Hirschman 2.0 or What Makes a Good Policy Advice System?
A Theory of Policy Advice System Quality & Capacity

Migone, Andrea, Toronto Metropolitan University, Toronto, ON
andrea.migone@torontomu.ca
ORCID: 0000-0001-8521-5024
Howlett, Michael, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC
howlett@sfu.ca
ORCID: 0000-0003-4689-740X

Words: 9725 (limit 8000 without references)
Abstract: 186/250
Bibliography: 3477

August 28, 2023
Draft 8

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Abstract

Not everyone's ideas count equally in terms of influencing and informing policy design and instrument choices. As the literature on policy advice has shown, policies are made by many different actors interacting with each other over relatively long timeframes. Actors within these 'policy advisory systems' interact within the confines of a set of political and economic institutions and governing norms and each brings with it different interests and resources. Understanding who these actors are, how they act and how this affects the overall nature of the advice system is a critical aspect of all public policy-making activity but not all of these elements have been equally well conceptualized or studied. In this article, the general nature of policy advice systems is set out, their major components described and a model of individual and organizational behavior within them outlined based on a modification of the Exit, Voice, Loyalty rubric of Albert Hirschman. The paper shows how individual organizational behaviour along the lines suggested by Hirschman can result in very different kinds of advice being provided by an advisory system, with predictable consequences for its nature and quality.

Introduction: Policy Composition and Policy Advice

Two interrelated elements compose public policies: *policy goals* and *policy means* operating at different levels of abstraction (Lasswell 1958). In this sense, policy goals represent governments' basic aims and expectations when deciding to pursue (or not) 'a course of action; while policy means are the techniques invoked to achieve those goals (Walsh 1994). A very broad and varied set of actors operates in this field some of whom decide or execute policy, while others provide input into its formation (Ball 2019; MacKillop and Downe 2022; Prince 2007).

With respect to the latter group, studies of advice since the 2000s noted that government decision-makers occupy the center of a complex system of policy advisors including both 'traditional' political advisors working in government and non-governmental ones. The latter include, among others, individuals staffing think tanks, academic institutions, NGOs, and other similar organizations, but also private sector consultants, and less formal or professional forms of advice from colleagues, friends and relatives and members of the public and political parties (Maley 2000; Peled 2002; Dobuzinskis et al. 2007; Craft and Halligan 2020). The literature in the policy sciences has developed some concepts – notably that of a 'policy advisory system' (PAS)

(Craft and Howlett 2012, Halligan 1995) – to help study and understand these actors and their activities.

While this work remains an advance on an earlier generation of studies from the 1970s and 1980s which tended to focus on single sets of actors – such as think tanks or interest groups – and ignore their interactions (Prince 2007; Maloney et al 1994) – currently the weak state of modelling on PAS does not allow for considerations of key questions such as the *quality* of advice provided or how that quality may change over time.

That is, it is certainly true that not everyone's ideas equally influence and inform government policy design and instrument choices, but who is influential about what subjects or topics, and how the nature of advice changes over time, remain outstanding questions in the field. Even the most significant questions with existing work – such as what are the consequences of the structure of a particular PAS, for example, in having advice dominated by external actors or heavily politicized have been addressed only in passing (Craft and Howlett 2013; Belyaeva 2019).

Here, the general nature of policy advice systems is set out, their major components described and a model of individual and organizational behavior within them put forward based on a modification of the Exit, Voice, Loyalty rubric of Albert Hirschman (1970) which allows consideration of, and provides answers to, these questions. We are not delving into the vast and very meaningful human resource management literature that explores these ideas and behaviours (Kaufman 2020; Morrison, 2014, 2023), although this may be a relevant future goal for public policy scholars. Rather the paper uses this model to show how individual and individual organizational behaviour within a PAS can be modelled to explain the very different kinds of advice which can be provided by an advisory system – from 'speaking truth to power' to overt

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currying of the favor of the most powerful policymakers - with predictable consequences for the nature and quality of that advice.

Policy Advisory Systems: The State of the Research

As has long been noted, policy-makers do not possess full knowledge of all areas of policy-making and typically rely on internal and external sources of *advice* when engaging in policy design and choice (Goldhamer 1978).

Early models of policy advice relied on simple 'market' metaphors in order to categorizing advisors, involving two distinct groups – buyers and sellers of policy advice – and sometimes augmenting them with a third category of 'brokers' intermediating between them and reconciling the demand for certain kinds of advice with its supply (Manwaring 2019) '(see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Evolution of the Modelling of Policy Advice Communities

As Figure 1 shows, these models gained complexity as different actors were arranged within each category. Actors were said to exist and interact within a set of political and economic institutions and governing norms with each actor embodying different interests and resources for those interactions (Plowden 1987; Seymour-Ure 1987). Ultimately this led to the development of the concept of a "policy advisory system' in which different kinds of actors can be said to be arrayed in different numbers and combinations in different sectors and governments (Craft and Wilder 2017).

The PAS concept recognized that advice can come from many different sources, that its quality and quantity can vary greatly, and that to some extent these variations are linked to governmental and interest articulation and aggregation systems. It suggests that the parameters and configurations of advice may vary by country or sector in empirically observable ways and that the different kinds of advice provided in such systems can be compared and contrasted with one another. In other words, examining the manner in which a *policy advice system* is structured, it has been argued, can help identify semi-permanent patterns of behaviour and who are the more or less influential actors involved in policy assessments in specific issue areas or countries (James and Jorgensen 2009). This would occur, for example, when a system relies heavily on internal bureaucratic expertise or if it engages with many external think tanks and other kinds of policy advisors.

In some cases, the number of influential policy actors can be very small, meaning the nature and the quality of advice on possible policy designs and instrument choices can be greatly influenced by the experience, specialization and training of this cadre (Howlett 2014). However, in other cases larger numbers of actors and organizations may compete for government attention

and understanding how and why certain kinds or sources of advice are more influential, and with what affect, is more problematic.

Thus far the literature on PAS has generally analyzed these differences in terms of a structural or 'insider-outsider' logic. In the first studies, PAS membership was simply said to be linked to how existing policy-making organizations fall into four general 'communities' depending on their degree of proximity to central policy actors, and on whether they were located inside or outside of government (Table 1).

Table 1   **The four communities of policy advisors**

	Proximate actors	Peripheral actors
Public/governmental sector	Core actors	Public sector insiders
	Central agencies *Executive staff* *Professional governmental policy analysts*	*Commissions, committees and task forces* *Research councils/scientists* *International organizations*
Non-governmental sector	Private sector insiders	Outsiders
	Consultants *Political party staff* *Pollsters Donors*	*Public interest groups* *Business associations* *Trade unions* *Academics* *Think tanks* *Media* *International nongovernmental organizations*

Source: Howlett (2014b)

Halligan's (1995), for example, argued that policy actors can be arrayed in a system depending on their location inside or outside government and the extent to which government was able to control actor activities (see Table 2).

Table 2. Policy Advisory Systems – Halligan Locational model

Location	Government control	
	High	**Low**
Public Service	Senior departmental policy advisers Central Agency advisers /strategic policy unit	Statutory appointments in public service
Internal to government	Political Advisory systems Temporary advisory policy units • Ministers Offices • First Ministers Offices Parliaments (e.g., a House of Commons)	Permanent advisory policy units Statutory authorities Legislatures (e.g., U.S. Congress)
External	Private sector/NGOS on contract Community organizations subject to government Federal international organizations	Trade unions, interest groups Community groups Confederal international communities/organizations

Source: Halligan (1995)

These kinds of structural models allow for empirically driven comparative inquiry into PAS structure and performance in different countries or sectors and also can be linked to some general notions about the likely *content* of the advice provided by different sets of actors.

Hence, for example, actors affecting the more abstract level of policy preferences and goals tend to be found among non-governmental outsiders and insiders, and the general public. However, the closer formulation and design move to the areas of programme operations and of choosing instruments and implementation measures, the more insiders and core actors become relevant (Page 2010) (see Table 3)

Table 3. Advisory system actors by policy level

		Content & Source of Advice		
Policy (normative)	**Goals**	General abstract policy aims	Operationalizable policy objectives	Specific policy targets
		Public, outsiders and insiders	Insiders and core actors	Core actors
Policy (cognitive)	**means**	General policy implementation preferences	Operationalizable policy tools	Specific policy tool calibrations

Source: Howlett (2014)

While useful in describing the elements of a system, the receptiveness of policy-makers to advice, and its likely content, such models say very little about the *quality* of advice provided. Yet this is, of course, a critical question both in general and for comparative inquiry. Is any configuration of PAS better than another? How do we know?

The Issue of the Quality of Advice in a Policy Advisory System

As noted above, most early work on PAS focused on understanding system structure as a marketplace of ideas (Halligan 1995) and especially highlighted the location of the actors (see Figure 1) vis a vis government policy-makers in assessing their likely influence and activities in such systems. Actors were generally designated either as insiders and outsiders with respect to the government machinery, with the assumption that insiders are more influential on the technical details of policy while outsiders hold more indirect or diffuse influence. Such analyses, however, rarely engaged with the issue of the content or quality of advice.

The impact on policy content of individual actors and components of the system was thought to progressively decline from core actors, to public sector insiders, to private sector insiders to

outsiders, highlighting the significant role core actors played in organizing and mobilizing the advice provided from other sources.

These location-based influence models generally stopped here, however, in assessing how different actors affected not the content or influence of advice but the *quality* of the advice provided to governments (Lindquist 1998; Howlett 2011); often suggesting only that increased competition in the provision of this advice between internal and external actors as the number of the latter, especially, grew might prove problematic or advantageous (Parsons 2004; Prince 2007; Bertelli and Wenger 2009; McGann and Sabatini 2011; Craft and Halligan 2020; Maley 2000, p. 453, 2011; OECD 2011; Craft and Halligan 2020).

Only a few statements were made about quality and the management implications of it for advisory system creation and re-structuring (Marciano and Craft 2023), like the following two which remain only very loosely anchored to existing research evidence on their purported superiority, and potentially contradictory. Thus Anderson (1996), for example, in a study of Canadian government efforts to improve the quality of advice and the capacity of the PAS, argued that promotion of external actors could enhance the nature of an advisory system:

> "A healthy policy-research community outside government can (now) play a vital role
>
> in enriching public understanding and debate of policy issues" and can serve as a natural
>
> complement to policy capacity within government (Anderson 1996).

While, on the other hand, Halligan (1995) looking at the experiences in Australia and Canada focussed on the internal configuration of advisors and argued that the

> "conventional wisdom appears to be that a good advice system should consist of at least
>
> three basic elements within government: a stable and reliable in-house advisory service
>
> provided by professional public servants; political advice for the minister from a

specialized political unit (generally the minister's office); and the availability of at least

one third opinion option from a specialized or central policy unit, which might be one

of the main central agencies" (Halligan 1995 p. 162)

Research on this key question in PAS studies, however, needs to improve, particularly by going beyond understanding the structure of PAS to how advisory behaviour, especially in the core set of internal actors, interacts with structure in affecting the quality of advice provision.

To tackle this shortcoming, we propose a model of individual and organizational behavior in advisory systems modelled on the discussion of Exit, Voice, & Loyalty organizational strategies set out by Albert Hirschman (1970). As will be shown, applying this rubric to PAS can provide a model of how key internal (and external) policy advisors are likely to act when their advice is ignored, the impact this has on them and, consequently, how their subsequent reactions can affect the nature of the advice provided by a PA system in predictable ways.

Hirschman 2.0: A Model of PAS Quality and Its Evolution Using Hirschman's Exit, Voice & Loyalty Categories

In important works in the 1970s, Albert O. Hirschman (1970, 1974) argued that individuals in organizations (and other aspects of life, like shopping) have only three basic responses to situations they do not agree with ("Hirschman 1.0").

The first is an *Exit* option so that they can leave a certain organization or stop buying a product, as may happen when a party leader veers to new policies or a product is found to have been produced unethically. The second option is *Voice*: individuals can stay but voice their concerns in the effort to promote change from within. Or they can choose to subsume their concerns to the greater good of the organization through *Loyalty*, putting aside their concerns. In the 1974 follow up to his original article, Hirschman noted that these options applied to all

organizations and that alteration of the proportion of individuals in each group could have serious consequences for the functioning of that entity.

> *[e]very state – and indeed every organization – requires for its establishment and existence some limitations or ceilings on the extent of exit or of voice or of both. In other words, there are levels of exit (disintegration) and voice (disruption) beyond which it is impossible for an organization to exist as an organization. At the same time, an organization needs minimal or floor levels of exit and voice in order to receive the necessary feedback about its performance. Every organization thus navigates between the Scylla of disintegration-disruption and the Charybdis of deterioration due to lack of feedback* (Hirschman 1974, p. 16).

Here we argue that the same organizational logic is true for Policy Advisory Systems, that is, that they can be thought of as comprising some actors who are discontented, some who express their discontent and others who mainly articulate their support for government intentions. Moreover, and most importantly, we argue that these proportions can evolve over time in such a way that they can be skewed in one direction or another, with serious consequences for the nature or quality of the advice provided. In general, we argue that a 'healthy' system is one encouraging 'voice' with smaller groups of actors and individuals exiting or subsuming their 'free and fearless' advice to the goals and aspirations of the organization and its leadership. Further, we argue that these proclivities can be measured and assessed not only at specific points in time but also dynamically as they change, evolve and, often, degenerate. That is, following and elaborating upon Hirschman ("Hirschman 2.0") we also argue that systems may degenerate if they lose valuable people/advisors or skew too heavily towards silence or loyalty in both cases leading to opportunistic self-interested or cynical behaviour which can further undermine advice quality.

From Hirschman 1.0 to Hirschman 2.0

When applied to the organizations and individuals who make up a policy advice system, a more complex set of behaviours exist than originally put forward by Hirschman exists. That is, in

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addition to the three kinds of principled behaviour set out by Hirschman – principled exit, principled dissent and principled loyalty – there are also more self-centered responses such as remaining with an organization while disengaging from its goals, engaging in silence or cynicism rather than voice (Zaki 2022), and parodying loyalty to organizational norms and goals in forms of currying favor or sycophantic 'toadyism' (Morrison 2014; 2023; Chahal and Poonam 2015; Crossman and Crossman 2011).

In other words, while in Hirschman's original formulation ("Hirschman 1.0") individuals in a PAS are noted only to be able to exercise an *Exit* option and leave an organization or system, they can also 'quietly quit' or remain in place but without devoting much effort to their work (Mahand and Caldwell 2023). Similarly, while they can engage in principled dissent or 'speaking truth to power' (Wildavsky 1979), they can also simply stop providing policy-relevant information by selecting *Silence* as an alternative to voice or full out organizational exit (Kim & Cho, 2023; Morrison 2014) or engage in morale destroying cynicism (Zaki 2022). And while they could pick *Loyalty* and choose to stay in an organization and subordinate their opinions and activities to the organizational mission for noble or principles reasons, they can also express this sentiment in a more opportunistic way by currying favor from leaders and managers often in a way that may ultimately be characterized by corruption and self-interest (Soloviev 2018; Chahal and Poonam 2015) (see Table 4)

Table 4. Hirschman 2.0

		INTEREST SERVED	
		Organizational Interest (Value)	**Self-Interest (Degraded/Opportunistic)**
HIRSCHMAN STRATEGIES	**Exit – leaving the organization**	Principled Resignation	Disengagement – Quietly Quitting/Withdrawal

physically or spiritually		
Voice – expressing opinion	Open Professional Expert Opinion/whistleblowing	Closed Silence/Cynicism
Loyalty – aligning self with organization and leaders	To Organizational Goals/Mission	Sycophancy Toadying to Leader/Career advancement/opportunism/ corruption

While these behaviours were originally attributed to individuals and may still be, they can also be extended to organizations. That is, as Hirschman noted, in any organization over time personal behavior linked to exit, voice and loyalty choices can affect the overall nature and configuration of an organization's personnel and the kinds of work it performs, seriously affecting its quality.

Thus, depending on how each of its constituent organizations behaves, some advisory systems thus can provide 'fearless' advice i.e., that which may contradict the sentiments of those in power or what Wildavsky (1979) referred to as 'Speaking Truth to Power' or they can provide advice which is intentionally congruent or consonant with the views of decision-makers. It is well known (Grube and Killick 2023; Schafer and Crichlow 2010; 't Hart 1990), for example, that too much of the latter can lead to poor advice and disastrous outcomes (Kelman et al 2017). The key question in considering PAS quality, then, is the extent to which a PAS can continue to provide 'free and fearless' advice to government, or whether, echoing Lord Acton's words to Bishop Creighton on the capacity of power to corrupt human beings whether such close access to power over an extended period of time leads to excessive loyalty ("toadyism") or opportunistic and deceptive practices (from "Potemkin Villages" to self-enrichment) (Egorov and Sonin 2023; Sassoon 2016; Sailor et al 2017).

Modelling the Quality of a PAS: A Virtuous and Two Less Desirable PAS Configurations

This way of thinking about policy advice and policy advisors and the outputs of policy advisory systems is very powerful and a significant improvement on insider-outsider models. In this model, the information curve represents the aggregate amount of policy relevant advice that is provided by the system, whether internally to government or by experts outside of it and independently of the role and position of those who produce it.

That is, for example, the number and type of organizations desirable or preferable in a PAS can be thought of as independent of location, per se, and as constituting a bell curve See Figure 2) where most of the information comes from two generally principles common areas: *Voice* and *Loyalty*, with only a small amount of (principled) exit. This is the thinking behind Wildavsky and other's notions about advisors speaking truth to power and a PAS with this configuration should thus look something like Figure 2 below. That is, with the majority of advisors and advisory organizations in the centre with relatively small amounts of negative feedback provided in the 'tail area' of dissent, where *Exit* and *Silence* dominate, and of corruption resulting from *Opportunism*.

Figure 2. Generic Representation of a Policy-Relevant Feedback Distribution

Feedback information

Muted Feedback

Muted feedback

Dissent

Toady

Corruption

Exit

Disengagement

Silence

Voice

Loyalty

Opportunism

While this distribution may be desirable or preferable, however, it is also possible for the distribution to be skewed towards one of the less desirable behaviours. Thus Figure 3 provides a general overview of two other ideal-typic skews: (1) a skew towards exit or disengagement or (2) a skew towards toadyism and opportunism.

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Figure 3. Typologies of Potential Skews in Policy-Relevant Feedback in PAS

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
Application of the Model to Different Political and Advice Systems and System Actors

If organizational values are in the driver's seat – and therefore we assume a 'virtuous approach' – the individuals are more likely to quit an organization if they find themselves unable to 'live' its values, will provide voice-based advice even in the face of disagreements with the leadership, and their loyalty will be more likely to align with the organization's mission and its goals. However, if a more self-interested approach prevails, we would expect a degraded and opportunistic approach to emerge, with silence and toadying becoming much more evident.

While this is clear in the case of individual behaviour within an organization, Hirschman 2.0 can also apply to organizational dynamics within a PAS. For example, Table 5 shows how a think tank may operate within the PAS in this way.

Table 5. Degenerative Model applied to PAS Actors – Think Tanks

		INTEREST SERVED	
		Organizational/Policy Values	**Self-Interest (Degraded participation/Opportunistic organizational behaviour)**
HIRSCHMAN STRATEGIES	**Exit – leaving the organization physically or spiritually**	Principled Resignation e.g. withdrawing from a sham consultation process	Quietly Quitting/Self-enrichment e.g. remaining involved to collect funds/network etc.
	Voice – expressing opinion	Open Professional Expert Opinion/whistleblowing e.g. Attending meetings and presenting reports that 'speak truth to power'	Closed Silence/Cynicism e.g. saying nothing or making cheap media appearances aimed at membership growth
	Loyalty – aligning self with	To Organizational Goals/Mission	Toadying to Leader/Career advancement

	organization and leaders	e.g. Supporting agreed upon participatory/consultative goals	e.g. aligning think tank with funders in order to advance org size/prestige

In this case, a 'principled' exit could involve abandoning a consultation process that is purely cosmetic, for example. However, if more opportunistic behaviour takes over, we would be more likely to see a shift towards self-serving activities like muting dissent and in extreme cases simply aligning the activities of the think tank to the agenda of the funders (Fraussen and Halpin 2017; Halpin et al 2018). Over time, if the behaviour becomes generalized, the think tank component of a PAS can shift away from 'speaking truth to power' to being populated by self-enriching sycophantic organizations and the quality of advice can decline precipitously: a description of a situation not unlike that commonly attributed to very corrupt authoritarian regimes (Wintrobe 1998; Pal 1993; Galeotti 2016; Huw et al 2022).

Even in a relatively effective PAS it is possible to face similar situations where qualified advisors exit a PAS and the organizations that compose it or choose to remain silent, perhaps waiting for 'better times,' creating a PAS with a distribution of advice very much skewed towards the left side of the continuum, where we would again see *Voice* being suppressed and *Exit* strategies accelerating. Bednar (2023) while analyzing the US administrative machinery's policymaking capacity, for example, notes a process identifiable with *Exit*: where these organizations experienced a notable loss of autonomy – for example by being 'sidelined' by the administration – employees commonly moved to different organizations, took early retirement, or simply did not invest as much in their policy craft, thereby undermining the capacity of those agencies and of the advisory system as a whole. This latter situation can also lead to the emergence of poor practices in the provision of policy-relevant knowledge, for example generating an

excessive number of whistle blowers or an excessive amount of 'cynical' journalism; with many negative images of government being propagated (Pemberton et al 2012; Vaughn 2013).

A second possible outcome would be that, after exit and the suppression of voice, a PAS would skew towards loyalty, potentially leading to groupthink and poor results. We know for example, that in Argentina between 1975 and 1983, mediocre management – mainly composed of underachieving officers, who were 'stuck' in the hierarchy for lack of better opportunity – plagued the regime's secret police (Scharpf and Gläßel 2020), something that is not uncommon across both geography and time (Dudek & Paczkowski, 2005; Sassoon, 2016). This is likely in situations, such as those involving policy-making within a dictatorship or in a very corrupt regime where *Voice* goes unrewarded and *Loyalty*, in its mode of providing a balanced input, may well also be punished and lead to exit or opportunism.

A recent and clear example of the latter is Russia's invasion of Ukraine which was conducted on the basis of preparations that revealed enormous faults in intelligence, military and policy advice (Egorov and Sonin 2023; Huw et al 2022). Autocratic regimes which punish voice and promote a particular kind of personalist loyalty are unable to provide critical information to leaders or even advice that is objective and balanced. In Putin's Russia, the emergence of a close-knit group of leaders (*siloviki*) in the repressive structure of the Russian state that is loyal to him, not least because of the privileges and financial benefits this provides them, provide this skewed type of information (Soldatov and Borogan 2010; Galeotti 2016; Huw et al 2022).

Putin of course is not unique. As Wintrobe (1998) noted, dictators are never quite sure whether their supporters are genuine, nor is it under much dispute that unscrupulous individuals face lower costs in an environment where falsifying one's preference is required (Crabtree et al

2020). Hence, not only professions of support, but also basic policy-relevant information is distorted in non-democratic systems.

From this perspective, we can also consider how specific decisional strategies are linked to each skew in the system. For example, if we consider the nature of a PAS heavily skewed towards the *Exit* dimension, it resembles Cohen, March and Olsen's (1972) description of the garbage can model, especially in the variation of participation typical of actors in this decision-making process. Within a *Voice* model, it would seem more logical to expect an incremental approach (at least if the system is working effectively and there is no intention from decision-makers to skew it towards another equilibrium). For example, consider how increased politicization of a PAS may result in skewing the flow of policy-relevant information towards the *Loyalty* dimension and away from *Voice*, such as is institutionalized in the American 'spoils system.' In a *Loyalty*-oriented PAS we are much more likely to find top-down decision-making strategies, which may favor prepackaged solutions and decision-based evidence making (Tingling and Brydon, 2010).

As the system further slides towards opportunism, the quality of the advice begins to suffer from toadyism and then the underpinning corruption of the system dramatically reduces the value of the information the decision-makers receive down to what we can think of a 'cronyistic shambles.' Weak information flows in general are a strong contributor to policy disasters across jurisdictions (Fagan 2023) and many examples of this phenomenon exist across history. A classic example was the 'filter' applied by cronies upon military intelligence information passed on to Hitler, which reflected not the full strategic and tactical situation, but what they believed the dictator wanted to hear (Donohue, 2018; Handel, 2003). Or, more recently, in the decline of the

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quality of advice received by the Trump administration in the US as loyalists replaced voice (Confessore and Vogel 2017).

Application at the Sectoral Level

It is also possible to disaggregate the functions above and measure how specific actors provide policy-relevant knowledge to the PAS on a sectoral basis. This would resemble Figure 4 below, where we could map not only the 'Hirschmanian' distribution of the quality of knowledge but also the relative weight of that advice and the proximity/distance of the actors providing it from the decision-makers in each sector.

**Figure 4. Description of a Potential PAS with Actors**

Figure 4 represents a 'healthy' sectoral PAS, with next to no opportunistic information and a limited exit dimension. This might represent the ideal Westminster model where provision of policy-relevant information was generally less diversified than it is today and with a predominance of 'insider' sources, specifically public servants (Craft and Halligan 2022).

These ideal types also exist at the sectoral level, although less obviously since their internal dynamics are less visible. Nevertheless, specific subfields can display different distributions of policy advice from the general model. Thus, for example, the PAS that underpins the efforts of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the Canadian federal government and administration to modernize the naval and air components of the CAF has slipped considerably towards the right side of the continuum as can be seen in Figure 7 (Howlett et al 2023; Migone et al 2022; 2023a).

This policy subfield suffers from a deep misalignment between the political vision of the government, which has increasingly pointed towards reduced expenses, an increased dual-use of the military and a political strategy of 'quiet neglect' of the needs of the military in terms of replacing key weapons systems on the one hand and the strategic approach of the CAF, which has tried to retain at least the bare-bone capacity needed to meet alliance and North American defense commitments on the other. Over the past two decades the political vision has progressively gained ascendancy and is now dominant, having all but marginalized the CAF perspective.

That is, a common problematic situation in a bureaucracy emerges when *Loyalty* dimension slips into sycophancy and the system does not provide the correct type of feedback to decision-makers, even if it falls short of devolving into rank opportunism and corruption. As Migone et al (2023a) have argued, Canadian military procurement programmes over the past three decades clearly illustrate these dynamics and effects: whereby a misalignment between the strategic outlook of the Canadian Armed Forces and various governments, both Liberal and Conservative,

driven by loyalists of each organization resulted in decade-long processes just to pick which platforms should replace aging frigates and jet fighters (Howlett et al 2023; Migone et al 2022, 2023a).

This situation showcased the faults of an advisory environment in which the default response was extreme *Loyalty* which followed a fair amount of *Exit.* The results have been dramatically insufficient: both naval and air forces in Canada are still struggling to replace their aging hardware, the costs have ballooned and in the face of multiple and very public promises for renewed capacity made by politicians still no new planes of frigates have been delivered at the end of two decades of planning and contracting (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. Skewed PAS in the Government of Canada for Military Procurement

Implications for Managing PAS Systems

These general and sectoral proclivities raise another important question, of course, concerning how, degenerated PAS can be avoided or corrected – that is, how a PAS can be *managed* (Marciano and Craft 2023).

Ideally, as we have seen, a virtuous Policy Advisory System should closely replicate the normal distribution with active *Voice* and not excessive *Exit*, *Loyalty* or any of the opportunistic dimensions raised above (Table 4). In such circumstances the quality of advice expected to be generated by the PAS may generally be thought of as well-rounded and multi-faceted, hence unlikely to succumb to faults such as groupthink, toadyism or corruption (Wray 2014). However, often this does not happen and many systems instead 'drift' over time towards Opportunism.

Changing and/or adding external actors, for example, can re-orient a degenerate system – thus explaining Anderson's (1998) claim that a healthy policy-research community outside government can (now) play a vital role in enriching public understanding and debate of policy issues and can serve as a natural complement to policy capacity within government. This diversity of views is important not in itself but because of how it reduces odds of degeneration in advice by encouraging *Voice* (See Figure 6 below). And, of course, efforts at preserving *Voice* in an existing system and discouraging *Exit* or misplaced *Loyalty* is also key.

In the Canadian sectoral case set out above, for example, it may be useful to think about 'resetting' the sources of policy advice within the CAF's procurement approach, perhaps by adding independent experts like academics, who may provide an alternative source of policy advice and evidence-based decision-making. Even if some of the literature sees the Canadian Armed Forces as suffering from a long-standing policy capacity gap – or perhaps from policy neglect – originating all the way back to the unification of the three services during the 1960s (Bland, 1990),

it has been shown that strategic visioning and capabilities-based planning was adopted by the CAF because of a lack of both political direction and strategic guidance (Hartfiel, 2010). Anecdotally, a substantial amount of internal advice appears to have been produced recently from the Chief of Defence Staff office, without much political input (Gosselin, 2008). Much of the external advice affecting Ottawa's choices appears to come from a relatively small subset of lobbyists and industry representatives (McDonald, 2020), and in practice the country still struggles with developing a solid military industry (Cimon, 2017).

This is not impossible, as has been shown with the emergence of the Italian government research institutes (GRIs) in an advisory role for what is a PAS with relatively low institutional capacity. In Italy, beyond the increased pluralization in the sources of advice, we find that the GRIs have replaced – or are at least supplementing – the traditional cabinet advisors beyond the classic political vs. technical lines of research, to include evidence-based advice, brokering and consultancy (Galanti and Lippi, 2023). The change from a highly politicized system (Lippi, 2012), which seems to have a predilection for legal and juridical forms of advice emerging from ministerial cabinets (Di Mascio and Natalini, 2016), to one where the GRIs hold increased relevance can be seen as a way to rebalance a skewed PAS system and to improve the overall quality of the advice.

Figure 6. Use of External Advice to Reorient a PAS' Skew

External advice

Skew towards opportunism

Dissent   **Toady**   **Corruption**

Exit   Disengagement   Silence   Voice   Loyalty   Opportunism

It is also possible to point at different types of attempts at diversifying the sources of policy advice that have emerged of late, for example the Kwanghwamun Citizensourcing Policy platform in South Korea relied on citizen-sourced ideas, thereby increasing not just the number of proposals, but also their legitimacy (Moon et al, 2023); something that may be rather useful when faced with 'wicked' problems. A similar concern with improving the quality of policy advice may be hiding behind the changes in the institutional logics of internal advisory systems in Germany (Veit et al, 2017), in the introduction of behavioural insights within the Danish public service as it went through its de-bureaucratization efforts (Laage-Thomsen, 2022), and of course failure to maintain an autonomous PAS can result in a 'vicious cycle' of policy advice where the repression, co-optation, and legitimation of the cycle of policy advice – the skewing of the system – can have very negative results (Bakir, 2023).

Conclusion: Modelling PAS Behaviour to Predict Behaviour and Inform PAS Management

Current research on PAS has focused on structure at the expense of considerations of content and, especially, the quality of advice provided.

As this article has argued, however, it is possible to build on the insights of earlier locational work and combine this with the insights of studies of organizational behaviour to arrive at a parsimonious but powerful explanation of PAS behaviour; one that translates directly into considerations around quality.

As the article has shown, a PAS in practice will often show one of the two skews highlighted above, and often an inertial propensity to devolve towards the most degenerated version possible: that of cronyistic opportunism if not outright corruption. Often, of course, existing mechanisms such as elections and changes in government prevent these worst-case scenarios from emerging by rotating elites and advisors in office although they are very apparent in regimes where such protections are lacking.

The application of our model to PAS has implications in two major areas: first the description of what an ideal configuration of a PAS looks like and why, and also how such an ideal distribution of policy-relevant advice can degenerate. This is accomplished through the development of an 'enhanced' model of advisor behaviour based on Hirschman's Exit, Voice, Loyalty scheme. The second is the discussion on how a government can correct or manage for these skews, a key topic in contemporary PAS research (Marciano and Craft 2023). Understanding of both topics benefits from the application of the model of PAS behaviour set out above.

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