works with the FNP in other capacities. Often there is overlap in planning responsibilities that calls for dialogue and communication. For example, the city owns parcels of land adjacent to The Forks. The land set aside for a major new development now being planned, the Human Rights Museum, belongs to the city, although in the eyes of visitors it will appear as part of The Forks. Another example: the Esplanade Riel footbridge to St. Boniface is city property, but its landing on the Forks side is owned by the FNP, and completion of that part of the development necessitated discussions between city and FNP officials. In cases such as these, relations with the city are at the bureaucratic level (Patterson, 2006).

Relations between the Forks North Portage Partnership and the City of Winnipeg have never been altogether smooth (August, 2006; Patterson, 2006). When we conducted our interviews, August was critical of the city regarding what he perceived to be a lack of a strong policy framework. He argued that the city lacks vision, a criticism he directed specifically at the mayor, Sam Katz, and pointed to the problems this poses for The Forks management’s own planning (August, 2006).

Similarly, Jim Patterson, manager of Economic Development in the Planning, Property, and Development department for the City of Winnipeg, reported that communication between the city and The Forks had deteriorated in recent years. The old director of this department, since retired, used to participate in regular FNP meetings. Patterson believed her replacement has not continued with this. His uncertainty regarding the factual situation provides further evidence of the poor lines of communication (Patterson, 2006).

These inadequate relations may hinder the revitalization of downtown Winnipeg, but they underline the importance of The Forks management’s independence from the city. We have seen in both the case of Kapyong and that of the airport that the independence of Canada Lands Company and the Winnipeg Airports Authority enhances their ability to act as agents of economic development. So it is with The Forks, the development of which has made it an unqualified success as a public space and a drawing-card for tourism.

A uniquely unblemished success in the middle of an often-maligned and stagnant urban core, The Forks was host to more than four million visits and 200 events in 2005, according to a survey conducted on behalf of The Forks management, involving 600 interviews. The survey
found that 90 per cent of visitors were satisfied with the Forks, 32 per cent reported nine or more
visits in a six-month period and almost 70 per cent said they visited, not only during Winnipeg’s
generally salubrious summer, but also came in the often bitterly cold winter weather to enjoy
skating, cross-country skiing and other winter activities. (Forks North Portage Partnership, 2006)

Despite their lackluster communication, it would appear that the Forks North
Portage Partnership and the City of Winnipeg both support a broad notion of downtown
revitalization. They are also on the same page regarding a number of key issues affecting The
Forks. For example, City Council maintains it should be kept as public space, and not become a
development site for housing. The politicians do not want private owners influencing the site’s
policies and development (Patterson, 2006). The FNP has acceded to this view and has come to
see The Forks as an entertainment/cultural centre, rather than an area compatible with housing.

Like Canada Lands Company and the Winnipeg Airports Authority, then, the
independence of The Forks/North Portage Partnership has enhanced its ability to achieve the
objectives for which it was created. To evaluate the agency’s record in the matter of respecting
community difference – our second criterion of evaluation (see introduction) – we offer a brief
summary of what happened in two instances in which proposals for new developments at The
Forks raised community concerns, instances that are representative of a larger number of similar
issues that have arisen over the years.

The first was a proposal for a German-Canadian cultural centre at the Forks,
which was greeted with consternation by city councillors, the Aboriginal community and the
Winnipeg public in early 1990. The proposed centre was to cost $3.5 million dollars, $750,000 of
which was to be paid for by the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative. In addition, it was suggested that
a $1 million dollar grant might be given towards the centre by the Community Places Program
(Thampi, 1990a).

City councillors who were opposed to the development argued that the proposal
seemed to favor “one ethnic group over others” (Thampi, 1990a, p. 3). In March of 1990, four out
of six city councillors on the Civic Planning committee hoped to block the grant of $750,000
from the Winnipeg Core Area Initiative because they felt that the Forks was an inappropriate
location for the development (Lett, 1990).

Councillor Glen Murray took the position that, in light of The Forks’ long history
as an aboriginal meeting-place, the group that should be represented at the Forks was the
aboriginal community (Thampi, 1990a). This sentiment was echoed by the First Nations
Confederacy, the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs (Stephenson, 1990) and a community group
called Greening the Forks, which voiced opposition to the plan of the German-Canadian Congress
of Manitoba to exhibit a three-tonne piece of the Berlin wall – not an artifact notable for its
relevance to Winnipeg’s history – at the cultural centre (Lett & Thampi, 1990).

In April, 1990, after “a storm of protest”, the Forks Renewal Corporation, as the
agency was then called, announced at a public forum that they were considering a new location
for the development (Thampi, 1990c, p. 1). By June a city council committee approved a motion
that effectively killed the proposal. (Thampi, 1990b). In this case, it is noticeable that the
response of the Forks Renewal Corporation was sluggish at best. It took direct intervention by the
city to stop this development proposal.

A decade later, another public dispute regarding a development at The Forks
revealed the management’s slightly increased willingness to respond to public concerns, while
illustrating how intractable the dilemma of effectiveness vs. responsiveness can be. The issue was
the recurrent question of housing development at The Forks and the dilemma was that the
agency’s very terms of reference virtually mandated some kind of commercial development.
Housing at the Forks had already been a contentious issue prior to this proposal. Two other
proposals had been suggested in previous years, including a 125-unit Eco-Village on the north
side of Provencher Bridge and a 100-unit condominium project south of the bridge. Opponents
pointed to a survey that showed that the public opposed more commercial development at the Forks (Santin, 1998).

The Forks North Portage Partnership operates under a mandate to become self-sustaining, and the agency gravitated toward housing as a relatively benign means of increasing its revenue as it strove to meet its mandate (Santin, 1998). In the eyes of many citizens, however, the self-sufficiency mandate raised fears of commercialization and creeping privatization of a valued public facility (Redekop, 1999). Debate was already brewing, therefore, before a Calgary developer unveiled a plan to build a residential senior’s complex at the Forks. In January 2000, Pointe of View developers insisted that the Forks site was the only place in Winnipeg the company would consider building a fortress-like 117-unit complex, estimated to cost $15-million dollars (Connor, 2000).

The plan met with objections that a historic site was not an appropriate location for housing, especially for seniors, in an area that frequently hosted loud public events (Connor, 2000). Other objectors were concerned that the Forks would lose “its unique character” (Williams, 2000, p. 6) and that the presence of seniors might result in restrictions on public events. A group named The Forks For People Not Profit collected more than 500 signatures in April 2000 to protest the housing proposal (Williams, 2000).

Management of The Forks went head to head in April 2000 with the city council in efforts to convince them that housing at the Forks would be the beginning of a revitalization of the entire downtown area, but several councillors remained opposed to the housing proposal (O’Brien, 2000). After a public consultation in spring of 2002, The Forks management finally relented and announced that housing would no longer be considered for the area (Santin, 2002).

The housing issue illustrates two important points. Since the Forks/North Portage Partnership is required to be self-supporting, its very terms of reference militate against responsiveness to the public where the agency’s revenues are concerned. Faced with public outrage, it has yielded, but it has clearly not been proactive in seeking public input. In short, as in the cases of the Kapyong Barracks and the Winnipeg Airports Authority, the objective of responsiveness to community concerns is less well served than that of effective management.

**Conclusion**

We have reviewed three case studies of the multi-level governance of federal properties in Winnipeg. In all three cases, as we have seen, the properties are administered by agencies at least one step removed from direct government supervision. Considering that this removal from government oversight is prompted by a desire for managerial and entrepreneurial effectiveness, but may exact the price of reduced responsiveness to community concerns, we posed two research questions:

- Are the operations of these agencies, and the character of their relations with federal and municipal governments, appropriate to the ends they are meant to serve?
- Are they appropriately responsive to the particularities of the community they are meant to serve?

In one of the three cases, accountability follows traditional lines. Canada Lands Company is owned by the federal government and, though it enjoys considerable freedom from direct oversight, it remains, in the final analysis, accountable to the federal government. The other two cases propel us squarely into the world of multi-level governance: The Forks/North Portage Partnership is governed by a board equally accountable to each of the three levels of government. In the case of the Winnipeg Airports Authority, accountability is even more blurred. Board members are appointed by four governments, two of them local; two chambers of commerce; and
the Winnipeg economic development agency, Destination Winnipeg. Additional members are appointed by the board itself (Winnipeg Airports Authority, 2006i).

What then are the answers to our two questions? Our data show that the answer to the first question is, by and large, yes. In the case of Canada Lands Company’s prospective take-over of the Kapyong Barracks land, we found that the process of land transfer was proving to be painfully time-consuming, but on the basis of the company’s past success with a similar development in Calgary, there is good reason to suppose that it will ultimately produce a quality development. As for the Forks/North Portage Partnership and the Winnipeg Airports Authority, both agencies have achieved successes that would likely have been impossible under direct government administration.

Responsiveness to the particularities of the community they serve is a different matter. The Winnipeg Airports Authority, we found, has two committees for public input into WAA decisions. One of them, an apparent vehicle for the maintenance of good lines of communication with the local elite, appeared to be well calculated to accomplish its objective. The other, obviously intended to enable the WAA to remain in touch with the grassroots, gave every indication of being half-hearted and likely very limited in its effectiveness.

In the Kapyong Barracks case, the land in question is still under the ownership of the Department of Defence. Most of the land is in the process of being transferred to the Canada Lands Company. As we have shown, two issues of community concern have arisen, but in neither case has there been any serious sign that responsible parties have even noticed that the concern exists. With the hierarchy of the Department of Defence apparently impenetrable, and Canada Lands Company not yet legally responsible, there would seem to be a compelling case for City of Winnipeg to intervene on behalf of the community, but the city, in this case, as in both other cases, has adopted a doggedly hands-off stance.

The most nearly responsive of the three agencies is the Forks/North Portage Partnership. Although it can hardly claim to be proactive in addressing community concerns, it has at least shown a willingness to pay attention whenever a community response to a pending decision produces a storm of adverse publicity. It is an open question whether the credit for this minimal degree of responsiveness goes to the agency or to the vigilance of the community.

Our case studies suggest, therefore, that, although governance has produced substantial benefits in the form of agency effectiveness, the question of how governance can be made to serve the requirement of respect for community difference remains unresolved.

Endnotes

1 The authors are grateful to Bob Young for creating an organizational and conceptual framework for this research, and to the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada’s Major Collaborative Research Initiative for funding it. As well, we thank the University of Winnipeg for facilitating it. Any shortcomings, however, are to be registered as debits against the authors’ reputational accounts.

2 This statement is based on the senior author’s 31 years of residence in Winnipeg, during which time participant observation of city politics has been part of his daily routine.

3 The following account has been compiled from reports in local news sources, as well as additional information obtained in interviews with an official well-informed regarding the status of military housing. The official cannot be named for ethical reasons, but a transcript of the interviews, with identifiers removed, can be made available on request.
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